/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 #include #endif #include static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) { if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return(SSLv3_server_method()); else return(NULL); } IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; /* init things to blank */ s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); if (s->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); return(-1); } for (;;) { state=s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->new_session=1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server=1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); if ((s->version>>8) != 3) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { BUF_MEM_free(buf); ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_buf=buf; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_num=0; s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* Server attempting to renegotiate with * client that doesn't support secure * renegotiation. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ret = -1; goto end; } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, * we will just send a HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: s->state=SSL_ST_OK; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->new_session = 2; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; } #else if (s->hit) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ /* normal PSK or KRB5 */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) { ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ) /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key * even when forbidden by protocol specs * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to * be able to handle this) */ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; else s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or * RSA but we have a sign only certificate * * PSK: may send PSK identity hints * * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange * message only if the cipher suite is either * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the * server certificate contains the server's * public key for key exchange. */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity * hint if provided */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) #endif || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ) ) ) ) { ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ ((s->session->peer != NULL) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts * and in RFC 2246): */ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && /* ... except when the application insists on verification * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) /* With normal PSK Certificates and * Certificate Requests are omitted */ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { /* no cert request */ skip=1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #endif s->init_num=0; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: /* This code originally checked to see if * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO * and then flushed. This caused problems * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING * still exist. So instead we just flush * unconditionally. */ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; else { if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } s->init_num=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when * the client sends its ECDH pub key in * a certificate, the CertificateVerify * message is not sent. * Also for GOST ciphersuites when * the client uses its key from the certificate * for key exchange. */ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; } else { int offset=0; int dgst_num; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num=0; /* We need to get hashes here so if there is * a client cert, it can be verified * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify * should be generalized. But it is next step */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return -1; for (dgst_num=0; dgst_nums3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { int dgst_size; s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); if (dgst_size < 0) { ret = -1; goto end; } offset+=dgst_size; } } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; #else if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; #endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret= -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; else s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; /* remove buffering on output */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num=0; if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ { /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ s->new_session=0; ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; /* s->server=1; */ s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); } ret = 1; goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret= -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state=s->state; s->state=state; cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); s->state=new_state; } } skip=0; } end: /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ s->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); return(ret); } int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=4; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, * so permit appropriate message length */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per * negotiation. */ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); return -1; } /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; } #endif s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; return 2; } return 1; } int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; unsigned int cookie_len; long n; unsigned long id; unsigned char *p,*d,*q; SSL_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; #endif STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, * This down switching should be handled by a different method. * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with * TLSv1. */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } s->first_packet=1; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->first_packet=0; d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; p+=2; if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ s->version = s->client_version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't * contain one, just return since we do not want to * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); if (cookie_length == 0) return 1; } /* load the client random */ memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* get the session-id */ j= *(p++); s->hit=0; /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with * an earlier library version) */ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) goto err; } else { i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ s->hit=1; } else if (i == -1) goto err; else /* i == 0 */ { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) goto err; } } p+=j; if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* cookie stuff */ cookie_len = *(p++); /* * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it * does not cause an overflow. */ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { /* too much data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } ret = 2; } p += cookie_len; } n2s(p,i); if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) { /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) { /* not enough data */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) == NULL)) { goto err; } p+=i; /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) { j=0; id=s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i=0; iid == id) { j=1; break; } } /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade * attack: CVE-2010-4180. */ #if 0 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not * enabled, though. */ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { s->session->cipher = c; j = 1; } } #endif if (j == 0) { /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher * list if we are asked to reuse it */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); goto f_err; } } /* compression */ i= *(p++); if ((p+i) > (d+n)) { /* not enough data */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q=p; for (j=0; j= i) { /* no compress */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions*/ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) { /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } } if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ { unsigned long Time; unsigned char *pos; Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ pos=s->s3->server_random; l2n(Time,pos); if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->hit=1; s->session->ciphers=ciphers; s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; ciphers=NULL; /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (pref_cipher == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; if (s->cipher_list) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); } } #endif /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ /* Can't disable compression */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed compression method */ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); if (comp_id == comp->id) { s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; break; } } if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { if (q[m] == comp_id) break; } if (m >= i) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); goto f_err; } } else if (s->hit) comp = NULL; else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { /* See if we have a match */ int m,nn,o,v,done=0; nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); for (m=0; mctx->comp_methods,m); v=comp->id; for (o=0; os3->tmp.new_compression=comp; else comp=NULL; } #else /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } #endif /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must * pick a cipher */ if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth=0; #else s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; #endif if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers=ciphers; if (ciphers == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); goto f_err; } ciphers=NULL; c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (c == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { sk=s->session->ciphers; for (i=0; ialgorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) nc=c; if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) ec=c; } if (nc != NULL) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; else if (ec != NULL) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; else s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; } else #endif s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; } if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } /* we now have the following setup. * client_random * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers * compression - basically ignored right now * ssl version is set - sslv3 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. * s->hit - session reuse flag * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } } #endif if (ret < 0) ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } err: if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return(ret); } int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; int i,sl; unsigned long l; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT unsigned long Time; #endif if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT p=s->s3->server_random; /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ l2n(Time,p); if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) return -1; #endif /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[4]); *(p++)=s->version>>8; *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length * session-id if we want it to be single use. * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. * * We also have an additional case where stateless session * resumption is successful: we always send back the old * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality * is unaffected. */ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit) s->session->session_id_length=0; sl=s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } *(p++)=sl; memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); p+=sl; /* put the cipher */ i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); p+=i; /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++)=0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++)=0; else *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); return -1; } if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } #endif /* do the header */ l=(p-d); d=buf; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; l2n3(l,d); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=4; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; int j,num; RSA *rsa; unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned int u; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char *p,*d; int al,i; unsigned long type; int n; CERT *cert; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4],kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; cert=s->cert; buf=s->init_buf; r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; n=0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (type & SSL_kRSA) { rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if(rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } RSA_up_ref(rsa); cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; } if (rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } r[0]=rsa->n; r[1]=rsa->e; s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (type & SSL_kEDH) { dhp=cert->dh_tmp; if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if (dhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } else { dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } r[0]=dh->p; r[1]=dh->g; r[2]=dh->pub_key; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { const EC_GROUP *group; ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); } if (ecdhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ if (ecdhp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto err; } /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH * keys over named (not generic) curves. For * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. */ if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key. * First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. * In this situation, we need four additional bytes * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams * structure. */ n = 4 + encodedlen; /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs */ r[0]=NULL; r[1]=NULL; r[2]=NULL; r[3]=NULL; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_kPSK) { /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); n+=2+nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); } else { pkey=NULL; kn=0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[4]); for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { s2n(nr[i],p); BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); p+=nr[i]; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by * the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy((unsigned char*)p, (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_kPSK) { /* copy PSK identity hint */ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); } #endif /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) * and p points to the space at the end. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { q=md_buf; j=0; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, (unsigned int *)&i); q+=i; j+=i; } if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); goto err; } s2n(u,p); n+=u+2; } else #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { /* lets do DSS */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; } else #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { /* let's do ECDSA */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; } else #endif { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; l2n3(n,d); /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num=n+4; s->init_off=0; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(-1); } int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int i,j,nl,off,n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { buf=s->init_buf; d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); d[0]=n; p+=n; n++; off=n; p+=2; n+=2; sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl=0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i=0; idata[4+n]); if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { s2n(j,p); i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); n+=2+j; nl+=2+j; } else { d=p; i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; n+=j; nl+=j; } } } /* else no CA names */ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); s2n(nl,p); d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; l2n3(n,d); /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num=n+4; s->init_off=0; #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->init_num += 4; #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { int i,al,ok; long n; unsigned long alg_k; unsigned char *p; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa=NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH BIGNUM *pub=NULL; DH *dh_srvr; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, /* ??? */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int decrypt_len; unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; size_t j; /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should * be sent already */ if (rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); goto f_err; } } else { pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; if ( (pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; } /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } else p-=2; } else n=i; } /* * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the * bound is sufficient to be safe. */ if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the * case that the decrypt fails. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); ERR_clear_error(); /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks * are done in constant time and are treated like any other * decryption error. */ version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8)); version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff)); /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not * support the requested protocol version. If * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { unsigned char workaround_good; workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8)); workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff)); version_good |= workaround_good; } /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good * to remain non-zero (0xff). */ decrypt_good &= version_good; /* * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees * it is still sufficiently large to read from. */ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], rand_premaster_secret[j]); } s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } else { p-=2; i=(int)n; } } if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); goto f_err; } else { if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } else dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; } pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); if (pub == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); BN_clear_free(pub); goto err; } DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; BN_clear_free(pub); pub=NULL; s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,p,i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; krb5_data enc_ticket; krb5_data authenticator; krb5_data enc_pms; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; int padl, outl; krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; krb5_ticket_times ttimes; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); n2s(p,i); enc_ticket.length = i; if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; p+=enc_ticket.length; n2s(p,i); authenticator.length = i; if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } authenticator.data = (char *)p; p+=authenticator.length; n2s(p,i); enc_pms.length = i; enc_pms.data = (char *)p; p+=enc_pms.length; /* Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption */ if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + enc_pms.