40720ce3ca
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
1098 lines
38 KiB
C
1098 lines
38 KiB
C
/*-
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* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com)
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*
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com)
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*
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* Copyright@2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
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* All right Reserved.
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* *
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* THIS FILE IS PROVIDED BY BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES ``AS IS'' AND *
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE *
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE *
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES BE LIABLE *
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL *
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS *
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) *
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT *
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY *
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF *
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* SUCH DAMAGE. *
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====================================================================*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/pem.h>
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#include <openssl/dso.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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# include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
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# include <openssl/dsa.h>
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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# include <openssl/dh.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
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# ifdef FLAT_INC
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# include "sureware.h"
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# else
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# include "vendor_defns/sureware.h"
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# endif
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# define SUREWARE_LIB_NAME "sureware engine"
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# include "e_sureware_err.c"
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static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p,
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void (*f) (void));
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static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e);
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static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e);
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static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e);
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static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
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/* RSA stuff */
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
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static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
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# endif
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/* RAND stuff */
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static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
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static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
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static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
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/* KM stuff */
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static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
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UI_METHOD *ui_method,
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void *callback_data);
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static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
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UI_METHOD *ui_method,
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void *callback_data);
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static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
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int idx, long argl, void *argp);
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# if 0
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static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
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int idx, long argl, void *argp);
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
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static int surewarehk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
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const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
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BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
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{
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return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
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}
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/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
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static RSA_METHOD surewarehk_rsa = {
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"SureWare RSA method",
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NULL, /* pub_enc */
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NULL, /* pub_dec */
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surewarehk_rsa_sign, /* our rsa_sign is OpenSSL priv_enc */
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surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec, /* priv_dec */
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NULL, /* mod_exp */
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surewarehk_mod_exp_mont, /* mod_exp_mongomery */
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NULL, /* init */
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NULL, /* finish */
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0, /* RSA flag */
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NULL,
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NULL, /* OpenSSL sign */
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NULL, /* OpenSSL verify */
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NULL /* keygen */
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};
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
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/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */
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static int surewarehk_modexp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
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const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
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BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
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{
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return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
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}
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static DH_METHOD surewarehk_dh = {
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"SureWare DH method",
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NULL, /* gen_key */
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NULL, /* agree, */
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surewarehk_modexp_dh, /* dh mod exp */
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NULL, /* init */
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NULL, /* finish */
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0, /* flags */
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NULL,
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NULL
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};
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# endif
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static RAND_METHOD surewarehk_rand = {
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/* "SureWare RAND method", */
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surewarehk_rand_seed,
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surewarehk_rand_bytes,
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NULL, /* cleanup */
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surewarehk_rand_add,
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surewarehk_rand_bytes,
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NULL, /* rand_status */
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};
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
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/* DSA stuff */
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static DSA_SIG *surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
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DSA *dsa);
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static int surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1,
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BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2,
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BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
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BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
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{
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BIGNUM t;
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int to_return = 0;
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BN_init(&t);
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/* let rr = a1 ^ p1 mod m */
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if (!surewarehk_modexp(rr, a1, p1, m, ctx))
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goto end;
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/* let t = a2 ^ p2 mod m */
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if (!surewarehk_modexp(&t, a2, p2, m, ctx))
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goto end;
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/* let rr = rr * t mod m */
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if (!BN_mod_mul(rr, rr, &t, m, ctx))
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goto end;
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to_return = 1;
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end:
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BN_free(&t);
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return to_return;
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}
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static DSA_METHOD surewarehk_dsa = {
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"SureWare DSA method",
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surewarehk_dsa_do_sign,
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NULL, /* sign setup */
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NULL, /* verify, */
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surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp, /* mod exp */
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NULL, /* bn mod exp */
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NULL, /* init */
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NULL, /* finish */
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0,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL
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};
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# endif
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static const char *engine_sureware_id = "sureware";
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static const char *engine_sureware_name = "SureWare hardware engine support";
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/* Now, to our own code */
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/*
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* As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking (indeed -
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* the lock will already be held by our caller!!!)
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*/
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static int bind_sureware(ENGINE *e)
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{
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
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const DSA_METHOD *meth2;
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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const DH_METHOD *meth3;
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# endif
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if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_sureware_id) ||
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!ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_sureware_name) ||
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &surewarehk_rsa) ||
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
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!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, &surewarehk_dsa) ||
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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!ENGINE_set_DH(e, &surewarehk_dh) ||
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# endif
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!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &surewarehk_rand) ||
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!ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, surewarehk_destroy) ||
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!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, surewarehk_init) ||
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!ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, surewarehk_finish) ||
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!ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, surewarehk_ctrl) ||
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!ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_privkey) ||
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!ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_pubkey))
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return 0;
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/*
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* We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly to the
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* cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use those functions. NB:
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* We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or anything "more generic" because
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* something like the RSAref code may not hook properly, and if you own
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* one of these cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
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* anyway!
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*/
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meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
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if (meth1) {
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surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
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surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
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}
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
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/*
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* Use the DSA_OpenSSL() method and just hook the mod_exp-ish bits.
