The check for SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION is
inconsistent. Most places check SSL->options, one place is checking
SSL_CTX->options; fix that.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
GH: #3523
The return code from tls1_mac is supposed to be a boolean 0 for fail, 1 for
success. In one place we returned -1 on error. This would cause code calling
the mac function to erroneously see this as a success (because a non-zero
value is being treated as success in all call sites).
Fortunately, AFAICT, the place that returns -1 can only happen on an
internal error so is not under attacker control. Additionally this code only
appears in master. In 1.1.0 the return codes are treated differently.
Therefore there are no security implications.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3495)
We are quite inconsistent about which alerts get sent. Specifically, these
alerts should be used (normally) in the following circumstances:
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR = The peer sent a syntactically incorrect message
SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER = The peer sent a message which was syntactically
correct, but a parameter given is invalid for the context
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE = The peer's messages were syntactically and
semantically correct, but the parameters provided were unacceptable to us
(e.g. because we do not support the requested parameters)
SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR = We messed up (e.g. malloc failure)
The standards themselves aren't always consistent but I think the above
represents the best interpretation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3480)
An alert message is 2 bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 -
TLSv1.2 to fragment such alerts across multiple records (some of which
could be empty). In practice it make no sense to send an empty alert
record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3 prohibts this altogether and other
libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not support this at all. Supporting it adds
significant complexity to the record layer, and its removal is unlikely
to cause inter-operability issues.
The DTLS code for this never worked anyway and it is not supported at a
protocol level for DTLS. Similarly fragmented DTLS handshake records only
work at a protocol level where at least the handshake message header
exists within the record. DTLS code existed for trying to handle fragmented
handshake records smaller than this size. This code didn't work either so
has also been removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3476)
When using the -trace option with TLSv1.3 all records appear as "application
data". This adds the ability to see the inner content type too.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3408)
Add padding callback for application control
Standard block_size callback
Documentation and tests included
Configuration file/s_client/s_srver option
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3130)
We were allocating the write buffer based on the size of max_send_fragment,
but ignoring it when writing data. We should fragment handshake messages
if they exceed max_send_fragment and reject application data writes that
are too large.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
There was code existing which attempted to handle the case where application
data is received after a reneg handshake has started in SCTP. In normal DTLS
we just fail the connection if this occurs, so there doesn't seem any reason
to try and work around it for SCTP. In practice it didn't work properly
anyway and is probably a bad idea to start with.
Fixes#3251
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
If we have received the EoED message but not yet had the CF then we are
"in init". Despite that we still want to write application data, so suppress
the "in init" check in ssl3_write_bytes() in that scenario.
Fixes#3041
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3091)
If read_ahead is set, or SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY is used then if
SSL_read_early_data() hits an EndOfEarlyData message then it will
immediately retry automatically, but this time read normal data instead
of early data!
Fixes#3041
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3077)
Fix some comments too
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3069)
The end of early data is now indicated by a new handshake message rather
than an alert.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
Found using various (old-ish) versions of gcc.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2940)
The value of SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH normally includes the compression
overhead (even if no compression is negotiated for a connection). Except in
a build where no-comp is used the value of SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH does
not include the compression overhead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2872)
Also updates SSL_has_pending() to use it. This actually fixes a bug in
SSL_has_pending() which is supposed to return 1 if we have any processed
or unprocessed data sitting in OpenSSL buffers. However it failed to return
1 if we had processed non-application data pending.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2875)
We also skip any early_data that subsequently gets sent. Later commits will
process it if we can.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
We provide SSL_write_early() which *must* be called first on a connection
(prior to any other IO function including SSL_connect()/SSL_do_handshake()).
Also SSL_write_early_finish() which signals the end of early data.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
do_ssl3_write() was crashing when compression was enabled. We calculate
the maximum length that a record will be after compression and reserve
those bytes in the WPACKET. Unfortunately we were adding the maximum
compression overhead onto the wrong variable resulting in a corrupted
record.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2814)
- FLAT_INC
- PKCS1_CHECK (the SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK options have been
no-oped)
- PKCS_TESTVECT (debugging leftovers)
- SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME (unfinished feature)
- DTLS_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE (unfinished feature)
- USE_OBJ_MAC (note this removes a define from the public header but
very unlikely someone would be depending on it)
- SSL_FORBID_ENULL
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
This removes the fips configure option. This option is broken as the
required FIPS code is not available.
FIPS_mode() and FIPS_mode_set() are retained for compatibility, but
FIPS_mode() always returns 0, and FIPS_mode_set() can only be used to
turn FIPS mode off.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
There are a small number of functions in libssl that are internal only
and never used by anything.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2770)
Following on from CVE-2017-3733, this removes the OPENSSL_assert() check
that failed and replaces it with a soft assert, and an explicit check of
value with an error return if it fails.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in
a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS
(instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security
issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If s->s3->tmp.new_cipher is NULL then a crash can occur. This can happen
if an alert gets sent after version negotiation (i.e. we have selected
TLSv1.3 and ended up in tls13_enc), but before a ciphersuite has been
selected.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2575)
The record layer was making decisions that should really be left to the
state machine around unexpected handshake messages that are received after
the initial handshake (i.e. renegotiation related messages). This commit
removes that code from the record layer and updates the state machine
accordingly. This simplifies the state machine and paves the way for
handling other messages post-handshake such as the NewSessionTicket in
TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)
Remove duplicate defines from EVP source files.
Most of them were in evp.h, which is always included.
Add new ones evp_int.h
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK is now always defined in evp.h, so
remove conditionals on it
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2201)
