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openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
Ben Laurie 060a38a2c0 Add DTLS-SRTP.
2011-11-15 23:02:16 +00:00

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/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c
* \brief Version independent SSL functions.
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#ifdef REF_CHECK
# include <assert.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
/* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
(int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
0, /* finish_mac_length */
(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
NULL, /* client_finished_label */
0, /* client_finished_label_len */
NULL, /* server_finished_label */
0, /* server_finished_label_len */
(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function
};
int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
{
if (s->method == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
return(0);
}
if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
{
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session=NULL;
}
s->error=0;
s->hit=0;
s->shutdown=0;
#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
* needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
if (s->renegotiate) return(1);
#else
if (s->renegotiate)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#endif
s->type=0;
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
s->version=s->method->version;
s->client_version=s->version;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
#if 0
s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
#endif
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
{
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
}
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
s->first_packet=0;
#if 1
/* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
* so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
{
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method=s->ctx->method;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
return(0);
}
else
#endif
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return(1);
}
/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
ctx->method=meth;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
SSL *s;
if (ctx == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
return(NULL);
}
if (ctx->method == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
return(NULL);
}
s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
if (s == NULL) goto err;
memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
s->options=ctx->options;
s->mode=ctx->mode;
s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
{
/* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
* the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
* parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
* called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
* settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
* accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
* used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
* Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
* duplicated it once. */
s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (s->cert == NULL)
goto err;
}
else
s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
#if 0
s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
#endif
s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!s->param)
goto err;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
#if 0
s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
s->trust = ctx->trust;
#endif
s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s->ctx=ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s->initial_ctx=ctx;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
# endif
#endif
s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
s->method=ctx->method;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
goto err;
s->references=1;
s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
SSL_clear(s);
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
#endif
return(s);
err:
if (s != NULL)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
if (s->ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
return 1;
}
int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
unsigned int id_len)
{
/* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
* we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
* find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
* any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
* use by this SSL. */
SSL_SESSION r, *p;
if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
return 0;
r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
r.session_id_length = id_len;
memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
/* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
* callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
* must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
* converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
(id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
{
memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
}
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return (p != NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
}
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
}
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
}
void SSL_free(SSL *s)
{
int i;
if(s == NULL)
return;
i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
#endif
if (i > 0) return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
if (s->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
if (s->bbio != NULL)
{
/* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
{
s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
}
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio=NULL;
}
if (s->rbio != NULL)
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
/* add extra stuff */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
/* Make the next call work :-) */
if (s->session != NULL)
{
ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
/* Free up if allocated */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_hostname)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
#endif
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
#endif
if (s->srtp_profiles)
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
{
/* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
*/
if (s->bbio != NULL)
{
if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
{
s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
}
}
if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
s->rbio=rbio;
s->wbio=wbio;
}
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
{ return(s->rbio); }
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
{ return(s->wbio); }
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
{
return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
}
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
{
int ret= -1;
BIO *b,*r;
b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (r != NULL)
BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
return(ret);
}
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
{
int ret= -1;
BIO *b,*r;
b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (r != NULL)
BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
return(ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
{
int ret=0;
BIO *bio=NULL;
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
ret=1;
err:
return(ret);
}
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
{
int ret=0;
BIO *bio=NULL;
if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
{
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL)
{ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; }
BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
}
else
SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
ret=1;
err:
return(ret);
}
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
{
int ret=0;
BIO *bio=NULL;
if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
{
bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
}
else
SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
ret=1;
err:
return(ret);
}
#endif
/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL)
{
ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
}
/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL)
{
ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
}
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
{
return(s->verify_mode);
}
int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
}
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
{
return(s->verify_callback);
}
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->verify_mode);
}
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
{
return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
}
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
{
s->verify_mode=mode;
if (callback != NULL)
s->verify_callback=callback;
}
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
}
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
{
s->read_ahead=yes;
}
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
{
return(s->read_ahead);
}
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
{
/* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
* (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
* and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
* errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
* (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
* so we'd better not return -1.)
