df4439186f
Trim trailing whitespace. It doesn't match OpenSSL coding standards, AFAICT, and it can cause problems with git tooling. Trailing whitespace remains in test data and external source. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8092)
374 lines
19 KiB
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374 lines
19 KiB
Text
=pod
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=head1 NAME
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SSL_set_max_early_data,
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SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data,
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SSL_get_max_early_data,
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SSL_CTX_get_max_early_data,
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SSL_set_recv_max_early_data,
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SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data,
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SSL_get_recv_max_early_data,
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SSL_CTX_get_recv_max_early_data,
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SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data,
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SSL_SESSION_set_max_early_data,
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SSL_write_early_data,
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SSL_read_early_data,
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SSL_get_early_data_status,
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SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn,
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SSL_CTX_set_allow_early_data_cb,
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SSL_set_allow_early_data_cb
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- functions for sending and receiving early data
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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int SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t max_early_data);
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uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_max_early_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
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int SSL_set_max_early_data(SSL *s, uint32_t max_early_data);
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uint32_t SSL_get_max_early_data(const SSL *s);
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int SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t recv_max_early_data);
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uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_recv_max_early_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
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int SSL_set_recv_max_early_data(SSL *s, uint32_t recv_max_early_data);
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uint32_t SSL_get_recv_max_early_data(const SSL *s);
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uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(const SSL_SESSION *s);
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int SSL_SESSION_set_max_early_data(SSL_SESSION *s, uint32_t max_early_data);
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int SSL_write_early_data(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written);
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int SSL_read_early_data(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes);
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int SSL_get_early_data_status(const SSL *s);
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typedef int (*SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn)(SSL *s, void *arg);
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void SSL_CTX_set_allow_early_data_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
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SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn cb,
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void *arg);
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void SSL_set_allow_early_data_cb(SSL *s,
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SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn cb,
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void *arg);
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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These functions are used to send and receive early data where TLSv1.3 has been
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negotiated. Early data can be sent by the client immediately after its initial
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ClientHello without having to wait for the server to complete the handshake.
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Early data can only be sent if a session has previously been established with
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the server, and the server is known to support it. Additionally these functions
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can be used to send data from the server to the client when the client has not
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yet completed the authentication stage of the handshake.
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Early data has weaker security properties than other data sent over an SSL/TLS
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connection. In particular the data does not have forward secrecy. There are also
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additional considerations around replay attacks (see L<REPLAY PROTECTION>
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below). For these reasons extreme care should be exercised when using early
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data. For specific details, consult the TLS 1.3 specification.
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When a server receives early data it may opt to immediately respond by sending
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application data back to the client. Data sent by the server at this stage is
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done before the full handshake has been completed. Specifically the client's
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authentication messages have not yet been received, i.e. the client is
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unauthenticated at this point and care should be taken when using this
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capability.
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A server or client can determine whether the full handshake has been completed
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or not by calling L<SSL_is_init_finished(3)>.
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On the client side, the function SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data() can be used to
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determine if a session established with a server can be used to send early data.
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If the session cannot be used then this function will return 0. Otherwise it
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will return the maximum number of early data bytes that can be sent.
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The function SSL_SESSION_set_max_early_data() sets the maximum number of early
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data bytes that can be sent for a session. This would typically be used when
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creating a PSK session file (see L<SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(3)>). If
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using a ticket based PSK then this is set automatically to the value provided by
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the server.
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A client uses the function SSL_write_early_data() to send early data. This
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function is similar to the L<SSL_write_ex(3)> function, but with the following
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differences. See L<SSL_write_ex(3)> for information on how to write bytes to
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the underlying connection, and how to handle any errors that may arise. This
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page describes the differences between SSL_write_early_data() and
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L<SSL_write_ex(3)>.
