openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
Richard Levitte 26a3a48d65 There have been a number of complaints from a number of sources that names
like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages.  That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.

This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
2000-06-01 22:19:21 +00:00

163 lines
4.1 KiB
C

/* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */
/* Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS"
basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. */
/* EME_OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
#if !defined(NO_SHA) && !defined(NO_SHA1)
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
unsigned char *from, int flen, unsigned char *param, int plen)
{
int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
unsigned char *db, *seed;
unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
return (0);
}
if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return (0);
}
dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (dbmask == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
to[0] = 0;
seed = to + 1;
db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
SHA1(param, plen, db);
memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
return (0);
#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
memcpy(seed,
"\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
20);
#endif
MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
return (1);
}
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, unsigned char *param,
int plen)
{
int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
unsigned char *maskeddb;
int lzero;
unsigned char *db, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
if (db == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
lzero = num - flen;
maskeddb = from - lzero + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen);
for (i = lzero; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
seed[i] ^= from[i - lzero];
MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
SHA1(param, plen, phash);
if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
else
{
for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
if (db[i] != 0x00)
break;
if (db[i] != 0x01 || i++ >= dblen)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP,
RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
else
{
mlen = dblen - i;
if (tlen < mlen)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
mlen = -1;
}
else
memcpy(to, db + i, mlen);
}
}
OPENSSL_free(db);
return (mlen);
}
int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, unsigned char *seed, long seedlen)
{
long i, outlen = 0;
unsigned char cnt[4];
SHA_CTX c;
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
{
cnt[0] = (i >> 24) & 255, cnt[1] = (i >> 16) & 255,
cnt[2] = (i >> 8) & 255, cnt[3] = i & 255;
SHA1_Init(&c);
SHA1_Update(&c, seed, seedlen);
SHA1_Update(&c, cnt, 4);
if (outlen + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH <= len)
{
SHA1_Final(mask + outlen, &c);
outlen += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
else
{
SHA1_Final(md, &c);
memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
outlen = len;
}
}
return (0);
}
#endif