*/
return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
}
X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
X509 *r;
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
r=NULL;
else
r=s->session->peer;
if (r == NULL) return(r);
CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return(r);
}
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *r;
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
r=NULL;
else
r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
/* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
* certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
return(r);
}
/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
* modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */
void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
{
CERT *tmp;
/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));
/* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
* vice-versa */
if (t->method != f->method)
{
t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
t->method=f->method; /* change method */
t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
}
tmp=t->cert;
if (f->cert != NULL)
{
CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
t->cert=f->cert;
}
else
t->cert=NULL;
if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
}
/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if ( (ctx == NULL) ||
(ctx->cert == NULL) ||
(ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return(0);
}
if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return(0);
}
return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
{
if (ssl == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return(0);
}
if (ssl->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return(0);
}
if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return(0);
}
return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
}
int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_accept_state(s);
return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
}
int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_connect_state(s);
return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
}
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
{
return(s->method->get_timeout());
}
int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(0);
}
return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
}
int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
{
return(0);
}
return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
}
int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return(-1);
}
return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
}
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
/* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
* expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
* 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
* even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
*/
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
else
return(1);
}
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
s->renegotiate=1;
s->new_session=1;
return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
}
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
{
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
s->renegotiate=1;
s->new_session=0;
return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
}
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
{
/* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
* false again once a handshake has finished */
return (s->renegotiate != 0);
}
long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
{
long l;
switch (cmd)
{
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
return(s->read_ahead);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
l=s->read_ahead;
s->read_ahead=larg;
return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
return(s->options|=larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
return(s->options&=~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return(s->mode|=larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
return(s->mode &=~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
return(s->max_cert_list);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
l=s->max_cert_list;
s->max_cert_list=larg;
return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
return 0;
if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
s->d1->mtu = larg;
return larg;
}
return 0;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
s->max_send_fragment = larg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
if (s->s3)
return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
else return 0;
default:
return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
}
}
long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
{
switch(cmd)
{
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
return 1;
default:
return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
}
}
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->sessions;
}
long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
{
long l;
switch (cmd)
{
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
return(ctx->read_ahead);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
l=ctx->read_ahead;
ctx->read_ahead=larg;
return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
return(ctx->max_cert_list);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
l=ctx->max_cert_list;
ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
l=ctx->session_cache_size;
ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
return(ctx->session_cache_size);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
return(ctx->options|=larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
return(ctx->options&=~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return(ctx->mode|=larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
return 1;
default:
return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
}
}
long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
{
switch(cmd)
{
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
return 1;
default:
return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
}
}
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
{
long l;
l=a->id-b->id;
if (l == 0L)
return(0);
else
return((l > 0)?1:-1);
}
int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp)
{
long l;
l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id;
if (l == 0L)
return(0);
else
return((l > 0)?1:-1);
}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* preference */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL)
{
if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
{
return(s->cipher_list);
}
else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
(s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
{
return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
}
}
return(NULL);
}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* algorithm id */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL)
{
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
{
return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
}
else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
{
return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
}
}
return(NULL);
}
/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n)
{
SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
if (s == NULL) return(NULL);
sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
return(NULL);
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n);
if (c == NULL) return(NULL);
return(c->name);
}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
* was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
* (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
* has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
* ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
* ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
* updated. */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
&s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
{
char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
int i;
if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
(len < 2))
return(NULL);
p=buf;
sk=s->session->ciphers;
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
int n;
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
n=strlen(c->name);
if (n+1 > len)
{
if (p != buf)
--p;
*p='\0';
return buf;
}
strcpy(p,c->name);
p+=n;
*(p++)=':';
len-=n+1;
}
p[-1]='\0';
return(buf);
}
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
{
int i,j=0;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (sk == NULL) return(0);
q=p;
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
/* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
(TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
continue;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
nokrb5)
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) &&
s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
p+=j;
}
/* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
* add SCSV if not renegotiating.