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When called by a client, SSL_write_early_data() must be the first IO function
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called on a new connection, i.e. it must occur before any calls to
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L<SSL_write_ex(3)>, L<SSL_read_ex(3)>, L<SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>
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or other similar functions. It may be called multiple times to stream data to
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the server, but the total number of bytes written must not exceed the value
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returned from SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(). Once the initial
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SSL_write_early_data() call has completed successfully the client may interleave
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calls to L<SSL_read_ex(3)> and L<SSL_read(3)> with calls to
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SSL_write_early_data() as required.
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If SSL_write_early_data() fails you should call L<SSL_get_error(3)> to determine
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the correct course of action, as for L<SSL_write_ex(3)>.
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When the client no longer wishes to send any more early data then it should
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complete the handshake by calling a function such as L<SSL_connect(3)> or
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L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>. Alternatively you can call a standard write function
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such as L<SSL_write_ex(3)>, which will transparently complete the connection and
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write the requested data.
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A server may choose to ignore early data that has been sent to it. Once the
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connection has been completed you can determine whether the server accepted or
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rejected the early data by calling SSL_get_early_data_status(). This will return
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SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED if the data was accepted, SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED if it
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was rejected or SSL_EARLY_DATA_NOT_SENT if no early data was sent. This function
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may be called by either the client or the server.
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A server uses the SSL_read_early_data() function to receive early data on a
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connection for which early data has been enabled using
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SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data() or SSL_set_max_early_data(). As for
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SSL_write_early_data(), this must be the first IO function
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called on a connection, i.e. it must occur before any calls to
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L<SSL_write_ex(3)>, L<SSL_read_ex(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>, L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>,
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or other similar functions.
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SSL_read_early_data() is similar to L<SSL_read_ex(3)> with the following
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differences. Refer to L<SSL_read_ex(3)> for full details.
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SSL_read_early_data() may return 3 possible values:
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=over 4
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=item SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR
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This indicates an IO or some other error occurred. This should be treated in the
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same way as a 0 return value from L<SSL_read_ex(3)>.
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=item SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
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This indicates that early data was successfully read. This should be treated in
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the same way as a 1 return value from L<SSL_read_ex(3)>. You should continue to
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call SSL_read_early_data() to read more data.
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=item SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH
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This indicates that no more early data can be read. It may be returned on the
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first call to SSL_read_early_data() if the client has not sent any early data,
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or if the early data was rejected.
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=back
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Once the initial SSL_read_early_data() call has completed successfully (i.e. it
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has returned SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS or SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH) then the
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server may choose to write data immediately to the unauthenticated client using
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SSL_write_early_data(). If SSL_read_early_data() returned
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SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH then in some situations (e.g. if the client only
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supports TLSv1.2) the handshake may have already been completed and calls
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to SSL_write_early_data() are not allowed. Call L<SSL_is_init_finished(3)> to
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determine whether the handshake has completed or not. If the handshake is still
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in progress then the server may interleave calls to SSL_write_early_data() with
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calls to SSL_read_early_data() as required.
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Servers must not call L<SSL_read_ex(3)>, L<SSL_read(3)>, L<SSL_write_ex(3)> or
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L<SSL_write(3)> until SSL_read_early_data() has returned with
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SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH. Once it has done so the connection to the client
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still needs to be completed. Complete the connection by calling a function such
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as L<SSL_accept(3)> or L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>. Alternatively you can call a
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standard read function such as L<SSL_read_ex(3)>, which will transparently
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complete the connection and read the requested data. Note that it is an error to
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attempt to complete the connection before SSL_read_early_data() has returned
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SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH.
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Only servers may call SSL_read_early_data().
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Calls to SSL_read_early_data() may, in certain circumstances, complete the
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connection immediately without further need to call a function such as
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L<SSL_accept(3)>. This can happen if the client is using a protocol version less
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than TLSv1.3. Applications can test for this by calling
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L<SSL_is_init_finished(3)>. Alternatively, applications may choose to call
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L<SSL_accept(3)> anyway. Such a call will successfully return immediately with no
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further action taken.
