Trim trailing whitespace. It doesn't match OpenSSL coding standards,
AFAICT, and it can cause problems with git tooling.
Trailing whitespace remains in test data and external source.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8092)
FreeBSD does not enable cryptodev(4) by default. OpenBSD disabled support
for /dev/crypto by default from 4.9 and removed it from 5.7. Now the engine
is properly enabled by default on BSD platforms (see #7885), it continuously
complains:
Could not open /dev/crypto: No such file or directory
Hide the nagging error message behind ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_DEBUG.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7896)
This is useful to determine the kernel driver running each algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
USE_SOFTDRIVERS: whether to use software (not accelerated) drivers
CIPHERS: list of ciphers to enable
DIGESTS: list of digests to enable
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Since each ioctl causes a context switch, slowing things down, if
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT is set, then:
- call the ioctl in digest_update, saving the result; and
- just copy the result in digest_final, instead of using another ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Digest must be able to do partial-state copy to be used.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Make CTR mode behave like a stream cipher.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
The engine needs a custom cipher context copy function to open a new
/dev/crypto session.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Close the session in digest_cleanup instead of digest_final. A failure
in closing the session does not mean a previous successful digest final
has failed as well.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
If the source ctx has not been initialized, don't initialize the copy
either.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Return failure when the digest_ctx is null in digest_update and
digest_final, and when md is null in digest_final.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Call functions to prepare methods after confirming that /dev/crytpo was
sucessfully open and that the destroy function has been set.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Previously, the API version limit was indicated with a numeric version
number. This was "natural" in the pre-3.0.0 because the version was
this simple number.
With 3.0.0, the version is divided into three separate numbers, and
it's only the major number that counts, but we still need to be able
to support pre-3.0.0 version limits.
Therefore, we allow OPENSSL_API_COMPAT to be defined with a pre-3.0.0
style numeric version number or with a simple major number, i.e. can
be defined like this for any application:
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=3
Since the pre-3.0.0 numerical version numbers are high, it's easy to
distinguish between a simple major number and a pre-3.0.0 numerical
version number and to thereby support both forms at the same time.
Internally, we define the following macros depending on the value of
OPENSSL_API_COMPAT:
OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
OPENSSL_API_1_0_0
OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
OPENSSL_API_3
They indicate that functions marked for deprecation in the
corresponding major release shall not be built if defined.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
If engine building fails for some reason, we must make sure to close
the /dev/crypto handle.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7506)
We opened /dev/crypto once for each session, which is quite unnecessary.
With this change, we open /dev/crypto once at engine init, and close
it on unload.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7506)
Copying an EVP_MD_CTX, including the implementation local bits, is a
necessary operation. In this case, though, it's the same as
initializing the local bits to be "copied to".
Fixes#7495
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7506)
We passed that ioctl a pointer to the whole session_op structure,
which wasn't quite right.
Notified by David Legault.
Fixes#7302
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7304)
Change all calls to getenv() inside libcrypto to use a new wrapper function
that use secure_getenv() if available and an issetugid then getenv if not.
CPU processor override flags are unchanged.
Extra checks for OPENSSL_issetugid() have been removed in favour of the
safe getenv.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7047)
The sense of the check for build-time support for most hashes was inverted.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6673)
These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
... to the check OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L, to correspond with
how it's declared.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6470)
Just because an engine implements algorithm methods, that doesn't mean
it also implements the ASN1 method. Therefore, be careful when looking
for an ASN1 method among all engines, don't try to use one that doesn't
exist.
Fixes#6381
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6383)
(cherry picked from commit 1ac3cd6277)
(cherry picked from commit 13b578ada3)
This patch fixes two issues in the ia32 RDRAND assembly code that result in a
(possibly significant) loss of entropy.
The first, less significant, issue is that, by returning success as 0 from
OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand() and OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed(), a subtle bias was introduced.
Specifically, because the assembly routine copied the remaining number of
retries over the result when RDRAND/RDSEED returned 'successful but zero', a
bias towards values 1-8 (primarily 8) was introduced.
The second, more worrying issue was that, due to a mixup in registers, when a
buffer that was not size 0 or 1 mod 8 was passed to OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes
or OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes, the last (n mod 8) bytes were all the same value.
This issue impacts only the 64-bit variant of the assembly.
This change fixes both issues by first eliminating the only use of
OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand, replacing it with OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes, and fixes the
register mixup in OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes. It also adds a sanity test for
OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes and OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes to help catch problems
of this nature in the future.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5342)
Conceptually, this is a squashed version of:
Revert "Address feedback"
This reverts commit 75551e07bd.
and
Revert "Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new"
This reverts commit ed6b2c7938.
But there were some intervening commits that made neither revert apply
cleanly, so instead do it all as one shot.
The crypto global locks were an attempt to cope with the awkward
POSIX semantics for pthread_atfork(); its documentation (the "RATIONALE"
section) indicates that the expected usage is to have the prefork handler
lock all "global" locks, and the parent and child handlers release those
locks, to ensure that forking happens with a consistent (lock) state.
However, the set of functions available in the child process is limited
to async-signal-safe functions, and pthread_mutex_unlock() is not on
the list of async-signal-safe functions! The only synchronization
primitives that are async-signal-safe are the semaphore primitives,
which are not really appropriate for general-purpose usage.
However, the state consistency problem that the global locks were
attempting to solve is not actually a serious problem, particularly for
OpenSSL. That is, we can consider four cases of forking application
that might use OpenSSL:
(1) Single-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL in the child (e.g.,
the child calls exec() immediately)
For this class of process, no locking is needed at all, since there is
only ever a single thread of execution and the only reentrancy is due to
signal handlers (which are themselves limited to async-signal-safe
operation and should not be doing much work at all).
(2) Single-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
The application must ensure that it does not fork() with an unexpected
lock held (that is, one that would get unlocked in the parent but
accidentally remain locked in the child and cause deadlock). Since
OpenSSL does not expose any of its internal locks to the application
and the application is single-threaded, the OpenSSL internal locks
will be unlocked for the fork(), and the state will be consistent.
(OpenSSL will need to reseed its PRNG in the child, but that is
an orthogonal issue.) If the application makes use of locks from
libcrypto, proper handling for those locks is the responsibility of
the application, as for any other locking primitive that is available
for application programming.
(3) Multi-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL after fork()
As for (1), the OpenSSL state is only relevant in the parent, so
no particular fork()-related handling is needed. The internal locks
are relevant, but there is no interaction with the child to consider.
(4) Multi-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
This is the case where the pthread_atfork() hooks to ensure that all
global locks are in a known state across fork() would come into play,
per the above discussion. However, these "calls into OpenSSL after
fork()" are still subject to the restriction to async-signal-safe
functions. Since OpenSSL uses all sorts of locking and libc functions
that are not on the list of safe functions (e.g., malloc()), this
case is not currently usable and is unlikely to ever be usable,
independently of the locking situation. So, there is no need to
go through contortions to attempt to support this case in the one small
area of locking interaction with fork().
In light of the above analysis (thanks @davidben and @achernya), go
back to the simpler implementation that does not need to distinguish
"library-global" locks or to have complicated atfork handling for locks.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4958)
This line will allow use private keys, which created by Crypto Pro, to
sign with OpenSSL.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4836)
Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
Names were not removed.
Some comments were updated.
Replace Andy's address with openssl.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4516)
cryptilib.h is the second.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
