Commit graph

18351 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Andy Polyakov
652c52a602 80-test_pkcs12.t: skip the test on Windows with non-Greek locale.
Test doesn't work on Windows with non-Greek locale, because of
Win32 perl[!] limitation, not OpenSSL. For example it passes on
Cygwin and MSYS...

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 21:05:04 +01:00
David Benjamin
2338ad8885 Fix math in BN_bn2dec comment.
The bound on log(2)/3 on the second line is incorrect and has an extra
zero compared to the divisions in the third line. log(2)/3 = 0.10034...
which is bounded by 0.101 and not 0.1001. The divisions actually
correspond to 0.101 which is fine. The third line also dropped a factor
of three.

The actual code appears to be fine. Just the comments are wrong.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 20:37:58 +01:00
Rob Percival
fa515410aa SCT_set_source resets validation_status
This makes it consistent with all of the other SCT setters.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 20:31:03 +01:00
Rob Percival
eb96e8b5fd Document that o2i_SCT_signature can leave the SCT in an inconsistent state
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 20:23:28 +01:00
Rob Percival
63e27d4d0f Removes {i2o,o2i}_SCT_signature from the CT public API
They may return if an SCT_signature struct is added in the future that
allows them to be refactored to conform to the i2d/d2i function signature
conventions.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 20:23:28 +01:00
Rob Percival
986dbbbeff Prevent double-free of CTLOG public key
Previously, if ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey failed, public_key would be freed by
CTLOG_free at the end of the function, and then again by the caller (who
would assume ownership was not transferred when CTLOG_new returned NULL).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 20:17:14 +01:00
Rob Percival
cdb2a60347 Internalizes SCT_verify and removes SCT_verify_v1
SCT_verify is impossible to call through the public API (SCT_CTX_new() is
not part of the public API), so rename it to SCT_CTX_verify and move it
out of the public API.

SCT_verify_v1 is redundant, since SCT_validate does the same verification
(by calling SCT_verify) and more. The API is less confusing with a single
verification function (SCT_validate).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 20:12:25 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
5579eab9ef Update fuzz corpora
This is a new minimal corpus with the following changes:
- asn1: files: 1135 (+474), tuples: 27236 (+7496)
- asn1parse: files: 305 (-3), tuples: 8758 (+11)
- bignum: files: 370 (-1), tuples: 9547 (+10)
- bndiv: files: 160 (+0), tuples: 2416 (+6)
- cms: files: 155 (-1), tuples: 3408 (+0)
- conf: files: 231 (-11), tuples: 4668 (+3)
- crl: files: 905 (+188), tuples: 22876 (+4096)
- ct: files: 117 (+35), tuples: 3557 (+908)
- x509: files: 920, tuples: 28334

Note that tuple count depends on the binary and is random.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 20:01:54 +01:00
FdaSilvaYY
0fe9123687 Constify a bit X509_NAME_get_entry
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 11:47:22 +02:00
FdaSilvaYY
9f5466b9b8 Constify some X509_NAME, ASN1 printing code
ASN1_buf_print, asn1_print_*, X509_NAME_oneline, X509_NAME_print

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 11:47:22 +02:00
FdaSilvaYY
bf9d5e483d Constify some input parameters.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 11:47:22 +02:00
FdaSilvaYY
a026fbf977 Constify some inputs buffers
remove useless cast to call ASN1_STRING_set

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 11:47:22 +02:00
FdaSilvaYY
35da893f86 Constify ASN1_PCTX_*
... add a static keyword.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 11:47:22 +02:00
Matt Caswell
61884b8140 Fix bio_enc_test
There was a block of code at the start that used the Camellia cipher. The
original idea behind this was to fill the buffer with non-zero data so that
oversteps can be detected. However this block failed when using no-camellia.
This has been replaced with a RAND_bytes() call.

I also updated the the CTR test section, since it seems to be using a CBC
cipher instead of a CTR cipher.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 09:24:29 +01:00
Matt Caswell
8b7c51a0e4 Add some sanity checks when checking CRL scores
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
c6231e9c7b Remove some dead code
The assignment to ret is dead, because ret is assigned again later.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
a36c5eabf5 Sanity check an ASN1_object_size result
If it's negative don't try and malloc it.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b197257d71 Check for error return from ASN1_object_size
Otherwise we try to malloc a -1 size.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
4d94bd362d Check for malloc error in bn_x931p.c
Ensure BN_CTX_get() has been successful

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
4162c7d378 Fix mem leak on error path
The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
85d6b09dda Fix mem leak on error path
The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
c72b8e069d Fix mem leak on error path
The mem pointed to by tmp can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
030648cea9 Ensure the mime_hdr_free function can handle NULLs
Sometimes it is called with a NULL pointer