*/
if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
{
static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
{
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
p+=j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
#endif
}
return(p-q);
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
int i,n;
if (s->s3)
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
if ((num%n) != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
return(NULL);
}
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
else
{
sk= *skp;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
}
for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
{
/* Check for SCSV */
if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
{
/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
p += n;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
#endif
continue;
}
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
p+=n;
if (c != NULL)
{
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
}
if (skp != NULL)
*skp=sk;
return(sk);
err:
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
return(NULL);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
* So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
*/
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
{
if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
return NULL;
return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
s->session->tlsext_hostname :
s->tlsext_hostname;
}
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
return -1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
* expected that this function is called from the callback set by
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
*
* The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
* strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
* string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
*
* The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
*
* 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
* callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
* or have a default application level protocol.
*
* 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
* client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
* API that this fallback case was enacted.
*
* 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
* that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
* assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
* a client should use.
*
* 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
* protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
*
* It returns either
* OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
* OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
*/
int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
{
unsigned int i, j;
const unsigned char *result;
int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
{
for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
{
if (server[i] == client[j] &&
memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
{
/* We found a match */
result = &server[i];
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
goto found;
}
j += client[j];
j++;
}
i += server[i];
i++;
}
/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
result = client;
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
found:
*out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
*outlen = result[0];
return status;
}
/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
* requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
* request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
*
* Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
* from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
* provided by the callback.
*/
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
{
*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
if (!*data) {
*len = 0;
} else {
*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
}
}
/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
* TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
* Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned
* by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
* not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
* it.
*
* The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
* such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
}
/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
* client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
* must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
* The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
* advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
* assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
*
* The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
* callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
}
# endif
#endif
static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
{
unsigned long l;
l=(unsigned long)
((unsigned int) a->session_id[0] )|
((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)|
((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)|
((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L);
return(l);
}
/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
* SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
* able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
* with a matching session ID. */
static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
{
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
return(1);
if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
return(1);
return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
}
/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
* SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
* variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
* ssl.h. */
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
if (meth == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
return(NULL);
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return NULL;
}
#endif
if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
goto err;
}
ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
ret->method=meth;
ret->cert_store=NULL;
ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;
/* We take the system default */
ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
ret->new_session_cb=0;
ret->remove_session_cb=0;
ret->get_session_cb=0;
ret->generate_session_id=0;
memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
ret->references=1;
ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
/* ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
ret->master_key=NULL;
ret->key_arg=NULL;
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
ret->info_callback=NULL;
ret->app_verify_callback=0;
ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
ret->read_ahead=0;
ret->msg_callback=0;
ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
#if 0
ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
#endif
ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
ret->client_cert_cb=0;
ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
|| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
goto err2;
}
ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!ret->param)
goto err;
if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
ret->extra_certs=NULL;
ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
goto err;
ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
{
OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
goto err;
}
ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
#define eng_strx(x) #x
#define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
/* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
{
ENGINE *eng;
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
if (!eng)
{
ERR_clear_error();
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
}
if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
ERR_clear_error();
}
#endif
#endif
/* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
* deployed might change this.
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
return(ret);
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err2:
if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
return(NULL);
}
#if 0
static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
{ OPENSSL_free(comp); }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
static void
ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
{
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
{
next = ent->next;
OPENSSL_free(ent);
}
OPENSSL_free(list);
}
#endif
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
{
int i;
if (a == NULL) return;
i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
#endif
if (i > 0) return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
if (a->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
/*
* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
* the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
* after the sessions were flushed.
