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openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
Alessandro Ghedini 200c8ed4f5 Remove useless code 
RT#4081

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 070c23325a)
2015-10-23 20:47:53 +02:00

3535 lines
117 KiB
C
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/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return (SSLv3_client_method());
else
return (NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
#endif
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
int ret = -1;
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
SSL_clear(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/*
* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
* don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
* handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;) {
state = s->state;
switch (s->state) {
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
/* break */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server = 0;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
buf = NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num = 0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/*
* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
*/
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown = 0;
ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num = 0;
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
/* receive renewed session ticket */
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
#endif
} else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
if (ret < 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 1) {
s->hit = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
}
#endif
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
/* or PSK */
if (!
(s->s3->tmp.
new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
} else {
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
} else
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num = 0;
/*
* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
* the server
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
/*
* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
*/
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
} else {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
else
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
if (s->hit) {
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
}
} else {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/*
* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
*/
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
else
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
/*
* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
* buffering now
*/
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
s->init_num = 0;
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
ret = 1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
goto end;
/* break; */
case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
/* did we do anything */
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
if (s->debug) {
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
new_state = s->state;
s->state = state;
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
s->state = new_state;
}
}
skip = 0;
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
if (buf != NULL)
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
return (ret);
}
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i;
unsigned long l;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
!sess->session_id_length ||
#else
/*
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
* "ticket" without a session ID.
*/
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
#endif
(sess->not_resumable)) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3->client_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = &(buf[4]);
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
#if 0
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
s->client_version = s->version;
#else
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
#endif
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i = 0;
else
i = s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++) = i;
if (i != 0) {
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
p += i;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
/*
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
* use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
s2n(i, p);
p += i;
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++) = 1;
#else
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j = 0;
else
j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
*(p++) = 1 + j;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
*(p++) = comp->id;
}
#endif
*(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((p =
ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#endif
l = (p - d);
d = buf;
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
l2n3(l, d);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = p - buf;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, al, ok;
unsigned int j;
long n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
} else { /* already sent a cookie */
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
p += 2;
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
s->hit = 0;
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/*
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
* EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
* servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
* is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
* we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
* server wants to resume.
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
} else {
/*
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
* didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->session_id_length = j;
memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
}
p += j;
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
if (i < 0) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
* set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
/* Workaround is now obsolete */
#if 0
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
#endif
{
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/*
* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for client
* authentication.
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (*(p++) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#else
j = *(p++);
if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (j == 0)
comp = NULL;
else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
} else
comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (p != (d + n)) {
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *q, *p;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
* KRB5 */
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p, llen);
if (llen + 3 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2l3(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q = p;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
nc += l + 3;
p = q;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL)
goto err;
if (s->session->sess_cert)
ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert = sc;
sc->cert_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/*
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
? 0 : 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (need_cert && i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (need_cert) {
sc->peer_cert_type = i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/*
* Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
* of lines ago.
*/
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer = x;
} else {
sc->peer_cert_type = i;
sc->peer_key = NULL;
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = NULL;
}
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return (ret);
}
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param, *p;
int al, j, ok;
long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
/*
* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
* ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
*/
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/*
* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
* identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
* problems later.
*/
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
} else {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len = 0;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (1 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 1;
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# else
if (0) ;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
x509);
# endif
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
rsa = NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0) ;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
goto f_err;
}
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
goto f_err;
}
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
goto f_err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# else
if (0) ;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
x509);
# endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
dh = NULL;
} else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
* public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/*
* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
* byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len = 4;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p += 3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p += 1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n -= param_len;
p += encoded_pt_len;
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
# endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
int sigalg;
if (2 > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
/* Should never happen */
if (sigalg == -1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
if (md == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
} else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
n -= 2;
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/*
* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
*/
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
int num;
unsigned int size;
j = 0;
q = md_buf;
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
q += size;
j += size;
}
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
unsigned long n, nc, l;
unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
const unsigned char *p, *q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
/*
* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
* wont be doing client auth.
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
}
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
ctype_num = *(p++);
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
p += ctype_num;
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
n2s(p, llen);
/*
* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
* length value.