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When a session is created between a server and a client the server will specify
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the maximum amount of any early data that it will accept on any future
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connection attempt. By default the server does not accept early data; a
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server may indicate support for early data by calling
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SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data() or
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SSL_set_max_early_data() to set it for the whole SSL_CTX or an individual SSL
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object respectively. The B<max_early_data> parameter specifies the maximum
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amount of early data in bytes that is permitted to be sent on a single
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connection. Similarly the SSL_CTX_get_max_early_data() and
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SSL_get_max_early_data() functions can be used to obtain the current maximum
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early data settings for the SSL_CTX and SSL objects respectively. Generally a
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server application will either use both of SSL_read_early_data() and
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SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data() (or SSL_set_max_early_data()), or neither of them,
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since there is no practical benefit from using only one of them. If the maximum
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early data setting for a server is non-zero then replay protection is
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automatically enabled (see L</REPLAY PROTECTION> below).
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If the server rejects the early data sent by a client then it will skip over
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the data that is sent. The maximum amount of received early data that is skipped
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is controlled by the recv_max_early_data setting. If a client sends more than
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this then the connection will abort. This value can be set by calling
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SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data() or SSL_set_recv_max_early_data(). The current
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value for this setting can be obtained by calling
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SSL_CTX_get_recv_max_early_data() or SSL_get_recv_max_early_data(). The default
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value for this setting is 16,384 bytes.
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The recv_max_early_data value also has an impact on early data that is accepted.
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The amount of data that is accepted will always be the lower of the
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max_early_data for the session and the recv_max_early_data setting for the
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server. If a client sends more data than this then the connection will abort.
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The configured value for max_early_data on a server may change over time as
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required. However clients may have tickets containing the previously configured
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max_early_data value. The recv_max_early_data should always be equal to or
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higher than any recently configured max_early_data value in order to avoid
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aborted connections. The recv_max_early_data should never be set to less than
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the current configured max_early_data value.
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Some server applications may wish to have more control over whether early data
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is accepted or not, for example to mitigate replay risks (see L</REPLAY PROTECTION>
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below) or to decline early_data when the server is heavily loaded. The functions
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SSL_CTX_set_allow_early_data_cb() and SSL_set_allow_early_data_cb() set a
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callback which is called at a point in the handshake immediately before a
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decision is made to accept or reject early data. The callback is provided with a
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pointer to the user data argument that was provided when the callback was first
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set. Returning 1 from the callback will allow early data and returning 0 will
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reject it. Note that the OpenSSL library may reject early data for other reasons
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in which case this callback will not get called. Notably, the built-in replay
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protection feature will still be used even if a callback is present unless it
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has been explicitly disabled using the SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY option. See
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L</REPLAY PROTECTION> below.
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=head1 NOTES
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The whole purpose of early data is to enable a client to start sending data to
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the server before a full round trip of network traffic has occurred. Application
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developers should ensure they consider optimisation of the underlying TCP socket
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to obtain a performant solution. For example Nagle's algorithm is commonly used
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by operating systems in an attempt to avoid lots of small TCP packets. In many
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scenarios this is beneficial for performance, but it does not work well with the
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early data solution as implemented in OpenSSL. In Nagle's algorithm the OS will
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buffer outgoing TCP data if a TCP packet has already been sent which we have not
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yet received an ACK for from the peer. The buffered data will only be
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transmitted if enough data to fill an entire TCP packet is accumulated, or if
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the ACK is received from the peer. The initial ClientHello will be sent in the
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first TCP packet along with any data from the first call to
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SSL_write_early_data(). If the amount of data written will exceed the size of a
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single TCP packet, or if there are more calls to SSL_write_early_data() then
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that additional data will be sent in subsequent TCP packets which will be
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buffered by the OS and not sent until an ACK is received for the first packet
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containing the ClientHello. This means the early data is not actually
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sent until a complete round trip with the server has occurred which defeats the
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objective of early data.
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In many operating systems the TCP_NODELAY socket option is available to disable
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Nagle's algorithm. If an application opts to disable Nagle's algorithm
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consideration should be given to turning it back on again after the handshake is
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complete if appropriate.
