7d550561e3
Call to i2d method returns an int value.
Fix:
CID 1338183 (#1 of 1): Improper use of negative value (NEGATIVE_RETURNS)
CID 1371691 (#1 of 1): Improper use of negative value (NEGATIVE_RETURNS)
CID 1371692 (#1 of 1): Improper use of negative value (NEGATIVE_RETURNS)
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7359)
(cherry picked from commit da84249be6
)
178 lines
4.9 KiB
C
178 lines
4.9 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
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#include "internal/evp_int.h"
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#ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD
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int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
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char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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const EVP_MD *type;
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unsigned char *p, *buf_in = NULL;
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int ret = -1, i, inl;
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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i = OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
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type = EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
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if (type == NULL) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
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goto err;
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}
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if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
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goto err;
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}
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inl = i2d(data, NULL);
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if (inl <= 0) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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buf_in = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
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if (buf_in == NULL) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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p = buf_in;
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i2d(data, &p);
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ret = EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL)
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&& EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf_in, inl);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, (unsigned int)inl);
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if (!ret) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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ret = -1;
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if (EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)signature->data,
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(unsigned int)signature->length, pkey) <= 0) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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ret = 0;
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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#endif
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int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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unsigned char *buf_in = NULL;
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int ret = -1, inl = 0;
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int mdnid, pknid;
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size_t inll = 0;
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if (!pkey) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return -1;
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}
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if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
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return -1;
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}
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ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
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if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid)) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
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goto err;
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}
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if (mdnid == NID_undef) {
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if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,
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ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
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goto err;
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}
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ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(ctx, it, asn, a, signature, pkey);
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/*
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* Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we exit
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* straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying verification
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* routine handles all verification.
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*/
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if (ret != 2)
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goto err;
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ret = -1;
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} else {
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const EVP_MD *type = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
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if (type == NULL) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,
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ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
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goto err;
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}
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/* Check public key OID matches public key type */
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if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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ret = 0;
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goto err;
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}
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}
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inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
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if (inl <= 0) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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if (buf_in == NULL) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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inll = inl;
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ret = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, signature->data, (size_t)signature->length,
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buf_in, inl);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, inll);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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