Add support for Linux TLS offload in the BIO layer
and specifically in bss_sock.c.
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5253)
Introduce a compatability layer that exposes the required structures
and constants for supporting ktls.
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5253)
Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
wipe it if there was no actual error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The existing tsan_counter() API increments a reference counter.
Provide a new API, tsan_decr(), to decrement such a reference counter.
This can be used, for example, when a reference is added to the session_ctx's
sess_accept stats but should more properly be tracked in the regular ctx's
statistics.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7464)
Change all calls to getenv() inside libcrypto to use a new wrapper function
that use secure_getenv() if available and an issetugid then getenv if not.
CPU processor override flags are unchanged.
Extra checks for OPENSSL_issetugid() have been removed in favour of the
safe getenv.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7047)
Relax memory_order on counter decrement itself, because mutable
members of the reference-counted structure should be visible on all
processors independently on counter. [Even re-format and minimize
dependency on other headers.]
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6900)
Goal here is to facilitate writing "thread-opportunistic" code that
withstands Thread Sanitizer's scrutiny. "Thread-opportunistic" is when
exact result is not required, e.g. some statistics, or execution flow
doesn't have to be unambiguous.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6786)
Run `make update ERROR_REBUILD=-rebuild` to remove some stale error
codes for SM2 (which is now using its own submodule for error codes,
i.e., `SM2_*`).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
The GOST engine needs to be loaded before we initialise libssl. Otherwise
the GOST ciphersuites are not enabled. However the SSL conf module must
be loaded before we initialise libcrypto. Otherwise we will fail to read
the SSL config from a config file properly.
Another problem is that an application may make use of both libcrypto and
libssl. If it performs libcrypto stuff first and OPENSSL_init_crypto()
is called and loads a config file it will fail if that config file has
any libssl stuff in it.
This commit separates out the loading of the SSL conf module from the
interpretation of its contents. The loading piece doesn't know anything
about SSL so this can be moved to libcrypto. The interpretation of what it
means remains in libssl. This means we can load the SSL conf data before
libssl is there and interpret it when it later becomes available.
Fixes#5809
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5818)
Fixes#4403
This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.
Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
The introduction of thread local public and private DRBG instances (#5547)
makes it very cumbersome to change the reseeding (time) intervals for
those instances. This commit provides a function to set the default
values for all subsequently created DRBG instances.
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
unsigned int master_reseed_interval,
unsigned int slave_reseed_interval,
time_t master_reseed_time_interval,
time_t slave_reseed_time_interval
);
The function is intended only to be used during application initialization,
before any threads are created and before any random bytes are generated.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5576)
In PR #5295 it was decided that the locking api should remain private
and used only inside libcrypto. However, the locking functions were added
back to `libcrypto.num` by `mkdef.pl`, because the function prototypes
were still listed in `internal/rand.h`. (This header contains functions
which are internal, but shared between libcrypto and libssl.)
This commit moves the prototypes to `rand_lcl.h` and changes the names
to lowercase, following the convention therein. It also corrects an
outdated documenting comment.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5375)
The NIST standard presents two alternative ways for seeding the
CTR DRBG, depending on whether a derivation function is used or not.
In Section 10.2.1 of NIST SP800-90Ar1 the following is assessed:
The use of the derivation function is optional if either an
approved RBG or an entropy source provides full entropy output
when entropy input is requested by the DRBG mechanism.
Otherwise, the derivation function shall be used.
Since the OpenSSL DRBG supports being reseeded from low entropy random
sources (using RAND_POOL), the use of a derivation function is mandatory.
For that reason we change the default and replace the opt-in flag
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF with an opt-out flag RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
This change simplifies the RAND_DRBG_new() calls.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
The functions drbg_setup() and drbg_cleanup() used to duplicate a lot of
code from RAND_DRBG_new() and RAND_DRBG_free(). This duplication has been
removed, which simplifies drbg_setup() and makes drbg_cleanup() obsolete.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
This commit adds three new accessors to the internal DRBG lock
int RAND_DRBG_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
int RAND_DRBG_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
int RAND_DRBG_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
The three shared DRBGs are intended to be used concurrently, so they
have locking enabled by default. It is the callers responsibility to
guard access to the shared DRBGs by calls to RAND_DRBG_lock() and
RAND_DRBG_unlock().
All other DRBG instances don't have locking enabled by default, because
they are intendended to be used by a single thread. If it is desired,
locking can be enabled by using RAND_DRBG_enable_locking().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
If such a timer/counter register is not available, the return value is always
zero. This matches the assembly implementations' behaviour.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)
This comment was correct for the original commit introducing this
function (5a3d21c058), but was fixed
in commit d2fa182988 (and
67b8bcee95)
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
GH: #4975
Every DRBG now supports automatic reseeding not only after a given
number of generate requests, but also after a specified time interval.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
A third shared DRBG is added, the so called master DRBG. Its sole purpose
is to reseed the two other shared DRBGs, the public and the private DRBG.
The randomness for the master DRBG is either pulled from the os entropy
sources, or added by the application using the RAND_add() call.
The master DRBG reseeds itself automatically after a given number of generate
requests, but can also be reseeded using RAND_seed() or RAND_add().
A reseeding of the master DRBG is automatically propagated to the public
and private DRBG. This construction fixes the problem, that up to now
the randomness provided by RAND_add() was added only to the public and
not to the private DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
Switch to make it return an uint32_t instead of the various different
types it returns now.
Fixes: #3125
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #4757
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API
and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when
the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular,
RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed
on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API'
and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues,
introducing the following changes:
- Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which
facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback.
- Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the
get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by
RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
- Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG
in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current
state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller
provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding.
- Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll()
(namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based
on rand_drbg_restart().
- Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy
source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
Use atomic operations for the counters
Rename malloc_lock to memdbg_lock
Also fix some style errors in mem_dbg.c
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4359)
Removed e_os.h from all bar three headers (apps/apps.h crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h and
ssl/ssl_locl.h).
Added e_os.h into the files that need it now.
Directly reference internal/nelem.h when required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
The one creating the DRBG should instantiate it, it's there that we
know which parameters we should use to instantiate it.
This splits the rand init in two parts to avoid a deadlock
because when the global drbg is created it wands to call
rand_add on the global rand method.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #4268
The DRBG callbacks 'get_entropy()' and 'cleanup_entropy()' are designed
in such a way that the randomness buffer does not have to be allocated
by the calling function. It receives the address of a dynamically
allocated buffer from get_entropy() and returns this address to
cleanup_entropy(), where it is freed. If these two calls are properly
paired, the address can be stored in a stack local variable of the
calling function, so there is no need for having a 'randomness' member
(and a 'filled' member) in 'RAND_DRBG'.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
The guard was checked but never defined. Also, rename it to reflect
that this is an internal header file, not a public one.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4254)
The socket stuff for DJGPP and VMS was only partially moved to
include/internal/sockets.h...
Remains vxWorks.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4254)
Remove GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS and osslargused.
Move socket-related things to new file internal/sockets.h; this is now
only needed by four(!!!) files. Compiles should be a bit faster.
Remove USE_SOCKETS ifdef's
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4209)