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In rare circumstances, it may be possible for a client to have a session that
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reports a max early data value greater than 0, but where the server does not
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support this. For example, this can occur if a server has had its configuration
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changed to accept a lower max early data value such as by calling
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SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data(). Another example is if a server used to
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support TLSv1.3 but was later downgraded to TLSv1.2. Sending early data to such
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a server will cause the connection to abort. Clients that encounter an aborted
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connection while sending early data may want to retry the connection without
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sending early data as this does not happen automatically. A client will have to
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establish a new transport layer connection to the server and attempt the SSL/TLS
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connection again but without sending early data. Note that it is inadvisable to
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retry with a lower maximum protocol version.
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=head1 REPLAY PROTECTION
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When early data is in use the TLS protocol provides no security guarantees that
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the same early data was not replayed across multiple connections. As a
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mitigation for this issue OpenSSL automatically enables replay protection if the
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server is configured with a non-zero max early data value. With replay
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protection enabled sessions are forced to be single use only. If a client
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attempts to reuse a session ticket more than once, then the second and
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subsequent attempts will fall back to a full handshake (and any early data that
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was submitted will be ignored). Note that single use tickets are enforced even
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if a client does not send any early data.
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The replay protection mechanism relies on the internal OpenSSL server session
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cache (see L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>). When replay protection is
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being used the server will operate as if the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option had been
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selected (see L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>). Sessions will be added to the cache
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whenever a session ticket is issued. When a client attempts to resume the
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session, OpenSSL will check for its presence in the internal cache. If it exists
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then the resumption is allowed and the session is removed from the cache. If it
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does not exist then the resumption is not allowed and a full handshake will
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occur.
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Note that some applications may maintain an external cache of sessions (see
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L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(3)> and similar functions). It is the application's
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responsibility to ensure that any sessions in the external cache are also
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populated in the internal cache and that once removed from the internal cache
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they are similarly removed from the external cache. Failing to do this could
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result in an application becoming vulnerable to replay attacks. Note that
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OpenSSL will lock the internal cache while a session is removed but that lock is
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not held when the remove session callback (see L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(3)>)
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is called. This could result in a small amount of time where the session has
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been removed from the internal cache but is still available in the external
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cache. Applications should be designed with this in mind in order to minimise
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the possibility of replay attacks.
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The OpenSSL replay protection does not apply to external Pre Shared Keys (PSKs)
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(e.g. see SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(3)). Therefore extreme caution
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should be applied when combining external PSKs with early data.
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Some applications may mitigate the replay risks in other ways. For those
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applications it is possible to turn off the built-in replay protection feature
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using the B<SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY> option. See L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> for
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details. Applications can also set a callback to make decisions about accepting
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early data or not. See SSL_CTX_set_allow_early_data_cb() above for details.
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=head1 RETURN VALUES
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SSL_write_early_data() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. In the event of a
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failure call L<SSL_get_error(3)> to determine the correct course of action.
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SSL_read_early_data() returns SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR for failure,
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SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS for success with more data to read and
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SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH for success with no more to data be read. In the
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event of a failure call L<SSL_get_error(3)> to determine the correct course of
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action.
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SSL_get_max_early_data(), SSL_CTX_get_max_early_data() and
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SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data() return the maximum number of early data bytes
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that may be sent.
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SSL_set_max_early_data(), SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data() and
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SSL_SESSION_set_max_early_data() return 1 for success or 0 for failure.
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SSL_get_early_data_status() returns SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED if early data was
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accepted by the server, SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED if early data was rejected by
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the server, or SSL_EARLY_DATA_NOT_SENT if no early data was sent.
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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L<SSL_get_error(3)>,
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L<SSL_write_ex(3)>,
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L<SSL_read_ex(3)>,
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L<SSL_connect(3)>,
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L<SSL_accept(3)>,
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L<SSL_do_handshake(3)>,
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L<SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(3)>,
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L<ssl(7)>
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=head1 HISTORY
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All of the functions described above were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
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=head1 COPYRIGHT
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Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
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=cut
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