We now send the highest supported version by the client, even if the session
uses an older version.
This fixes 2 problems:
- When you try to reuse a session but the other side doesn't reuse it and
uses a different protocol version the connection will fail.
- When you're trying to reuse a session with an old version you might be
stuck trying to reuse the old version while both sides support a newer
version
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
GH: #852, MR: #2452
Use the new pipeline cipher capability to encrypt multiple records being
written out all in one go. Two new SSL/SSL_CTX parameters can be used to
control how this works: max_pipelines and split_send_fragment.
max_pipelines defines the maximum number of pipelines that can ever be used
in one go for a single connection. It must always be less than or equal to
SSL_MAX_PIPELINES (currently defined to be 32). By default only one
pipeline will be used (i.e. normal non-parallel operation).
split_send_fragment defines how data is split up into pipelines. The number
of pipelines used will be determined by the amount of data provided to the
SSL_write call divided by split_send_fragment. For example if
split_send_fragment is set to 2000 and max_pipelines is 4 then:
SSL_write called with 0-2000 bytes == 1 pipeline used
SSL_write called with 2001-4000 bytes == 2 pipelines used
SSL_write called with 4001-6000 bytes == 3 pipelines used
SSL_write_called with 6001+ bytes == 4 pipelines used
split_send_fragment must always be less than or equal to max_send_fragment.
By default it is set to be equal to max_send_fragment. This will mean that
the same number of records will always be created as would have been
created in the non-parallel case, although the data will be apportioned
differently. In the parallel case data will be spread equally between the
pipelines.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Disabled by default, but can be enabled by setting the
ct_validation_callback on a SSL or SSL_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Adapted from BoringSSL. Added a test.
The extension parsing code is already attempting to already handle this for
some individual extensions, but it is doing so inconsistently. Duplicate
efforts in individual extension parsing will be cleaned up in a follow-up.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
To enable heartbeats for DTLS, configure with enable-heartbeats.
Heartbeats for TLS have been completely removed.
This addresses RT 3647
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If init failed we'd like to set an error code to indicate that. But if
init failed then when the error system tries to load its strings its going
to fail again. We could get into an infinite loop. Therefore we just set
a single error the first time around. After that no error is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Previous commit 7bb196a71 attempted to "fix" a problem with the way
SSL_shutdown() behaved whilst in mid-handshake. The original behaviour had
SSL_shutdown() return immediately having taken no action if called mid-
handshake with a return value of 1 (meaning everything was shutdown
successfully). In fact the shutdown has not been successful.
Commit 7bb196a71 changed that to send a close_notify anyway and then
return. This seems to be causing some problems for some applications so
perhaps a better (much simpler) approach is revert to the previous
behaviour (no attempt at a shutdown), but return -1 (meaning the shutdown
was not successful).
This also fixes a bug where SSL_shutdown always returns 0 when shutdown
*very* early in the handshake (i.e. we are still using SSLv23_method).
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The DTLSv1_listen function exposed details of the underlying BIO
abstraction and did not properly allow for IPv6. This commit changes the
"peer" argument to be a BIO_ADDR and makes it a first class function
(rather than a ctrl) to ensure proper type checking.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Calling SSL_shutdown while in init previously gave a "1" response, meaning
everything was successfully closed down (even though it wasn't). Better is
to send our close_notify, but fail when trying to receive one.
The problem with doing a shutdown while in the middle of a handshake is
that once our close_notify is sent we shouldn't really do anything else
(including process handshake/CCS messages) until we've received a
close_notify back from the peer. However the peer might send a CCS before
acting on our close_notify - so we won't be able to read it because we're
not acting on CCS messages!
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Only two macros CRYPTO_MDEBUG and CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT to control this.
If CRYPTO_MDEBUG is not set, #ifdef out the whole debug machinery.
(Thanks to Jakob Bohm for the suggestion!)
Make the "change wrapper functions" be the only paradigm.
Wrote documentation!
Format the 'set func' functions so their paramlists are legible.
Format some multi-line comments.
Remove ability to get/set the "memory debug" functions at runtme.
Remove MemCheck_* and CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init macros.
Add CRYPTO_mem_debug(int flag) function.
Add test/memleaktest.
Rename CRYPTO_malloc_init to OPENSSL_malloc_init; remove needless calls.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Also tweak some of the code in demos/bio, to enable interactive
testing of BIO_s_accept's use of SSL_dup. Changed the sconnect
client to authenticate the server, which now exercises the new
SSL_set1_host() function.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The protocol selection code is now consolidated in a few consecutive
short functions in a single file and is table driven. Protocol-specific
constraints that influence negotiation are moved into the flags
field of the method structure. The same protocol version constraints
are now applied in all code paths. It is now much easier to add
new protocol versions without reworking the protocol selection
logic.
