The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c427570e50)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
This commit is for the 1.0.2 changes
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c84351)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 63eab8a620)
and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some
new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to
know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the
link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous
DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 59669b6abf)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_both.c
The client sends a session ID with the session ticket, and uses
the returned ID to detect resumption, so we do not need to peek
at handshake messages: s->hit tells us explicitly if we're resuming.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
407886f589cf2dbaed82db0a44173036c3bc3317.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 980bc1ec61)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
The supported signature algorithms extension needs to be processed before
the certificate to use is decided and before a cipher is selected (as the
set of shared signature algorithms supported may impact the choice).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
see RT #3203
Future versions of OpenSSL use the canonical terms "ECDHE" and "DHE"
as configuration strings and compilation constants. This patch
introduces aliases so that the stable 1.0.2 branch can be
forward-compatible with code and configuration scripts that use the
normalized terms, while avoiding changing any library output for
stable users.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Support separate parse and add callback arguments.
Add new callback so an application can free extension data.
Change return value for send functions so < 0 is an error 0
omits extension and > 0 includes it. This is more consistent
with the behaviour of other functions in OpenSSL.
Modify parse_cb handling so <= 0 is an error.
Make SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext argument
order consistent.
NOTE: these changes WILL break existing code.
Remove (now inaccurate) in line documentation.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33f653adf3)
Use "parse" and "add" for function and callback names instead of
"first" and "second".
Change arguments to callback so the extension type is unsigned int
and the buffer length is size_t. Note: this *will* break existing code.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de2a9e38f3)
Reject attempts to use extensions handled internally.
Add flags to each extension structure to indicate if an extension
has been sent or received. Enforce RFC5246 compliance by rejecting
duplicate extensions and unsolicited extensions and only send a
server extension if we have sent the corresponding client extension.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 28ea0a0c6a)
Use the same structure for client and server custom extensions.
Add utility functions in new file t1_ext.c.
Use new utility functions to handle custom server and client extensions
and remove a lot of code duplication.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ecf4d66090)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_lib.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Move custom extension structures from SSL_CTX to CERT structure.
This change means the form can be revised in future without binary
compatibility issues. Also since CERT is part of SSL structures
so per-SSL custom extensions could be supported in future as well as
per SSL_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b83294fe30)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_cert.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Don't call internal functions directly call them through
SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on
Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions
from shared libraries.
By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile
time option "enable-unit-test".
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fc7961c4)
Conflicts:
ssl/heartbeat_test.c
ssl/ssl.h
util/mkdef.pl
SRP ciphersuites do not have no authentication. They have authentication
based on SRP. Add new SRP authentication flag and cipher string.
(cherry picked from commit a86b88acc373ac1fb0ca709a5fb8a8fa74683f67)
If multiple TLS extensions are expected but not received, the TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks are the only chance for the receive-side to trigger a specific TLS alert during the handshake.
Removed logic which no-op'd TLS extension generate callbacks (as the generate callbacks need to always be called in order to trigger alerts), and updated the serverinfo-specific custom TLS extension callbacks to track which custom TLS extensions were received by the client, where no-ops for 'generate' callbacks are appropriate.
(cherry picked from commit ac20719d99)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
Removed prior audit proof logic - audit proof support was implemented using the generic TLS extension API
Tests exercising the new supplemental data registration and callback api can be found in ssltest.c.
Implemented changes to s_server and s_client to exercise supplemental data callbacks via the -auth argument, as well as additional flags to exercise supplemental data being sent only during renegotiation.
(cherry picked from commit 36086186a9)
Conflicts:
Configure
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/ssltest.c
New ctrl sets current certificate based on certain criteria. Currently
two options: set the first valid certificate as current and set the
next valid certificate as current. Using these an application can
iterate over all certificates in an SSL_CTX or SSL structure.
(cherry picked from commit 0f78819c8c)
PR#3169
This patch, which currently applies successfully against master and
1_0_2, adds the following functions:
SSL_[CTX_]select_current_cert() - set the current certificate without
disturbing the existing structure.
SSL_[CTX_]get0_chain_certs() - get the current certificate's chain.
SSL_[CTX_]clear_chain_certs() - clear the current certificate's chain.
The patch also adds these functions to, and fixes some existing errors
in, SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod.
(cherry picked from commit 2f56c9c015dbca45379c9a725915b3b8e765a119)
Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.
This is a forward-port of commits:
4af793036ff4c93b46ed3da721dac92583270191
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
Check for Suite B support using method flags instead of version numbers:
anything supporting TLS 1.2 cipher suites will also support Suite B.
Return an error if an attempt to use DTLS 1.0 is made in Suite B mode.
(cherry picked from commit 4544f0a691)
Add correct flags for DTLS 1.2, update s_server and s_client to handle
DTLS 1.2 methods.
Currently no support for version negotiation: i.e. if client/server selects
DTLS 1.2 it is that or nothing.
(cherry picked from commit c3b344e36a)
Conflicts:
apps/s_server.c
Use the enc_flags field to determine whether we should use explicit IV,
signature algorithms or SHA256 default PRF instead of hard coding which
versions support each requirement.
(cherry picked from commit cbd64894ec)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Revise DTLS code. There was a *lot* of code duplication in the
DTLS code that generates records. This makes it harder to maintain and
sometimes a TLS update is omitted by accident from the DTLS code.
Specifically almost all of the record generation functions have code like
this:
some_pointer = buffer + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH;
... Record creation stuff ...
set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL_MT_SOMETHING, message_len);
...
write_handshake_message(ssl);
Where the "Record creation stuff" is identical between SSL/TLS and DTLS or
in some cases has very minor differences.
By adding a few fields to SSL3_ENC to include the header length, some flags
and function pointers for handshake header setting and handshake writing the
code can cope with both cases.
(cherry picked from commit 173e72e64c)
Kludge alert. This is arranged by passing padding length in unused
bits of SSL3_RECORD->type, so that orig_len can be reconstructed.
(cherry picked from commit 8bfd4c659f)
We have to use EVP in FIPS mode so we can only partially mitigate
timing differences.
Make an extra call to EVP_DigestSignUpdate to hash additonal blocks
to cover any timing differences caused by removal of padding.
(cherry picked from commit b908e88ec1)
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
(cherry picked from commit e130841bcc)
client hello message. Previously this could only be retrieved on an initial
connection and it was impossible to determine the cipher IDs of any uknown
ciphersuites.
(backport from HEAD)
