In plain PSK we don't need to do anymore construction after the preamble.
We weren't detecting this case and treating it as an unknown cipher.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
WPACKET_allocate_bytes() requires you to know the size of the data you
are allocating for, before you create it. Sometimes this isn't the case,
for example we know the maximum size that a signature will be before we
create it, but not the actual size. WPACKET_reserve_bytes() enables us to
reserve bytes in the WPACKET, but not count them as written yet. We then
subsequently need to acall WPACKET_allocate_bytes to actually count them as
written.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This was a temporary function needed during the conversion to WPACKET. All
callers have now been converted to the new way of doing this so this
function is no longer required.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Some functions were being called from both code that used WPACKETs and code
that did not. Now that more code has been converted to use WPACKETs some of
that duplication can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
If we have a handshake fragment waiting then dtls1_read_bytes() was not
correctly setting the value of recvd_type, leading to an uninit read.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Before loading a key from an engine, it may need to be initialized.
When done loading the key, we must de-initialize the engine.
(if the engine is already initialized somehow, only the reference
counter will be incremented then decremented)
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
When I said before that s_client "used to work in 1.0.2" that was only
partly true. It worked for engines which provided a default generic
method for some key type, because it called ENGINE_set_default() and
that ended up being an implicit initialisation and functional refcount.
But an engine which doesn't provide generic methods doesn't get initialised,
and then when you try to use it you get an error:
cannot load client certificate private key file from engine
140688147056384:error:26096075:engine routines:ENGINE_load_private_key:not initialised:crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c:66:
unable to load client certificate private key file
cf. https://github.com/OpenSC/libp11/issues/107 (in which we discover
that engine_pkcs11 *used* to provide generic methods that OpenSSL would
try to use for ephemeral DH keys when negotiating ECDHE cipher suites in
TLS, and that didn't work out very well.)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1639)
This used to work in 1.0.2 but disappeared when the argument parsing was
revamped.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1639)
Add update for testing renegotiation. Also change info on CTLOG_FILE
environment variable - which always seems to be required.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The TLSProxy::Record->new call hard-codes a version, like
70-test_sslrecords.t.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This is a regression test for
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1431. It tests a
maximally-padded record with each possible invalid offset.
This required fixing a bug in Message.pm where the client sending a
fatal alert followed by close_notify was still treated as success.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
A mem leak could occur on an error path. Also the mempacket BIO_METHOD
needs to be cleaned up, because of the newly added DTLS test.
Also fixed a double semi-colon in ssltestlib.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The buffer to receive messages is initialised to 16k. If a message is
received that is larger than that then the buffer is "realloc'd". This can
cause the location of the underlying buffer to change. Anything that is
referring to the old location will be referring to free'd data. In the
recent commit c1ef7c97 (master) and 4b390b6c (1.1.0) the point in the code
where the message buffer is grown was changed. However s->init_msg was not
updated to point at the new location.
CVE-2016-6309
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
If we request more bytes to be allocated than double what we have already
written, then we grow the buffer by the wrong amount.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
We actually construct a HelloVerifyRequest in two places with common code
pulled into a single function. This one commit handles both places.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
If the underlying BUF_MEM gets realloc'd then the pointer returned could
become invalid. Therefore we should always ensure that the allocated
memory is filled in prior to any more WPACKET_* calls.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an
infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and
never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in
a Denial Of Service attack.
CVE-2016-6305
GitHub Issue #1563
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a
mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested
NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore
the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious
server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As
this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not
occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable.
Issue reported by Shi Lei.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
OCSP_RESPID was made opaque in 1.1.0, but no accessors were provided for
setting the name/key value for the OCSP_RESPID.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.
CVE-2016-6304
Issue reported by Shi Lei.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