* As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
* the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
* free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
* (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
*/
if (a->sessions != NULL)
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
if (a->sessions != NULL)
lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
if (a->cert_store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
if (a->cert != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
if (a->client_CA != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
#else
a->comp_methods = NULL;
#endif
if (a->srtp_profiles)
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (a->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (a->client_cert_engine)
ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
if (a->wbuf_freelist)
ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
if (a->rbuf_freelist)
ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
{
ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
{
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
{
ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_mode=mode;
ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
int have_ecdh_tmp;
#endif
X509 *x = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
if (c == NULL) return;
kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
(rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
#else
rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
(dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
#else
dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
#endif
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
dh_rsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
mask_k=0;
mask_a=0;
emask_k=0;
emask_a=0;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
#endif
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
}
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
}
if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
#if 0
/* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
if ( (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
#endif
if (dh_tmp_export)
emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
if (dh_tmp)
mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
{
mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
}
if (dsa_sign)
{
mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
}
mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
#endif
/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
* ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
*/
if (have_ecc_cert)
{
/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
{
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (ecdh_ok)
{
if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
{
mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
{
emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
}
}
if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
{
mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
{
emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
}
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (ecdsa_ok)
{
mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
}
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (have_ecdh_tmp)
{
mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
#endif
c->mask_k=mask_k;
c->mask_a=mask_a;
c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
c->valid=1;
}
/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int keysize = 0;
int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
{
/* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (keysize > 163) return 0;
}
/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
{
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
{
/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
return 0;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
return 0;
}
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
/* signature alg must be RSA */
if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
{
/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* all checks are ok */
}
#endif
/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
CERT *c;
int i;
c=s->cert;
ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
/* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
* since no certificate is needed for
* anon ECDH and for authenticated
* EECDH, the check for the auth
* algorithm will set i correctly
* NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
* not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
* we need an RSA cert. Placing the
* checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
* checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
*/
i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
}
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
{
i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
}
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
{
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
else
i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
}
else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
{
/* VRS something else here? */
return(NULL);
}
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(NULL);
}
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
}
EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
{
unsigned long alg_a;
CERT *c;
int idx = -1;
alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
c=s->cert;
if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
{
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
}
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
if (idx == -1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(NULL);
}
if (pmd)
*pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
}
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
{
int i;
/* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
* and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
|| SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
&& (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
{
CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
/* auto flush every 255 connections */
if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
((i & mode) == mode))
{
if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
:s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
{
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
}
}
}
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
{
return(s->method);
}
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
int conn= -1;
int ret=1;
if (s->method != meth)
{
if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
if (s->method->version == meth->version)
s->method=meth;
else
{
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method=meth;
ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
}
if (conn == 1)
s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
else if (conn == 0)
s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
}
return(ret);
}
int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
{
int reason;
unsigned long l;
BIO *bio;
if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);
/* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
* etc, where we do encode the error */
if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
{
if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
else
return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
{
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
if (BIO_should_read(bio))
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
/* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
* to write to the rbio, and an application program where
* rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
* should wait for.
* However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
* (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
* SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
* this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
* to keep it. */
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
{
reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
else
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
}
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
{
bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
if (BIO_should_write(bio))
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
/* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
{
reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
else
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
}
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
{
return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
}
if (i == 0)
{
if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
{
/* assume it is the socket being closed */
return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
}
else
{
if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
}
}
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
}
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
{
int ret=1;
if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
return(-1);
}
s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
{
ret=s->handshake_func(s);
}
return(ret);
}
/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
* one of these calls will reset it */
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server=1;
s->shutdown=0;
s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
/* clear the current cipher */
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
}
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server=0;
s->shutdown=0;
s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
/* clear the current cipher */
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
}
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return(0);
}
