/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b); static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver) { if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return(SSLv3_client_method()); else return(NULL); } IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method) int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf=NULL; unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we * already got and don't await it anymore, because * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; s->tlsext_hb_seq++; } #endif for (;;) { state=s->state; switch(s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->renegotiate=1; s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; /* break */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: s->server=0; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_buf=buf; buf=NULL; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } /* setup buffing BIO */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; } /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num=0; /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ if (s->bbio != s->wbio) s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio); break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { /* receive renewed session ticket */ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; } #endif } else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* The server hello indicated that * an audit proof would follow. */ if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised) s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A; else #endif s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; } s->init_num=0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B: ret = tls1_get_server_supplemental_data(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; s->init_num = 0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ret=ssl3_check_finished(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { s->hit = 1; if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; } #endif /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */ /* or PSK */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num=0; /* at this point we check that we have the * required stuff from the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } } #endif if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert * sent back */ /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. * We need to skip the certificate verify * message when client's ECDH public key is sent * inside the client certificate. */ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; } else { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; } if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; } s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; #else if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; #endif s->init_num=0; s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth=0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) s->session->compress_meth=0; else s->session->compress_meth= s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { ret= -1; goto end; } break; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; /* clear flags */ s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; if (s->hit) { s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) { s->state=SSL_ST_OK; s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0; } } else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else #endif s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->init_num=0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; else s->state=SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->init_buf != NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; } /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, * remove the buffering now */ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ s->init_num=0; s->renegotiate=0; s->new_session=0; ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; ret=1; /* s->server=0; */ s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret= -1; goto end; /* break; */ } /* did we do anything */ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state=s->state; s->state=state; cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1); s->state=new_state; } } skip=0; } end: s->in_handshake--; if (buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(buf); if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret); return(ret); } int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; int i; unsigned long Time,l; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int j; SSL_COMP *comp; #endif buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT !sess->session_id_length || #else (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || #endif (sess->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) goto err; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p=s->s3->client_random; Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ l2n(Time,p); if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) goto err; /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[4]); /* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can * choke if we initially report a higher version then * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports * 1.0. * * Possible scenario with previous logic: * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret * containing version 1.0. * * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. */ #if 0 *(p++)=s->version>>8; *(p++)=s->version&0xff; s->client_version=s->version; #else *(p++)=s->client_version>>8; *(p++)=s->client_version&0xff; #endif /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* Session ID */ if (s->new_session) i=0; else i=s->session->session_id_length; *(p++)=i; if (i != 0) { if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i); p+=i; } /* Ciphers supported */ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH /* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2 */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; #endif s2n(i,p); p+=i; /* COMPRESSION */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++)=1; #else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) j=0; else j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); *(p++)=1+j; for (i=0; ictx->comp_methods,i); *(p++)=comp->id; } #endif *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions*/ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #endif l=(p-d); d=buf; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; l2n3(l,d); s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *p,*d; int i,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ok; unsigned int j; long n; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, /* ?? */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return 1; } else /* already sent a cookie */ { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } } if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1]; al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } p+=2; /* load the server hello data */ /* load the server random */ memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* get the session-id */ j= *(p++); if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j); } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0) { if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length)) { /* actually a client application bug */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto f_err; } s->hit=1; } else /* a miss or crap from the other end */ { /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ s->hit=0; if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) { goto f_err; } } s->session->session_id_length=j; memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */ } p+=j; c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); if (c == NULL) { /* unknown cipher */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */ if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c); if (i < 0) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->session->cipher) s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { /* Workaround is now obsolete */ #if 0 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)) #endif { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; /* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for * client authentication. */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) goto f_err; /* lets get the compression algorithm */ /* COMPRESSION */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (*(p++) != 0) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } #else j= *(p++); if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } if (j == 0) comp=NULL; else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); goto f_err; } else comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j); if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } else { s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions*/ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto err; } #endif if (p != (d+n)) { /* wrong packet length */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); goto f_err; } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) { int al,i,ok,ret= -1; unsigned long n,nc,llen,l; X509 *x=NULL; const unsigned char *q,*p; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; SESS_CERT *sc; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } n2l3(p,llen); if (llen+3 != n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } for (nc=0; nc llen) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q=p; x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l); if (x == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto f_err; } if (q != (p+l)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x=NULL; nc+=l+3; p=q; } i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ) { al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ sc=ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (sc == NULL) goto err; if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); s->session->sess_cert=sc; sc->cert_chain=sk; /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); sk=NULL; /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x); /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) ? 