/* ssl/statem/statem_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num); if (ret < 0) return (-1); if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway */ ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], ret); if (ret == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); return (1); } s->init_off += ret; s->init_num -= ret; return (0); } int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) { unsigned char *p; int i; unsigned long l; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); if (i <= 0) return 0; s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); l = i; /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (!s->server) { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; } else { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; } if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. */ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; int slen; /* * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set * the appropriate error. */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return; if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); } #endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; long remain; remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } } else { if (remain != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no * SCTP is used */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); #endif } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al, i; /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); goto f_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (i < 0 || (unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); goto f_err; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (s->server) { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; } else { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; s->init_num = 1; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { unsigned char *p; unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) return 0; l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); p = ssl_handshake_start(s); l2n3(l, p); l += 3; if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); } WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { WORK_STATE ret; ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) return ret; } #endif /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf * in case there are any unexpected retransmits */ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num = 0; if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; if (s->server) { s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; } else { ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; } if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; } } return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) { /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; unsigned char *p; unsigned long l; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; do { while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; return 0; } if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; s->init_num = i - 1; s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->init_num += i; } skip_message = 0; if (!s->server) if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' * MAC. */ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { s->init_num = 0; skip_message = 1; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } } while (skip_message); /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ *mt = *p; s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { /* * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible * ClientHello */ /* * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read */ l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { n2l3(p, l); /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); goto f_err; } if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_num = 0; } return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return 0; } int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) { long n; unsigned char *p; int i; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* We've already read everything in */ *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; return 1; } p = s->init_msg; n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; while (n > 0) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, &p[s->init_num], n, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = 0; return 0; } s->init_num += i; n -= i; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for * Finished verification. */ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ssl3_take_mac(s); #endif /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } /* * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared * unsigned */ if (s->init_num < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; return 0; } *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; return 1; } int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_PKEY *pk; int ret = -1, i; if (pkey == NULL) pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); else pk = pkey; if (pk == NULL) goto err; i = pk->type; if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { ret = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { ret = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) { ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC; } #endif else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; } else if (x && (i == EVP_PKEY_DH || i == EVP_PKEY_DHX)) { /* * For DH two cases: DH certificate signed with RSA and DH * certificate signed with DSA. */ i = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); if (i & EVP_PKS_RSA) ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; else if (i & EVP_PKS_DSA) ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; } err: if (!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return (ret); } int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) { int al; switch (type) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; break; case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; break; case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; break; case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; break; case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; break; default: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; break; } return (al); } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) return 0; return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); }