int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return(0);
}
int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return(0);
}
SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return(NULL);
}
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
return("TLSv1.2");
else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return("TLSv1.1");
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
return("TLSv1");
else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
return("SSLv3");
else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
return("SSLv2");
else
return("unknown");
}
SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
X509_NAME *xn;
SSL *ret;
int i;
if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
return(NULL);
ret->version = s->version;
ret->type = s->type;
ret->method = s->method;
if (s->session != NULL)
{
/* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s);
}
else
{
/* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect
* that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later --
* they should not both point to the same object,
* and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */
ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
ret->method = s->method;
ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
if (s->cert != NULL)
{
if (ret->cert != NULL)
{
ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
}
ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
if (ret->cert == NULL)
goto err;
}
SSL_set_session_id_context(ret,
s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
}
ret->options=s->options;
ret->mode=s->mode;
SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
ret->debug=s->debug;
/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
goto err;
/* setup rbio, and wbio */
if (s->rbio != NULL)
{
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio))
goto err;
}
if (s->wbio != NULL)
{
if (s->wbio != s->rbio)
{
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio))
goto err;
}
else
ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
}
ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
ret->server = s->server;
ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
ret->new_session = s->new_session;
ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
ret->rstate=s->rstate;
ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
ret->hit=s->hit;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
{
if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
== NULL)
goto err;
/* Dup the client_CA list */
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
{
if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err;
ret->client_CA=sk;
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
{
X509_NAME_free(xn);
goto err;
}
}
}
if (0)
{
err:
if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret);
ret=NULL;
}
return(ret);
}
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
{
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
}
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
s->expand=NULL;
}
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
s->compress=NULL;
}
#endif
}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
return(s->cert->key->x509);
else
return(NULL);
}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
else
return(NULL);
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
{
if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
return(s->session->cipher);
return(NULL);
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
{
return NULL;
}
const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
{
return NULL;
}
#else
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
{
if (s->compress != NULL)
return(s->compress->meth);
return(NULL);
}
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
{
if (s->expand != NULL)
return(s->expand->meth);
return(NULL);
}
#endif
int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
{
BIO *bbio;
if (s->bbio == NULL)
{
bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
s->bbio=bbio;
}
else
{
bbio=s->bbio;
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
}
(void)BIO_reset(bbio);
/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return(0);
}
if (push)
{
if (s->wbio != bbio)
s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
}
else
{
if (s->wbio == bbio)
s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
}
return(1);
}
void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
{
if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
{
/* remove buffering */
s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
assert(s->wbio != NULL);
#endif
}
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio=NULL;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
{
ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
}
void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
{
s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
}
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
{
return(s->quiet_shutdown);
}
void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
{
s->shutdown=mode;
}
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
{
return(s->shutdown);
}
int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
{
return(s->version);
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
{
return(ssl->ctx);
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
{
if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
return ssl->ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ctx == NULL)
ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
#endif
if (ssl->cert != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
ssl->ctx = ctx;
return(ssl->ctx);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
}
int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
const char *CApath)
{
return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
}
#endif
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
{
ssl->info_callback=cb;
}
/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
function pointer. */
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
{
return ssl->info_callback;
}
int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
{
return(ssl->state);
}
void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
{
ssl->state = state;
}
void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
{
ssl->verify_result=arg;
}
long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
{
return(ssl->verify_result);
}
int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
{
return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
}
void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
{
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
}
int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
{
return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
}
void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
{
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
}
int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
{
return(1);
}
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->cert_store);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
{
if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
ctx->cert_store=store;
}
int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
{
return(s->rwstate);
}
/*!
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param cb the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
}
#endif
#ifdef DOXYGEN
/*!
* \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
* \param ssl the SSL session.
* \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
* \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
* of the required key in bits.
* \return the temporary RSA key.
* \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
*/
RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
{}
#endif
/*!
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param dh the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
{
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (identity_hint != NULL)
{
ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
return 0;
}
else
ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
return 1;
}
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
if (s->session == NULL)
return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
if (identity_hint != NULL)
{
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
return 0;
}
else
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
return 1;
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
{
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
return NULL;
return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
{
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
return NULL;
return(s->session->psk_identity);
}
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int max_psk_len))
{
s->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int max_psk_len))
{
ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
{
s->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
{
ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
#endif
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
* vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
* any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
* Returns newly allocated ctx;
*/
EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md)
{
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
return *hash;
}
void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
{
if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
*hash=NULL;
}
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
{
s->debug = debug;
}
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
{
return s->hit;
}
#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
#endif
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
ssl_cipher_id);
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