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openssl/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
Kurt Cancemi 5e6e650d62 Remove pointless free loop in X509_TRUST_cleanup() 
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1194)
2016-06-20 09:58:58 -04:00

298 lines
8.7 KiB
C
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/*
* Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "internal/x509_int.h"
static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags);
static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
/*
* WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without
* any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index
* into the table
*/
static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
{X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL},
{X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth,
NULL},
{X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth,
NULL},
{X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect,
NULL},
{X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign,
NULL},
{X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign,
NULL},
{X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP,
NULL},
{X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL}
};
#define X509_TRUST_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(trstandard)
static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL;
static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b)
{
return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
}
int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *,
int) {
int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int);
oldtrust = default_trust;
default_trust = trust;
return oldtrust;
}
int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
{
X509_TRUST *pt;
int idx;
/* We get this as a default value */
if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x,
flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT);
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
if (idx == -1)
return default_trust(id, x, flags);
pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags);
}
int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
{
if (!trtable)
return X509_TRUST_COUNT;
return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
}
X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
{
if (idx < 0)
return NULL;
if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT)
return trstandard + idx;
return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
}
int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id)
{
X509_TRUST tmp;
int idx;
if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX))
return id - X509_TRUST_MIN;
tmp.trust = id;
if (!trtable)
return -1;
idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp);
if (idx == -1)
return -1;
return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
}
int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust)
{
if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST);
return 0;
}
*t = trust;
return 1;
}
int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2)
{
int idx;
X509_TRUST *trtmp;
/*
* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
*/
flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME;
/* Get existing entry if any */
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
/* Need a new entry */
if (idx == -1) {
if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
} else
trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
/* dup supplied name */
if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
/* Set all other flags */
trtmp->flags |= flags;
trtmp->trust = id;
trtmp->check_trust = ck;
trtmp->arg1 = arg1;
trtmp->arg2 = arg2;
/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
if (idx == -1) {
if (trtable == NULL
&& (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;;
}
if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
return 1;
err:
if (idx == -1) {
OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
OPENSSL_free(trtmp);
}
return 0;
}
static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
{
if (!p)
return;
if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) {
if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
OPENSSL_free(p->name);
OPENSSL_free(p);
}
}
void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
{
sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
trtable = NULL;
}
int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp)
{
return xp->flags;
}
char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp)
{
return xp->name;
}
int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp)
{
return xp->trust;
}
static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
/*
* Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in
* any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either
* expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the
* certificate is self-signed.
*/
flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU;
return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
}
static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
/*
* Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not
* rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat"
* trust in self-signed certificates apply.
*/
flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU);
return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
}
static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
else
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
{
X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux;
int i;
if (ax && ax->reject) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
(flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
}
}
if (ax && ax->trust) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
(flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
}
/*
* Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
*
* Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
* self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
* suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
*
* But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
* trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
* from lack of EKU constraints.
*
* Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
* explicit reject.
*/
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
}
if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0)
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
/*
* Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat.
*/
return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags);
}
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