In the presence of "holes" in the list of enabled client protocols
we no longer select client protocols below the hole based on a
subset of the constraints and then fail shortly after when it is
found that these don't meet the remaining constraints (suiteb, FIPS,
security level, ...). Ideally, with the new min/max controls users
will be less likely to create "holes" in the first place.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The following entry points have been made async aware:
SSL_accept
SSL_read
SSL_write
Also added is a new mode - SSL_MODE_ASYNC. Calling the above functions with
the async mode enabled will initiate a new async job. If an async pause is
encountered whilst executing the job (such as for example if using SHA1/RSA
with the Dummy Async engine), then the above functions return with
SSL_WANT_ASYNC. Calling the functions again (with exactly the same args
as per non-blocking IO), will resume the job where it left off.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
There are lots of calls to EVP functions from within libssl There were
various places where we should probably check the return value but don't.
This adds these checks.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Rebuild error source files: the new mkerr.pl functionality will now
pick up and translate static function names properly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Previously each message specific process function would create its own
PACKET structure. Rather than duplicate all of this code lots of times we
should create it in the state machine itself.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Implement all of the necessary changes to make DTLS on the server work
with the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Implement all of the necessary changes for moving TLS server side
processing into the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Split the TLS server ssl3_get_* and ssl3_send_* functions into two ready
for the migration to the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Move all DTLS client side processing into the new state machine code. A
subsequent commit will clean up the old dead code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Create a dtls_get_message function similar to the old dtls1_get_message but
in the format required for the new state machine code. The old function will
eventually be deleted in later commits.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The new state machine code will split up the reading and writing of
hanshake messages into discrete phases. In order to facilitate that the
existing "get" type functions will be split into two halves: one to get
the message and one to process it. The "send" type functions will also have
all work relating to constructing the message split out into a separate
function just for that. For some functions there will also be separate
pre and post "work" phases to prepare or update state.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This is the first drop of the new state machine code.
The rewrite has the following objectives:
- Remove duplication of state code between client and server
- Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS
- Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location
so that it is easier to validate
- Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions
- Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid
transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues
where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something
else)
- Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better
understand each)
- message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the
event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a
message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc
- handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now
- Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all
the state changes local to a file
This builds on previous state machine related work:
- Surface CCS processing in the state machine
- Version negotiation rewrite
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The function ssl3_get_message gets a whole message from the underlying bio
and returns it to the state machine code. The new state machine code will
split this into two discrete steps: get the message header and get the
message body. This commit splits the existing function into these two
sub steps to facilitate the state machine implementation.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The existing implementation of DTLSv1_listen() is fundamentally flawed. This
function is used in DTLS solutions to listen for new incoming connections
from DTLS clients. A client will send an initial ClientHello. The server
will respond with a HelloVerifyRequest containing a unique cookie. The
client the responds with a second ClientHello - which this time contains the
cookie.
Once the cookie has been verified then DTLSv1_listen() returns to user code,
which is typically expected to continue the handshake with a call to (for
example) SSL_accept().
Whilst listening for incoming ClientHellos, the underlying BIO is usually in
an unconnected state. Therefore ClientHellos can come in from *any* peer.
The arrival of the first ClientHello without the cookie, and the second one
with it, could be interspersed with other intervening messages from
different clients.
The whole purpose of this mechanism is as a defence against DoS attacks. The
idea is to avoid allocating state on the server until the client has
verified that it is capable of receiving messages at the address it claims
to come from. However the existing DTLSv1_listen() implementation completely
fails to do this. It attempts to super-impose itself on the standard state
machine and reuses all of this code. However the standard state machine
expects to operate in a stateful manner with a single client, and this can
cause various problems.
A second more minor issue is that the return codes from this function are
quite confused, with no distinction made between fatal and non-fatal errors.
Most user code treats all errors as non-fatal, and simply retries the call
to DTLSv1_listen().
This commit completely rewrites the implementation of DTLSv1_listen() and
provides a stand alone implementation that does not rely on the existing
state machine. It also provides more consistent return codes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anon DH ciphersuite with the
value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur. This commits adds a test to
reject p, g and pub key parameters that have a 0 value (in accordance with
RFC 5246)
The security vulnerability only affects master and 1.0.2, but the fix is
additionally applied to 1.0.1 for additional confidence.
CVE-2015-1794
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
make errors wants things in a different order to the way things are
currently defined in the header files. The easiest fix is to just let it
reorder it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.
Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
c0bf69a791
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Remove RFC2712 Kerberos support from libssl. This code and the associated
standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Add SSL_use_certiicate_chain file functions: this is works the same
way as SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file but for an SSL structure.
Update SSL_CONF code to use the new function.
Update docs.
Update ordinals.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