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
2b201c5c9d Ensure CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free behaves properly with a NULL arg
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Matt Caswell
2f3930bc0e Fix leak on error in tls_construct_cke_gost
Don't leak pke_ctx on error.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-08-23 00:19:15 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
b1b22b0b77 Test the support curves in tls
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1472
2016-08-22 22:13:04 +02:00
FdaSilvaYY
2d87ee6825 Closing output file from inside the loop who open it
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #1471
2016-08-22 21:32:04 +02:00
Matt Caswell
1c55e372b9 Fix no-des
The PKCS12 command line utility is not available if no-des is used.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 16:39:28 +01:00
Rich Salz
464d59a5bb RT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1
Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err.
Add a test case.
Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 11:25:12 -04:00
Richard Levitte
a66234bc86 Configure: Properly cache the configured compiler command
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 16:12:42 +02:00
Kazuki Yamaguchi
0110a47036 Fix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters()
The variable 'buffer', allocated by EC_POINT_point2buf(), isn't
free'd on the success path.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 15:10:03 +01:00
Kazuki Yamaguchi
9ba6f347fe Expose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERS
Declare EC{PK,}PARAMETERS_{new,free} functions in public headers. The
free functions are necessary because EC_GROUP_get_ec{pk,}parameters()
was made public by commit 60b350a3ef ("RT3676: Expose ECgroup i2d
functions").

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 15:10:02 +01:00
FdaSilvaYY
fb2141c773 Fix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC context
Code was relying on an implicit data-sharing through duplication of
loopargs_t pointer-members made by ASYNC_start_job().

Now share structure address instead of structure content.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 15:03:51 +01:00
Richard Levitte
0038ad480b Avoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variables
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 15:36:35 +02:00
Richard Levitte
599e5904b2 Make 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new'
The following would fail, or rather, freeze:

    openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048
    openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem

In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request
from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating
something new.  This changes makes it fully flagged.

RT#4655

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 15:28:00 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
3ba1ef829c bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.
Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then
touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because
if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted
stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would
upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages,
touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at
least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to
overstep the guard page.

Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal
instructions in some VM setups.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 14:58:32 +02:00
Matt Caswell
fe34735c19 Choose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" options
The previous ciphersuite broke in no-ec builds.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 13:52:02 +01:00
Kazuki Yamaguchi
099e2968ed Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()
Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f33
("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()").

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 13:38:48 +01:00
Richard Levitte
1c288878af ssltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't
In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the
stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value.  The
compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it
to be picky.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 14:02:31 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
1194ea8dc3 crypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password.
Originally PKCS#12 subroutines treated password strings as ASCII.
It worked as long as they were pure ASCII, but if there were some
none-ASCII characters result was non-interoperable. But fixing it
poses problem accessing data protected with broken password. In
order to make asscess to old data possible add retry with old-style
password.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 13:52:59 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
b799aef863 crypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 13:52:55 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
70bf33d182 Add PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 13:52:51 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
9e6b2f54e4 crypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 13:50:04 +02:00
Matt Caswell
5cb4d6466a Prevent DTLS Finished message injection
Follow on from CVE-2016-2179

The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw.

This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling
code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to
the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its
own.

The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject
a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is
assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to
receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e
where the client receives the injected Finished message).

The MITM requires the following capabilities:
- The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it
is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages.
- The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client
- The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server

The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client
will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first
fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message,
with the second fragment containing the final byte.

During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM
injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing
all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence
number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message.

OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and
will buffer it for later use.

After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in
two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be
dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments
and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM
fragment and the final byte from the real client.

The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that
this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g.
the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in
advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of
the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished
message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in
256 of such injection attempts will succeed.

It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such
that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client
authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will
include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed
portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so
the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the
whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding
would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As
this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker
knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will
send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process
of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the
modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means
that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be
correct in all cases.

In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack
against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed
against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified
handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection.
Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message
injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL.
The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size
that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message
will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not
have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited
if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate
Finished message injection flaw.

The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 10:53:55 +01:00
Matt Caswell
f5c7f5dfba Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.

The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.

However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.

Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.

So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.

An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.

I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.

A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.

The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.

Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.

As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.

Issue reported by Quan Luo.

CVE-2016-2179

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 10:53:55 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5dfd03812c Fix enable-zlib
The enable-zlib option was broken by the recent "const" changes.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 09:43:13 +01:00
Richard Levitte
68a39960a7 VMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files
Most of the time, this isn't strictly needed.  However, in the default
extern model (called relaxed refdef), symbols are treated as weak
common objects unless they are initialised.  The librarian doesn't
include weak symbols in the (static) libraries, which renders them
invisible when linking a program with said those libraries, which is a
problem at times.

Using the strict refdef model is much more like standard C on all
other platforms, and thereby avoid the issues that come with the
relaxed refdef model.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-08-22 10:10:59 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e6ed2b9108 Add test/bio_enc_test.c.
RT#4628

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-08-21 23:34:26 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
c1a7dcbe16 evp/bio_enc.c: refine non-overlapping logic.
RT#4628

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-08-21 23:34:12 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
2e929e538c ecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-08-21 22:16:48 +02:00