/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess); #endif SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, }; long tls1_default_timeout(void) { /* * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for * http, the cache would over fill */ return (60 * 60 * 2); } int tls1_new(SSL *s) { if (!ssl3_new(s)) return (0); s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); } void tls1_free(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ ssl3_free(s); } void tls1_clear(SSL *s) { ssl3_clear(s); s->version = s->method->version; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int nid_list[] = { NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ }; static int pref_list[] = { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ # endif NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ # endif NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ # endif NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ # endif NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ # endif NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ # endif NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ }; int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) { /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) return 0; return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; } int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) { /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ switch (nid) { case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ return 1; case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ return 2; case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ return 3; case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ return 4; case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ return 5; case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ return 6; case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ return 7; case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ return 8; case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ return 9; case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ return 10; case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ return 11; case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ return 12; case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ return 13; case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ return 14; case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ return 15; case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ return 16; case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ return 17; case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ return 18; case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ return 19; case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ return 20; case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ return 21; case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ return 22; case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ return 23; case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ return 24; case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ return 25; default: return 0; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ # else # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ # else # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ # else # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, # endif # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) # endif }; int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) { size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); if (p) memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); return (int)slen; } unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) { int extdatalen = 0; unsigned char *orig = buf; unsigned char *ret = buf; /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) return orig; ret += 2; if (ret >= limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ unsigned long size_str; long lenmax; /*- * check for enough space. * 4 for the servername type and entension length * 2 for servernamelist length * 1 for the hostname type * 2 for hostname length * + hostname length */ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; /* extension type and length */ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); s2n(size_str + 5, ret); /* length of servername list */ s2n(size_str + 3, ret); /* hostname type, length and hostname */ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; s2n(size_str, ret); memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); ret += size_str; } /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (s->renegotiate) { int el; if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the * Client Hello message */ int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 for the srp type type and entension length * 1 for the srp user identity * + srp user identity length */ if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; /* fill in the extension */ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); s2n(login_len + 1, ret); (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); ret += login_len; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ long lenmax; if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) { /* * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ long lenmax; if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { int ticklen; if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) return NULL; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; } else ticklen = 0; if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) goto skip_ext; /* * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for * ticket */ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); s2n(ticklen, ret); if (ticklen) { memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); ret += ticklen; } } skip_ext: if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); } # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) return NULL; if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); s2n(col + 2, ret); s2n(col, ret); memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); ret += col; } # endif if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { int i; long extlen, idlen, itmp; OCSP_RESPID *id; idlen = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); if (itmp <= 0) return NULL; idlen += itmp + 2; } if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); if (extlen < 0) return NULL; } else extlen = 0; if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) return NULL; s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; s2n(idlen, ret); for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { /* save position of id len */ unsigned char *q = ret; id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); /* skip over id len */ ret += 2; itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); /* write id len */ s2n(itmp, q); } s2n(extlen, ret); if (extlen > 0) i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension */ if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); s2n(1, ret); /*- * Set mode: * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { /* * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support * for Next Protocol Negotiation */ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); s2n(0, ret); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { int el; ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } # endif /* * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always * appear last. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c * does not. */ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) hlen -= 5; if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { hlen = 0x200 - hlen; if (hlen >= 4) hlen -= 4; else hlen = 0; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); s2n(hlen, ret); memset(ret, 0, hlen); ret += hlen; } } if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) return orig; s2n(extdatalen, orig); return ret; } unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) { int extdatalen = 0; unsigned char *orig = buf; unsigned char *ret = buf; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int next_proto_neg_seen; # endif /* * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) return orig; ret += 2; if (ret >= limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); s2n(0, ret); } if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { int el; if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ long lenmax; if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } /* * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves * extension */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); s2n(0, ret); } if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); s2n(0, ret); } # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) return NULL; if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); s2n(sol + 2, ret); s2n(sol, ret); memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); ret += sol; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { int el; ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } # endif if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 }; if (limit - ret < 36) return NULL; memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); ret += 36; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); s2n(1, ret); /*- * Set mode: * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { const unsigned char *npa; unsigned int npalen; int r; r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s-> ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); s2n(npalen, ret); memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); ret += npalen; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } } # endif if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) return orig; s2n(extdatalen, orig); return ret; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /*- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: * SNI, * elliptic_curves * ec_point_formats * * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). */ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) { unsigned short type, size; static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 0x00, /* uncompressed */ }; /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; if (data >= (d + n - 2)) return; data += 2; if (data > (d + n - 4)) return; n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; if (data + size > d + n) return; data += size; if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) return; if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) return; } else { const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); if (data + len != d + n) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) return; } s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; } # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) { unsigned short type; unsigned short size; unsigned short len; unsigned char *data = *p; int renegotiate_seen = 0; int sigalg_seen = 0; s->servername_done = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; } # endif s->srtp_profile = NULL; if (data >= (d + n - 2)) goto ri_check; n2s(data, len); if (data > (d + n - len)) goto ri_check; while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); if (data + size > (d + n)) goto ri_check; # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); # endif if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); /*- * The servername extension is treated as follows: * * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, * in which case an fatal alert is generated. * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches * the value of the Host: field. * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername * extension. * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. * */ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { unsigned char *sdata; int servname_type; int dsize; if (size < 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; if (dsize > size) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } sdata = data; while (dsize > 3) { servname_type = *(sdata++); n2s(sdata, len); dsize -= 3; if (len > dsize) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->servername_done == 0) switch (servname_type) { case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } s->servername_done = 1; } else s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; break; default: break; } dsize -= len; } if (dsize != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) return -1; memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; } s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); } # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); # endif } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); } # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); # endif } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { unsigned char *sdata = data; if (size < 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { /* shouldn't really happen */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); } /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); else s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } # endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { int dsize; if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } sigalg_seen = 1; n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { if (size < 5) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; size--; if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { const unsigned char *sdata; int dsize; /* Read in responder_id_list */ n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; if (dsize > size) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } while (dsize > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; int idsize; if (dsize < 4) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } n2s(data, idsize); dsize -= 2 + idsize; size -= 2 + idsize; if (dsize < 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } sdata = data; data += idsize; id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); if (!id) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (data != sdata) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } /* Read in request_extensions */ if (size < 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; if (dsize != size) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } sdata = data; if (dsize > 0) { if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); } s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } } /* * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. */ else s->tlsext_status_type = -1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { switch (data[0]) { case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { /*- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a * renegotiation. * * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing * anything like that, but this might change). * * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new * Finished message could have been computed.) */ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } # endif /* session ticket processed earlier */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) return 0; } # endif data += size; } *p = data; ri_check: /* Need RI if renegotiating */ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); return 0; } return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly * fill the length of the block. */ static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) { unsigned int off = 0; while (off < len) { if (d[off] == 0) return 0; off += d[off]; off++; } return off == len; } # endif int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) { unsigned short length; unsigned short type; unsigned short size; unsigned char *data = *p; int tlsext_servername = 0; int renegotiate_seen = 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; # endif s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); # endif if (data >= (d + n - 2)) goto ri_check; n2s(data, length); if (data + length != d + n) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); if (data + size > (d + n)) goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } tlsext_servername = 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || ecpointformatlist_length < 1) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); } # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); # endif } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || (size > 0)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; } # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { unsigned char *sdata = data; if (size < 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { /* shouldn't really happen */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); } else { s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } # endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { /* * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status * request message. */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; /* We must have requested it. */ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } /* The data must be valid */ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s-> ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } # endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { switch (data[0]) { case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) return 0; } # endif data += size; } if (data != d + n) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { if (s->tlsext_hostname) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } } else { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } } *p = data; ri_check: /* * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on * initial connect only. */ if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support. */ int using_ecc = 0; int i; unsigned char *j; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { using_ecc = 1; break; } } using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); if (using_ecc) { if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) { int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); s2n(id, j); } } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input { int r = 1; if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s-> ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); if (!r) return -1; } if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { /* shouldn't really happen */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); } if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); } else { s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); } if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; } if (r == 2) /* * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate * server opaque PRF input */ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; } # endif return 1; } int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. */ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); if (using_ecc) { if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ return 1; } int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) { int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ /* * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ # endif if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s-> initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input { /* * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ int r = 1; if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s-> ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); if (!r) { ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { /* shouldn't really happen */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); } s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { /* * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); } else { s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; } } if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { /* * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the * handshake. */ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } } err: # endif switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return -1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); return 1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->servername_done = 0; default: return 1; } } int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) { int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; int al; /* * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because * this may influence which certificate is sent */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int r; CERT_PKEY *certpkey; certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ if (certpkey == NULL) { s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; return 1; } /* * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate * et al can pick it up. */ s->cert->key = certpkey; r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); switch (r) { /* We don't want to send a status request response */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; break; /* status request response should be sent */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; else s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; break; /* something bad happened */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } } else s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; err: switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return -1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); return 1; default: return 1; } } int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it * must contain uncompressed. */ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { /* we are using an ECC cipher */ size_t i; unsigned char *list; int found_uncompressed = 0; list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { found_uncompressed = 1; break; } } if (!found_uncompressed) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); return -1; } } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s-> initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { /* * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a * value from the server too. */ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } /* * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } } # endif /* * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the * callback */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int r; /* * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no * response. */ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (r == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } if (r < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } } switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return -1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); return 1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->servername_done = 0; default: return 1; } } /*- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. * * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket * extension, if any. * len: the length of the session ID. * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. * * Returns: * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. * * Side effects: * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. */ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) { /* Point after session ID in client hello */ const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; unsigned short i; *ret = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; /* * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful * resumption. */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) return 0; if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) return 0; if (p >= limit) return -1; /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { i = *(p++); p += i; if (p >= limit) return -1; } /* Skip past cipher list */ n2s(p, i); p += i; if (p >= limit) return -1; /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ i = *(p++); p += i; if (p > limit) return -1; /* Now at start of extensions */ if ((p + 2) >= limit) return 0; n2s(p, i); while ((p + 4) <= limit) { unsigned short type, size; n2s(p, type); n2s(p, size); if (p + size > limit) return 0; if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { int r; if (size == 0) { /* * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have * one. */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; return 1; } if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { /* * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than * generating the session from ticket now, trigger * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to * calculate the master secret later. */ return 2; } r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); switch (r) { case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; return 2; case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ return r; case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; return 3; default: /* fatal error */ return -1; } } p += size; } return 0; } /*- * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. * * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. * sess_id: points at the session ID. * sesslen: the length of the session ID. * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * Returns: * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. */ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) { SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *sdec; const unsigned char *p; int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; HMAC_CTX hctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ if (eticklen < 48) return 2; /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, &ctx, &hctx, 0); if (rv < 0) return -1; if (rv == 0) return 2; if (rv == 2) renew_ticket = 1; } else { /* Check key name matches */ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) return 2; HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity * checks on ticket. */ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); if (mlen < 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return -1; } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return 2; } /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); if (!sdec) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return -1; } EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return 2; } slen += mlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); p = sdec; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); OPENSSL_free(sdec); if (sess) { /* * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by * standard. */ if (sesslen) memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); sess->session_id_length = sesslen; *psess = sess; if (renew_ticket) return 4; else return 3; } ERR_clear_error(); /* * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; } /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ typedef struct { int nid; int id; } tls12_lookup; static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} # endif }; static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} # endif }; static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { if (table[i].nid == nid) return table[i].id; } return -1; } # if 0 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { if (table[i].id == id) return table[i].nid; } return -1; } # endif int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) { int sig_id, md_id; if (!md) return 0; md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); if (md_id == -1) return 0; sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); if (sig_id == -1) return 0; p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; return 1; } int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) { return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); } const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) { switch (hash_alg) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: return EVP_sha1(); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: return EVP_sha224(); case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: return EVP_sha256(); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: return EVP_sha384(); case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: return EVP_sha512(); # endif default: return NULL; } } /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) { int i, idx; const EVP_MD *md; CERT *c = s->cert; /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) return 1; /* Should never happen */ if (!c) return 0; c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) { unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1]; switch (sig_alg) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; break; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; break; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; break; # endif default: continue; } if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); if (md) { c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; } } } /* * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not * supported it stays as NULL. */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); # endif return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; unsigned short hbtype; unsigned int payload; unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Read type and payload length first */ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) return 0; /* silently discard */ hbtype = *p++; n2s(p, payload); if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ pl = p; if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { unsigned char *buffer, *bp; int r; /* * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding */ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); bp = buffer; /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; s2n(payload, bp); memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding, s, s->msg_callback_arg); OPENSSL_free(buffer); if (r < 0) return r; } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { unsigned int seq; /* * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number */ n2s(pl, seq); if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { s->tlsext_hb_seq++; s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; } } return 0; } int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf, *p; int ret = -1; unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); return -1; } /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); return -1; } /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return -1; } /* * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. */ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); /*- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number * as payload to distuingish different messages and add * some random stuff. * - Message Type, 1 byte * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) * - Padding */ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); p = buf; /* Message Type */ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ s2n(payload, p); /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 16; /* Random padding */ if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); if (ret >= 0) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; } err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } #endif