/* ssl/t1_enc.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG # include #endif /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, int sec_len, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, unsigned char *out, int olen) { int chunk; size_t j; EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init; EVP_PKEY *mac_key; unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t A1_len; int ret = 0; chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); if (!mac_key) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) goto err; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init)) goto err; if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) goto err; if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) goto err; if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) goto err; if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) goto err; if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; for (;;) { /* Reinit mac contexts */ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) goto err; if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx)) goto err; if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) goto err; if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) goto err; if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) goto err; if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) goto err; if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) goto err; if (olen > chunk) { if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j)) goto err; out += j; olen -= j; /* calc the next A1 value */ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; } else { /* last one */ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; memcpy(out, A1, olen); break; } } ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init); OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1)); return ret; } /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, const unsigned char *sec, int slen, unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen) { int len, i, idx, count; const unsigned char *S1; long m; const EVP_MD *md; int ret = 0; /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ count = 0; for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++; } if(!count) { /* Should never happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } len = slen / count; if (count == 1) slen = 0; S1 = sec; memset(out1, 0, olen); for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { if (!md) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); goto err; } if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1), seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, out2, olen)) goto err; S1 += len; for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) { out1[i] ^= out2[i]; } } } ret = 1; err: return ret; } static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, unsigned char *tmp, int num) { int ret; ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num); #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t", s->session->master_key_length); { int i; for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) { fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]); } fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ return ret; } int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) { static const unsigned char empty[] = ""; unsigned char *p, *mac_secret; unsigned char *exp_label; unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv; int client_write; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; const EVP_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const SSL_COMP *comp; #endif const EVP_MD *m; int mac_type; int *mac_secret_size; EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; EVP_PKEY *mac_key; int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl; int reuse_dd = 0; is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression; #endif #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which); fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp); fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c); fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n", c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len); fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); { int i; for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; else s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) reuse_dd = 1; else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) goto err; else /* * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); dd = s->enc_read_ctx; mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->expand != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand = NULL; } if (comp != NULL) { s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); if (s->expand == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); goto err2; } if (!RECORD_LAYER_setup_comp_buffer(&s->rlayer)) goto err; } #endif /* * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); } else { if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; else s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) reuse_dd = 1; else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; dd = s->enc_write_ctx; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); if (!mac_ctx) goto err; s->write_hash = mac_ctx; } else mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->compress != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress = NULL; } if (comp != NULL) { s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); if (s->compress == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); goto err2; } } #endif /* * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); } if (reuse_dd) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd); p = s->s3->tmp.key_block; i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ? cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl; /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; else k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { ms = &(p[0]); n = i + i; key = &(p[n]); n += j + j; iv = &(p[n]); n += k + k; exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST; exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; client_write = 1; } else { n = i; ms = &(p[n]); n += i + j; key = &(p[n]); n += j + k; iv = &(p[n]); n += k; exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST; exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; client_write = 0; } if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i); if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, *mac_secret_size); EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key); EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which); { int z; for (z = 0; z < i; z++) printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } #endif if (is_export) { /* * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value * since only the correct one will be used :-). */ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), exp_label, exp_label_len, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) goto err2; key = tmp1; if (k > 0) { if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2)) goto err2; if (client_write) iv = iv1; else iv = &(iv1[k]); } } #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG { int i; fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n"); fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= "); for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= "); for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } } else { if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } } /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO if (s->msg_callback) { int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0; if (*mac_secret_size) s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC, mac_secret, *mac_secret_size, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (c->key_len) s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY, key, c->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (k) { if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV; else wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV; s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } } #endif #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which); { int z; for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\niv="); { int z; for (z = 0; z < k; z++) printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2)); return (1); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: return (0); } int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *c; const EVP_MD *hash; int num; SSL_COMP *comp; int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; int ret = 0; #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) return (1); if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp, SSL_USE_ETM(s))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); return (0); } s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c; s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash; s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); num *= 2; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num; s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1; if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(p1); goto err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("client random\n"); { int z; for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("server random\n"); { int z; for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("master key\n"); { int z; for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } #endif if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num)) goto err; #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("\nkey block\n"); { int z; for (z = 0; z < num; z++) printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } #endif if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { /* * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; #endif } } ret = 1; err: if (p2) { OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num); OPENSSL_free(p2); } return (ret); } int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) { unsigned int ret; EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL; int i; if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return 0; for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) { d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; break; } } if (!d) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); return 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return ((int)ret); } int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) { int hashlen; unsigned char hash[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char buf2[12]; if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return 0; hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash)); if (hashlen == 0) return 0; if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, out, buf2, sizeof buf2)) return 0; OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2)); return sizeof buf2; } int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len) { unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p, len); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int hashlen; /* If we don't have any digests cache records */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { /* * keep record buffer: this wont affect client auth because we're * freezing the buffer at the same point (after client key * exchange and before certificate verify) */ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; if(!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return -1; } hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash)); #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen); #endif tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen); } else { tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); } OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff); #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO if (s->msg_callback) { s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER, s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } #endif #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); } int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context) { unsigned char *buff; unsigned char *val = NULL; size_t vallen, currentvalpos; int rv; #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); if (buff == NULL) goto err2; /* * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label. */ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; if (use_context) { vallen += 2 + contextlen; } val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); if (val == NULL) goto err2; currentvalpos = 0; memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen); currentvalpos += llen; memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; if (use_context) { val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; currentvalpos++; val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; currentvalpos++; if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); } } /* * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow */ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, out, buff, olen); OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen); OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen); #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ goto ret; err1: SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); rv = 0; goto ret; err2: SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); rv = 0; ret: if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff); if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val); return (rv); } int tls1_alert_code(int code) { switch (code) { case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return (-1); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); default: return (-1); } }