/* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # include # include # ifdef _WIN32 # include # include # define stat _stat # define chmod _chmod # define open _open # define fdopen _fdopen # define fstat _fstat # define fileno _fileno # endif #endif /* * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback... */ # if !defined(S_ISREG) # define S_ISREG(m) ((m) & S_IFREG) # endif #define RAND_BUF_SIZE 1024 #define RFILE ".rnd" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically) * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what. We know that * stdio functions return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it). * * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89 */ static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) = (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen; # define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS \ "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0" # define openssl_fopen(fname, mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS) #endif /* * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c If |bytes| is * -1 read the complete file; otherwise read the specified amount. */ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) { /* * The load buffer size exceeds the chunk size by the comfortable amount * of 'RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH' bytes (not bits!). This is done on purpose * to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such * a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk * (unless it's the only one). */ #define RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE (RAND_BUF_SIZE + RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH) unsigned char buf[RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO struct stat sb; #endif int i, n, ret = 0; FILE *in; if (bytes == 0) return 0; if ((in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb")) == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); return -1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); fclose(in); return -1; } if (bytes < 0) { if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) bytes = sb.st_size; else bytes = RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH; } #endif /* * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here. * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning * temporarily. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma environment save # pragma message disable maylosedata2 #endif /* * Don't buffer, because even if |file| is regular file, we have * no control over the buffer, so why would we want a copy of its * contents lying around? */ setbuf(in, NULL); #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma environment restore #endif for ( ; ; ) { if (bytes > 0) n = (bytes <= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE) ? (int)bytes : RAND_BUF_SIZE; else n = RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE; i = fread(buf, 1, n, in); #ifdef EINTR if (ferror(in) && errno == EINTR){ clearerr(in); if (i == 0) continue; } #endif if (i == 0) break; RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i); ret += i; /* If given a bytecount, and we did it, break. */ if (bytes > 0 && (bytes -= i) <= 0) break; } OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); fclose(in); if (!RAND_status()) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); return -1; } return ret; } int RAND_write_file(const char *file) { unsigned char buf[RAND_BUF_SIZE]; int ret = -1; FILE *out = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO struct stat sb; if (stat(file, &sb) >= 0 && !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_NOT_A_REGULAR_FILE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); return -1; } #endif /* Collect enough random data. */ if (RAND_priv_bytes(buf, (int)sizeof(buf)) != 1) return -1; #if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \ !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) { # ifndef O_BINARY # define O_BINARY 0 # endif /* * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions * should be restrictive from the start */ int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600); if (fd != -1) out = fdopen(fd, "wb"); } #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent * rand file in a concurrent use situation. */ out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+"); #endif if (out == NULL) out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb"); if (out == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); return -1; } #if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) /* * Yes it's late to do this (see above comment), but better than nothing. */ chmod(file, 0600); #endif ret = fwrite(buf, 1, RAND_BUF_SIZE, out); fclose(out); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, RAND_BUF_SIZE); return ret; } const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size) { char *s = NULL; size_t len; int use_randfile = 1; #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) DWORD envlen; WCHAR *var; /* Look up various environment variables. */ if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"RANDFILE", NULL, 0)) == 0) { use_randfile = 0; if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"HOME", NULL, 0)) == 0 && (envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"USERPROFILE", NULL, 0)) == 0) envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"SYSTEMROOT", NULL, 0); } /* If we got a value, allocate space to hold it and then get it. */ if (envlen != 0) { int sz; WCHAR *val = _alloca(envlen * sizeof(WCHAR)); if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, envlen) < envlen && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { s = _alloca(sz); if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz, NULL, NULL) == 0) s = NULL; } } #else if ((s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL || *s == '\0') { use_randfile = 0; s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME"); } #endif #ifdef DEFAULT_HOME if (!use_randfile && s == NULL) s = DEFAULT_HOME; #endif if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') return NULL; len = strlen(s); if (use_randfile) { if (len + 1 >= size) return NULL; strcpy(buf, s); } else { if (len + 1 + strlen(RFILE) + 1 >= size) return NULL; strcpy(buf, s); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS strcat(buf, "/"); #endif strcat(buf, RFILE); } return buf; }