Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
The previous 2 commits moved supported groups and ciphers out of the
session object to avoid race conditions. We now also move ecpointformats
for consistency. There does not seem to be a race condition with access
to this data since it is only ever set in a non-resumption handshake.
However, there is no reason for it to be in the session.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9176)
Similarly to the previous commit we were storing the peer offered list
of ciphers in the session. In practice there is no need for this
information to be avilable from one resumption to the next since this
list is specific to a particular handshake. Since the session object is
supposed to be immutable we should not be updating it once we have decided
to resume. The solution is to remove the session list out of the session
object.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9176)
In TLSv1.3 the supported groups can be negotiated each time a handshake
occurs, regardless of whether we are resuming or not. We should not store
the supported groups information in the session because session objects
can be shared between multiple threads and we can end up with race
conditions. For most users this won't be seen because, by default, we
use stateless tickets in TLSv1.3 which don't get shared. However if you
use SSL_OP_NO_TICKET (to get stateful tickets in TLSv1.3) then this can
happen.
The answer is to move the supported the supported group information into
the SSL object instead.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9176)
In particular, adhere to the rule that we must not modify any
property of an SSL_SESSION object once it is (or might be) in
a session cache. Such modifications are thread-unsafe and have
been observed to cause crashes at runtime.
To effect this change, standardize on the property that
SSL_SESSION->ext.hostname is set only when that SNI value
has been negotiated by both parties for use with that session.
For session resumption this is trivially the case, so only new
handshakes are affected.
On the client, the new semantics are that the SSL->ext.hostname is
for storing the value configured by the caller, and this value is
used when constructing the ClientHello. On the server, SSL->ext.hostname
is used to hold the value received from the client. Only if the
SNI negotiation is successful will the hostname be stored into the
session object; the server can do this after it sends the ServerHello,
and the client after it has received and processed the ServerHello.
This obviates the need to remove the hostname from the session object
in case of failed negotiation (a change that was introduced in commit
9fb6cb810b in order to allow TLS 1.3
early data when SNI was present in the ClientHello but not the session
being resumed), which was modifying cached sessions in certain cases.
(In TLS 1.3 we always produce a new SSL_SESSION object for new
connections, even in the case of resumption, so no TLS 1.3 handshakes
were affected.)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)
Implement support for stateful TLSv1.3 tickets, and use them if
SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
An alpn_selected value containing NUL bytes in it will result in
ext.alpn_selected_len having a larger value than the number of bytes
allocated in ext.alpn_selected.
Issue found by OSS-fuzz.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6507)
If the remove_session_cb accesses the session's data (for instance,
via SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version), a potential use after free
can occur. For this, consider the following scenario when adding
a new session via SSL_CTX_add_session:
- The session cache is full
(SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
- Only the session cache has a reference to ctx->session_cache_tail
(that is, ctx->session_cache_tail->references == 1)
Since the cache is full, remove_session_lock is called to remove
ctx->session_cache_tail from the cache. That is, it
SSL_SESSION_free()s the session, which free()s the data. Afterwards,
the free()d session is passed to the remove_session_cb. If the callback
accesses the session's data, we have a use after free.
The free before calling the callback behavior was introduced in
commit e4612d02c5 ("Remove sessions
from external cache, even if internal cache not used.").
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6222)
We generate the secrets based on the nonce immediately so there is no
need to keep the nonce.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6415)
Don't call the decrypt ticket callback if we've already encountered a
fatal error. Do call it if we have an empty ticket present.
Change the return code to have 5 distinct returns codes and separate it
from the input status value.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
This removes some code because we cannot trace the original contributor
to get their agreement for the licence change (original commit e03ddfae).
After this change there will be numerous failures in the test cases until
someone rewrites the missing code.