*/
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += llen;
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
n2s(p, llen);
#if 0
{
FILE *out;
out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
fclose(out);
}
#endif
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2s(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
q = p;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
goto cont;
else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p += l;
nc += l + 2;
}
if (0) {
cont:
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
goto done;
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
done:
if (ca_sk != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
long n;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *d;
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n < 6) {
/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint);
n2s(p, ticklen);
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
if (ticklen == 0)
return 1;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
/*
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
* one
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
/*
* Remove the old session from the cache
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
s->session);
} else {
/* We carry on if this fails */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
}
}
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
# else
EVP_sha1(), NULL);
# endif
ret = 1;
return (ret);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
unsigned long resplen, n;
const unsigned char *p;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n < 4) {
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
n2l3(p, resplen);
if (resplen + 4 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
#endif
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
long n;
/* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
ret = 1;
return (ret);
}
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p, *d;
int n;
unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p = &(d[4]);
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
/*
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else {
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
x509);
if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|| (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
goto err;
}
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
q = p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p += 2;
n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif
if (n <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
s2n(n, q);
n += 2;
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
tmp_buf,
sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
authp = NULL;
# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
authp = &authenticator;
# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
kssl_err.text);
}
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (krb5rc) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
/*-
* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
* in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
*
* Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
* n = krb5_ap_req.length;
* memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
* if (krb5_ap_req.data)
* kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
*
* Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
* (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
* Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
* with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
* Example:
* KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
* Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
* optional authenticator omitted.
*/
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
p += enc_ticket->length;
n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
/* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
if (authp && authp->length) {
s2n(authp->length, p);
memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
p += authp->length;
n += authp->length + 2;
free(authp->data);
authp->data = NULL;
authp->length = 0;
} else {
s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
n += 2;
}
tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
/*-
* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
* kssl_ctx->length);
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
sizeof tmp_buf);
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
outl += padl;
if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
/* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
s2n(outl, p);
memcpy(p, epms, outl);
p += outl;
n += outl + 2;
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
tmp_buf,
sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else {
/* we get them from the cert */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
/* generate a new random key */
if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/*
* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
* clear it out afterwards
*/
n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
if (n <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p, n);
/* clean up */
memset(p, 0, n);
/* send off the data */
n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n, p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
n += 2;
DH_free(dh_clnt);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
/*
* Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
* ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
/*-
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
} else {
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
srvr_pub_pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
|| (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
|| (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
}
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
/*
* Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
* private key to perform the ECDH computation.
*/
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
* clear it out afterwards
*/
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
if (field_size <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p, n);
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
} else {
/*
* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
* accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key */
n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
}
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
int keytype;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
/*
* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
peer_cert =
s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
if (!peer_cert)
peer_cert =
s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
if (!peer_cert) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
*
* * parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
/*
* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
* * would be used
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/*
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
* data
*/
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
shared_ukm) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*
* Encapsulate it into sequence
*/
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
< 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80) {
*(p++) = 0x81;
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
n = msglen + 3;
} else {
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
n = msglen + 2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
premaster_secret,
32);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
/* send off the data */
n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
s2n(n, p);
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
n += 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session->master_key_length =
SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key)) <
0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
/*
* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
* strnlen.
*/
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
size_t identity_len;
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
n = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk_or_pre_ms,
sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
} else if (psk_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
identity_len = strlen(identity);
if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t += psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint =
BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
&& s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
psk_or_pre_ms,
pre_ms_len);
s2n(identity_len, p);
memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
n = 2 + identity_len;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
l2n3(n, d);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = n + 4;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p, *d;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n;
int j;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p = &(d[4]);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
} else {
ERR_clear_error();
}
/*
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
* digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 4;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i;
size_t sigsize = 64;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
l2n3(n, d);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
s->init_num = (int)n + 4;
s->init_off = 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int i;
unsigned long l;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(-1); We then get retied later
*/
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return (-1);
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
if (x509 != NULL)
X509_free(x509);
if (pkey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return (1);
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
}
}
/* Ok, we have a cert */
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
if (!l) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
s->init_num = (int)l;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i, idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int pkey_bits;
SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
#endif
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH | SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return (1);
sc = s->session->sess_cert;
if (sc == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else {
return 1;
}
}
#endif
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
if (rsa != NULL) {
/* server key exchange is not allowed. */
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# endif
/* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
/* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
/* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
/* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/*
* Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
* the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
* message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
* Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
* ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
* pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
* is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
*/
static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
{
int ok = 0;
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return 0;
/* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/*
* This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
* so permit appropriate message length.
* We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
* and not its length.
*/
s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
if (!ok)
return -1;
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
return 1;
/* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
}
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
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