0 : 1; #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x); printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey)); printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) { x=NULL; al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey); if (need_cert && i < 0) { x=NULL; al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (need_cert) { sc->peer_cert_type=i; CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); /* Why would the following ever happen? * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x; sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); if (s->session->peer != NULL) X509_free(s->session->peer); CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); s->session->peer=x; } else { sc->peer_cert_type=i; sc->peer_key= NULL; if (s->session->peer != NULL) X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer=NULL; } s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; x=NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* Check the audit proof. */ if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb) { ret = s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb_arg); if (ret <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_INVALID_AUDIT_PROOF); goto f_err; } } #endif ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); return(ret); } int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; #endif EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; unsigned char *param,*p; int al,i,j,param_len,ok; long n,alg_k,alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; int curve_nid = 0; int encoded_pt_len = 0; #endif /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems later.*/ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) { s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } #endif s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) { RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) { DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) { EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL; } #endif } else { s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); } param_len=0; alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; n2s(p,i); param_len=i+2; /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH); goto f_err; } /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL * characters, the hint is truncated from the first * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a * NULL-terminated string. */ memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i); memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { n2s(p,i); param_len=i+2; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n2s(p,i); param_len+=i+2; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; i = (unsigned int)(p[0]); p++; param_len+=i+1; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n2s(p,i); param_len+=i+2; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; /* We must check if there is a certificate */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #else if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); #endif } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } n2s(p,i); param_len=i+2; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n2s(p,i); param_len+=i+2; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa; rsa=NULL; } #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) { if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } n2s(p,i); param_len=i+2; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n2s(p,i); param_len+=i+2; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n2s(p,i); param_len+=i+2; if (param_len > n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #else if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); #endif /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh; dh=NULL; } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { EC_GROUP *ngroup; const EC_GROUP *group; if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the * server's ephemeral ECDH public key. * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n. */ /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. */ param_len=3; if ((param_len > n) || (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); if (ngroup == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto f_err; } p+=3; /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */ p+=1; param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len); if ((param_len > n) || (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); goto f_err; } n-=param_len; p+=encoded_pt_len; /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA. */ if (0) ; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); #endif /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh; ecdh=NULL; BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); srvr_ecpoint = NULL; } else if (alg_k) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */ /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); /* Should never happen */ if (sigalg == -1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); if (md == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif p += 2; n -= 2; } else md = EVP_sha1(); n2s(p,i); n-=2; j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { /* wrong packet length */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { int num; j=0; q=md_buf; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i); q+=i; j+=i; } i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif { EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } } else { if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */ { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* still data left over */ if (n != 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (dh != NULL) DH_free(dh); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); if (ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(ecdh); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(-1); } int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { int ok,ret=0; unsigned long n,nc,l; unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i; X509_NAME *xn=NULL; const unsigned char *p,*q; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; /* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records * as we wont be doing client auth. */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) goto err; } return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto err; } /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); goto err; } } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the certificate types */ ctype_num= *(p++); if (s->cert->ctypes) { OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes); s->cert->ctypes = NULL; } if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) { /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */ s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num); memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num); s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num; ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER; } for (i=0; is3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i]; p+=p[-1]; if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { n2s(p, llen); /* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and * following length value. */ if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } p += llen; } /* get the CA RDNs */ n2s(p,llen); #if 0 { FILE *out; out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w"); fwrite(p,1,llen,out); fclose(out); } #endif if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } for (nc=0; nc llen) { if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) goto cont; /* netscape bugs */ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); goto err; } q=p; if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL) { /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG) goto cont; else { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } if (q != (p+l)) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p+=l; nc+=l+2; } if (0) { cont: ERR_clear_error(); } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1; s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num; if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free); s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk; ca_sk=NULL; ret=1; err: if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free); return(ret); } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) { return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen; long n; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *d; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (n < 6) { /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); n2s(p, ticklen); /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ if (ticklen + 6 != n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (s->session->tlsext_tick) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; } s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal * client session ID matching to work and we know much * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. * * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine * session resumption. * * We choose the former approach because this fits in with * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the * ticket. */ EVP_Digest(p, ticklen, s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 EVP_sha256(), NULL); #else EVP_sha1(), NULL); #endif ret=1; return(ret); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) { int ok, al; unsigned long resplen,n; const unsigned char *p; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (n < 4) { /* need at least status type + length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto f_err; } n2l3(p, resplen); if (resplen + 4 != n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int ret; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); goto f_err; } if (ret < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } } return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); return(-1); } #endif int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { int ok,ret=0; long n; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (n > 0) { /* should contain no data */ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return -1; } ret=1; return(ret); } int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int n; unsigned long alg_k; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encoded_pt_len = 0; BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL; #endif if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[4]); alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* Fool emacs indentation */ if (0) {} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; else { pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) goto err; s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf; q=p; /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) p+=2; n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); #ifdef PKCS1_CHECK if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++; if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70; #endif if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { s2n(n,q); n+=2; } s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ krb5_data *enc_ticket; krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ authp = NULL; #ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator; #endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err); enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); if (enc == NULL) goto err; #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG { printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text); } #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (krb5rc) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: ** ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); ** ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ) ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. ** Example: ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with ** optional authenticator omitted. */ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ s2n(enc_ticket->length,p); memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); p+= enc_ticket->length; n = enc_ticket->length + 2; /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ if (authp && authp->length) { s2n(authp->length,p); memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); p+= authp->length; n+= authp->length + 2; free(authp->data); authp->data = NULL; authp->length = 0; } else { s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */ n+=2; } tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) goto err; /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, ** kssl_ctx->length); ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); */ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key,iv); EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl); outl += padl; if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ s2n(outl,p); memcpy(p, epms, outl); p+=outl; n+=outl + 2; s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; if (scert == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) dh_srvr=scert->peer_dh_tmp; else { /* we get them from the cert */ int idx = scert->peer_cert_type; EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL; dh_srvr = NULL; if (idx >= 0) spkey = X509_get_pubkey( scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); if (spkey) { dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey); EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); } if (dh_srvr == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { /* Use client certificate key */ EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; dh_clnt = NULL; if (clkey) dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); if (dh_clnt == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else { /* generate a new random key */ if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); DH_free(dh_clnt); goto err; } } /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but * make sure to clear it out afterwards */ n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt); if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) DH_free(dh_srvr); if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); DH_free(dh_clnt); goto err; } /* generate master key from the result */ s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,p,n); /* clean up */ memset(p,0,n); if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) n = 0; else { /* send off the data */ n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); s2n(n,p); BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p); n+=2; } DH_free(dh_clnt); /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/ } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) { const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; EC_KEY *tkey; int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; int field_size = 0; /* Did we send out the client's * ECDH share for use in premaster * computation as part of client certificate? * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. */ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) { /* XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication using ECDH certificates. * To add such support, one needs to add * code that checks for appropriate * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. * For example, the cert have an ECC * key on the same curve as the server's * and the key should be authorized for * key agreement. * * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect * to skip sending the certificate verify * message. * * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; */ } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; } else { /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; } srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* Reuse key info from our certificate * We only need our private key to perform * the ECDH computation. */ const BIGNUM *priv_key; tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (priv_key == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } else { /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but * make sure to clear it out afterwards */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); if (field_size <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } /* generate master key from the result */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ -> generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, n); memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* Send empty client key exch message */ n = 0; } else { /* First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key */ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ /* Encoded point will be copied here */ p += 1; /* copy the point */ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n); /* increment n to account for length field */ n += 1; } /* Free allocated memory */ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { /* GOST key exchange message creation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; X509 *peer_cert; size_t msglen; unsigned int md_len; int keytype; unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; EVP_PKEY *pub_key; /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509; if (!peer_cert) peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509; if (!peer_cert) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); goto err; } pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL); /* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key * parameters match those of server certificate, use * certificate key for key exchange */ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); /* Generate session key */ RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32); /* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) { /* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key * would be used */ ERR_clear_error(); } } /* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific * context data */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)); EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,shared_ukm)<0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ /*Encapsulate it into sequence */ *(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; msglen=255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (msglen >= 0x80) { *(p++)=0x81; *(p++)= msglen & 0xff; n=msglen+3; } else { *(p++)= msglen & 0xff; n=msglen+2; } memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) { /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { /* send off the data */ n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); s2n(n,p); BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p); n+=2; } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN]; unsigned char *t = NULL; unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; int psk_err = 1; n = 0; if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); goto err; } psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN, psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } else if (psk_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); goto psk_err; } /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len; t = psk_or_pre_ms; memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); s2n(psk_len, t); memset(t, 0, psk_len); t+=psk_len; s2n(psk_len, t); if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); n = strlen(identity); s2n(n, p); memcpy(p, identity, n); n+=2; psk_err = 0; psk_err: OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_err != 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } } #endif else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; l2n3(n,d); s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=n+4; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); #endif return(-1); } int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_PKEY *pkey; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; unsigned u=0; unsigned long n; int j; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[4]); pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey; /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0) { if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); } else { ERR_clear_error(); } /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature * using agreed digest and cached handshake records. */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 2; #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } s2n(u,p); n = u + 4; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) goto err; } else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0])); if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(u,p); n=u+2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(j,p); n=j+2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(j,p); n=j+2; } else #endif if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { unsigned char signbuf[64]; int i; size_t sigsize=64; s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_id_GostR3411_94, data); if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) { p[2+j]=signbuf[i]; } s2n(j,p); n=j+2; } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; l2n3(n,d); s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; s->init_num=(int)n+4; s->init_off=0; } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return(-1); } /* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently * just check cert exists and if static DH client certificates can be used. */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_k; if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) return 0; alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; int i = scert->peer_cert_type; EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL; clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */ if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH) return 1; if (i >= 0) spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509); if (spkey) { /* Compare server and client parameters */ i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey); EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); if (i != 1) return 0; } s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; } return 1; } int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { X509 *x509=NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; int i; unsigned long l; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ if (s->cert->cert_cb && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { /* If we get an error, we need to * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); * We then get retied later */ i=0; i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey)) i=0; } else if (i == 1) { i=0; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509); if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) i = 0; if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); return(1); } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2; } } /* Ok, we have a cert */ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key); s->init_num=(int)l; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { int i,idx; long alg_k,alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; SESS_CERT *sc; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh; #endif alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* we don't have a certificate */ if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) return(1); sc=s->session->sess_cert; if (sc == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; #endif /* This is the passed certificate */ idx=sc->peer_cert_type; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) { /* check failed */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto f_err; } else { return 1; } } #endif pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #endif if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if (rsa == NULL || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { if (dh == NULL || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } } else #endif { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); err: return(0); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) { unsigned int len, padding_len; unsigned char *d; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) { len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; d[4] = len; memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); d[5 + len] = padding_len; memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; s->init_off = 0; } return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ /* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) return 1; /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate * message, so permit appropriate message length */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) return 2; return 1; } #endif int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i != 0) return i; } #endif if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey); return i; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int tls1_get_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s) { int al; int ok; unsigned long supp_data_len, authz_data_len; long n; unsigned short supp_data_type, authz_data_type, proof_len; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *new_proof; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B, SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, /* use default limit */ TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* The message cannot be empty */ if (n < 3) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Length of supplemental data */ n2l3(p,supp_data_len); n -= 3; /* We must have at least one supplemental data entry * with type (1 byte) and length (2 bytes). */ if (supp_data_len != (unsigned long) n || n < 4) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Supplemental data type: must be authz_data */ n2s(p,supp_data_type); n -= 2; if (supp_data_type != TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_TYPE); goto f_err; } /* Authz data length */ n2s(p, authz_data_len); n -= 2; if (authz_data_len != (unsigned long) n || n < 1) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Authz data type: must be audit_proof */ authz_data_type = *(p++); n -= 1; if (authz_data_type != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_AUTHZ_DATA_TYPE); goto f_err; } /* We have a proof: read its length */ if (n < 2) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } n2s(p, proof_len); n -= 2; if (proof_len != (unsigned long) n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Store the proof */ new_proof = OPENSSL_realloc(s->session->audit_proof, proof_len); if (new_proof == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } s->session->audit_proof_length = proof_len; s->session->audit_proof = new_proof; memcpy(s->session->audit_proof, p, proof_len); /* Got the proof, but can't verify it yet. */ return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); return -1; } #endif