All *_free functions should accept a NULL parameter. After this change
the following *_free functions will fail if a NULL parameter is passed:
BIO_ACCEPT_free()
BIO_CONNECT_free()
BN_BLINDING_free()
BN_CTX_free()
BN_MONT_CTX_free()
BN_RECP_CTX_free()
BUF_MEM_free()
COMP_CTX_free()
ERR_STATE_free()
TXT_DB_free()
X509_STORE_free()
ssl3_free()
ssl_cert_free()
SSL_SESSION_free()
SSL_free()
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5757)
Since the public and private DRBG are per thread we don't need one
per ssl object anymore. It could also try to get entropy from a DRBG
that's really from an other thread because the SSL object moved to an
other thread.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
If the server is configured to allow early data then we check if the PSK
session presented by the client is available in the cache or not. If it
isn't then this may be a replay and we disallow it. If it is then we allow
it and remove the session from the cache. Note: the anti-replay protection
is not used for externally established PSKs.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
Conceptually in TLSv1.3 there can be multiple sessions associated with a
single connection. Each NewSessionTicket issued can be considered a
separate session. We can end up issuing multiple NewSessionTickets on a
single connection at the moment (e.g. in a post-handshake auth scenario).
Each of those issued tickets should have the new_session_cb called, it
should go into the session cache separately and it should have a unique
id associated with it (so that they can be found individually in the
cache).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
These functions are similar to SSL_CTX_set_cookie_{generate,verify}_cb,
but used for the application-controlled portion of TLS1.3 stateless
handshake cookies rather than entire DTLSv1 cookies.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5463)
Adds application data into the encrypted session ticket
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3802)
It is expected that SSL_CTX objects are shared across threads,
and as such we are responsible for ensuring coherent data accesses.
Aligned integer accesses ought to be atomic already on all supported
architectures, but we can be formally correct.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).
In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.
If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.
Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
Removed e_os.h from all bar three headers (apps/apps.h crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h and
ssl/ssl_locl.h).
Added e_os.h into the files that need it now.
Directly reference internal/nelem.h when required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
A condition was removed by commit 1053a6e2281d; presumably it was an
unintended change. Restore the previous behavior so the get_session_cb
won't be called with zero-length session ID.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4236)
Give each SSL object it's own DRBG, chained to the parent global
DRBG which is used only as a source of randomness into the per-SSL
DRBG. This is used for all session, ticket, and pre-master secret keys.
It is NOT used for ECDH key generation which use only the global
DRBG. (Doing that without changing the API is tricky, if not impossible.)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4050)
The comment "The following should not return 1, otherwise, things
are very strange" is from the very first commit of OpenSSL. The
really meaning of the comment is if the identical session can be
found from internal cache after calling get_session_cb but not
found before calling get_session_cb, it is just strange.
The value 1 was originated from the old doc of SSLeay, reversed
from the actual return value of SSL_CTX_add_session().
Anyway either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session() should not
interrupt the session resumption process. So the checking of
return value of SSL_CTX_add_session() is not necessary.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4014)
This just adds the processing for sending and receiving the newly added
ticket_nonce field. It doesn't actually use it yet.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3852)
Properly copy ext.alpn_session in ssl_session_dup()
Use OPENSSL_strndup() as that's used in ssl_asn1.c
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3770)
Code was added in commit b3c31a65 that overwrote the last ex_data value
using CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() causing a memory leak, and potentially
confusing the ex_data dup() callback.
In ssl_session_dup(), fix error handling (properly reference and up-ref
shared data) and new-up the ex_data before calling CRYPTO_dup_ex_data();
all other structures that dup ex_data have the destination ex_data new'd
before the dup.
Fix up some of the ex_data documentation.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3323)
We are quite inconsistent about which alerts get sent. Specifically, these
alerts should be used (normally) in the following circumstances:
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR = The peer sent a syntactically incorrect message
SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER = The peer sent a message which was syntactically
correct, but a parameter given is invalid for the context
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE = The peer's messages were syntactically and
semantically correct, but the parameters provided were unacceptable to us
(e.g. because we do not support the requested parameters)
SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR = We messed up (e.g. malloc failure)
The standards themselves aren't always consistent but I think the above
represents the best interpretation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3480)
Provide a way to test whether the SSL_SESSION object can be used to resume a
sesion or not.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3008)
This move prepares for the later addition of the new custom extensions
API. The context codes have an additional "SSL_" added to their name to
ensure we don't have name clashes with other applications.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3139)