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, &kssl_err)) != 0) { #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); if (kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will return authtime == 0. */ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); if (kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); goto err; } #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); if (enc == NULL) goto err; memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } outl += padl; if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of * the protocol version. * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pms, outl); if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) { s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); } } /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, ** but it caused problems for apache. ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; */ } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) { int ret = 1; int field_size = 0; const EC_KEY *tkey; const EC_GROUP *group; const BIGNUM *priv_key; /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Let's get server private key and group information */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) { /* use the certificate */ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; } else { /* use the ephermeral values we saved when * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. */ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Let's get client's public key */ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (n == 0L) { /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { /* XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication using ECDH certificates * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is * never executed. When that support is * added, we ought to ensure the key * received in the certificate is * authorized for key agreement. * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that * the two ECDH shares are for the same * group. */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); goto f_err; } if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ } else { /* Get client's public key from encoded point * in the ClientKeyExchange message. */ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Get encoded point length */ i = *p; p += 1; if (n != 1 + i) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer * currently, so set it to the start */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; } /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); if (field_size <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; /* Compute the master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); return (ret); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { unsigned char *t = NULL; unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; int psk_err = 1; char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto psk_err; } if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto psk_err; } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); goto psk_err; } /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity * string for the callback */ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } else if (psk_len == 0) { /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; goto psk_err; } /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; t = psk_or_pre_ms; memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); s2n(psk_len, t); memset(t, 0, psk_len); t+=psk_len; s2n(psk_len, t); if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); psk_err = 0; psk_err: OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_err != 0) goto f_err; } else #endif if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; size_t outlen=32, inlen; unsigned long alg_a; int Ttag, Tclass; long Tlen; /* Get our certificate private key*/ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use * a client certificate for authorization only. */ client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (client_pub_pkey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) ERR_clear_error(); } /* Decrypt session key */ if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } start = p; inlen = Tlen; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } /* Generate master secret */ s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) ret = 2; else ret = 1; gerr: EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); if (ret) return ret; else goto err; } else { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto f_err; } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) err: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif return(-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; unsigned char *p; int al,ok,ret=0; long n; int type=0,i,j; X509 *peer; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->session->peer != NULL) { peer=s->session->peer; pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); } else { peer=NULL; pkey=NULL; } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } ret=1; goto end; } if (peer == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare * signature without length field */ if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) { i=64; } else { n2s(p,i); n-=2; if (i > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } } j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { unsigned char signature[64]; int idx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); if (i!=64) { fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); } for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; } j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); if (j<=0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; goto f_err; } ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } end: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return(ret); } int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) { int i,ok,al,ret= -1; X509 *x=NULL; unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; const unsigned char *p,*q; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } n2l3(p,llen); if (llen+3 != n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } for (nc=0; nc llen) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q=p; x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (p != (q+l)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x=NULL; nc+=l+3; } if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } } else { i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); if (i <= 0) { al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); goto f_err; } } if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL * when we arrive here. */ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ sk=NULL; ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } err: if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); return(ret); } int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) { unsigned long l; X509 *x; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); if (x == NULL) { /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(0); } } l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); if (!l) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(0); } s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; s->init_num=(int)l; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; int len, slen; unsigned int hlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is * too long */ if (slen > 0xFF00) return -1; /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) return -1; senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); if (!senc) return -1; p = senc; i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; /* Skip message length for now */ p += 3; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present * it does all the work otherwise use generated values * from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { OPENSSL_free(senc); return -1; } } else { RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); p += len; EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); p += len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ p += 4; s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num= len; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; s->init_off=0; OPENSSL_free(senc); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { unsigned char *p; /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) return -1; p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; /* message length */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); /* status type */ *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; /* length of OCSP response */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); /* actual response */ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; s->init_off = 0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #endif