c16de9d832
Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
252 lines
7.9 KiB
C
252 lines
7.9 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "e_os.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "rand_lcl.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
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# include <linux/random.h>
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#endif
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#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && \
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!defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
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# error "UEFI and VXWorks only support seeding NONE"
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#endif
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#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \
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|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
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|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
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# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
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# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
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# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
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# endif
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# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
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# error "Unsupported HP-PA and IA32 at the same time."
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# endif
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# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
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# error "Must have one of HP-PA or IA32"
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# endif
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/*
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* The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to
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* generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the
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* uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
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* interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
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* relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
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* it can be read. If it is ported to an environment where execution speed
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* is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
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* clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results
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* would be far more predictable. This should only be used for legacy
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* platforms.
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*
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* As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte.
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*/
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size_t RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
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{
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short int code;
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gid_t curr_gid;
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pid_t curr_pid;
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uid_t curr_uid;
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int i, k;
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size_t bytes_needed;
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struct timespec ts;
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unsigned char v;
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# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
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long duration;
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extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code);
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# else
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long long duration;
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extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
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# endif
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/*
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* Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some* variation between
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* different processes.
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*/
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curr_gid = getgid();
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RAND_POOL_add(pool, &curr_gid, sizeof(curr_gid), 0);
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curr_pid = getpid();
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RAND_POOL_add(pool, &curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid), 0);
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curr_uid = getuid();
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RAND_POOL_add(pool, &curr_uid, sizeof(curr_uid), 0);
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bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 2 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
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for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) {
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/*
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* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
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* interference, etc.
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*/
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for (k = 0; k < 99; k++)
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ts.tv_nsec = random();
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# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
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/* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */
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duration = 1;
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s$sleep(&duration, &code);
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# else
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/* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */
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duration = 1;
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s$sleep2(&duration, &code);
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# endif
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/* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
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clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
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v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
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RAND_POOL_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2);
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}
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return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
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}
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# else
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# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) && \
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(defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) || !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
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# error "Seeding uses EGD but EGD is turned off or no device given"
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# endif
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# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) && !defined(DEVRANDOM)
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# error "Seeding uses urandom but DEVRANDOM is not configured"
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# endif
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# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
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# if defined(DEVRANDOM)
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# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
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# else
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# error "OS seeding requires DEVRANDOM to be configured"
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# endif
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# endif
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# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
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# error "librandom not (yet) supported"
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# endif
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/*
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* Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful.
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*
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* TODO(DRBG): If more than one entropy source is available, is it
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* preferable to stop as soon as enough entropy has been collected
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* (as favored by @rsalz) or should one rather be defensive and add
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* more entropy than requested and/or from different sources?
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*
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* Currently, the user can select multiple entropy sources in the
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* configure step, yet in practice only the first available source
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* will be used. A more flexible solution has been requested, but
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* currently it is not clear how this can be achieved without
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* overengineering the problem. There are many parameters which
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* could be taken into account when selecting the order and amount
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* of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality,
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* possibility of blocking).
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*/
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size_t RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
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{
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# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE
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return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
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# else
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size_t bytes_needed;
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size_t entropy_available = 0;
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unsigned char *buffer;
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# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
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bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
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buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
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if (buffer != NULL) {
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size_t bytes = 0;
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if (getrandom(buffer, bytes_needed, 0) == (int)bytes_needed)
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bytes = bytes_needed;
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entropy_available = RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
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}
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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# endif
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# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
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{
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/* Not yet implemented. */
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}
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# endif
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# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
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bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
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if (bytes_needed > 0) {
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static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM, NULL };
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FILE *fp;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
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if ((fp = fopen(paths[i], "rb")) == NULL)
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continue;
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setbuf(fp, NULL);
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buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
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if (buffer != NULL) {
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size_t bytes = 0;
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if (fread(buffer, 1, bytes_needed, fp) == bytes_needed)
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bytes = bytes_needed;
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entropy_available = RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
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}
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fclose(fp);
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
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}
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}
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# endif
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# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
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entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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# endif
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# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
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entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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# endif
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# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
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bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
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if (bytes_needed > 0) {
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static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
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int i;
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for (i = 0; paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
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buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
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if (buffer != NULL) {
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size_t bytes = 0;
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int num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i],
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buffer, (int)bytes_needed);
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if (num == (int)bytes_needed)
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bytes = bytes_needed;
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entropy_available = RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
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}
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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}
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}
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# endif
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return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
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# endif
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}
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# endif
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#endif
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