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*/
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meth2 = DSA_OpenSSL();
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if (meth2) {
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surewarehk_dsa.dsa_do_verify = meth2->dsa_do_verify;
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}
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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/* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */
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meth3 = DH_OpenSSL();
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if (meth3) {
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surewarehk_dh.generate_key = meth3->generate_key;
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surewarehk_dh.compute_key = meth3->compute_key;
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}
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# endif
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/* Ensure the sureware error handling is set up */
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ERR_load_SUREWARE_strings();
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return 1;
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}
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
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static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
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{
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if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_sureware_id) != 0))
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return 0;
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if (!bind_sureware(e))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
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IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
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# else
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static ENGINE *engine_sureware(void)
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{
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ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
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if (!ret)
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return NULL;
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if (!bind_sureware(ret)) {
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ENGINE_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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void ENGINE_load_sureware(void)
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{
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/* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
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ENGINE *toadd = engine_sureware();
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if (!toadd)
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return;
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ENGINE_add(toadd);
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ENGINE_free(toadd);
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ERR_clear_error();
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}
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# endif
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/*
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* This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading the
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* SureWareHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an init() or
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* finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're operating with
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* global locks, so this should be thread-safe implicitly.
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*/
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static DSO *surewarehk_dso = NULL;
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */
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static int rsaHndidx = -1;
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
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/* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */
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static int dsaHndidx = -1;
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# endif
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/*
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* These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has
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* successfully (un)loaded.
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*/
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static SureWareHook_Init_t *p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Finish_t *p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Free_t *p_surewarehk_Free = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL;
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static SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL;
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/* Used in the DSO operations. */
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static const char *surewarehk_LIBNAME = "SureWareHook";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Init = "SureWareHook_Init";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Finish = "SureWareHook_Finish";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = "SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = "SureWareHook_Rand_Seed";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = "SureWareHook_Load_Privkey";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = "SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey =
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"SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey =
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"SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Free = "SureWareHook_Free";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = "SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = "SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = "SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign";
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static const char *n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = "SureWareHook_Mod_Exp";
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static BIO *logstream = NULL;
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/*
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* SureWareHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the
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* higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no error
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* checking, take a look lower down where these functions are called, the
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* checking and error handling is probably down there.
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*/
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static int threadsafe = 1;
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static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p,
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void (*f) (void))
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{
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int to_return = 1;
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switch (cmd) {
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case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM:
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{
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BIO *bio = (BIO *)p;
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
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if (logstream) {
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BIO_free(logstream);
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logstream = NULL;
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}
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if (CRYPTO_add(&bio->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO) > 1)
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logstream = bio;
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else
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SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL,
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SUREWARE_R_BIO_WAS_FREED);
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}
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
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break;
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/*
|
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* This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing"
|
|
* the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from
|
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* within the library (or were provided to the library from the
|
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* calling application). This is to remove any baggage for
|
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* applications not using multithreading.
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*/
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case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING:
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
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threadsafe = 0;
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
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break;
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|
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/* The command isn't understood by this engine */
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default:
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SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL,
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ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
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to_return = 0;
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break;
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}
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return to_return;
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}
|
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|
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/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_surewarehk()" constructor) */
|
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static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e)
|
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{
|
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ERR_unload_SUREWARE_strings();
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return 1;
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}
|
|
|
|
/* (de)initialisation functions. */
|
|
static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e)
|
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{
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char msg[64] = "ENGINE_init";
|
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SureWareHook_Init_t *p1 = NULL;
|
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SureWareHook_Finish_t *p2 = NULL;
|
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SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p3 = NULL;
|
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SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p4 = NULL;
|
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SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p5 = NULL;
|
|
SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p6 = NULL;
|
|
SureWareHook_Free_t *p7 = NULL;
|
|
SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p8 = NULL;
|
|
SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p9 = NULL;
|
|
SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p12 = NULL;
|
|
SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p13 = NULL;
|
|
SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p14 = NULL;
|
|
SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p15 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (surewarehk_dso != NULL) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Attempt to load libsurewarehk.so/surewarehk.dll/whatever. */
|
|
surewarehk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, surewarehk_LIBNAME, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (surewarehk_dso == NULL) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!
|
|
(p1 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Init_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Init))
|
|
|| !(p2 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Finish_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Finish))
|
|
|| !(p3 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes))
|
|
|| !(p4 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed))
|
|
|| !(p5 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey))
|
|
|| !(p6 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey))
|
|
|| !(p7 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Free_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Free))
|
|
|| !(p8 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec))
|
|
|| !(p9 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign))
|
|
|| !(p12 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign))
|
|
|| !(p13 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey))
|
|
|| !(p14 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey))
|
|
|| !(p15 =
|
|
(SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso,
|
|
n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp))) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Copy the pointers */
|
|
p_surewarehk_Init = p1;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Finish = p2;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = p3;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = p4;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = p5;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = p6;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Free = p7;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = p8;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = p9;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = p12;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = p13;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = p14;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = p15;
|
|
/* Contact the hardware and initialises it. */
|
|
if (p_surewarehk_Init(msg, threadsafe) == SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (p_surewarehk_Init(msg, threadsafe) == SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* try to load the default private key, if failed does not return a
|
|
* failure but wait for an explicit ENGINE_load_privakey
|
|
*/
|
|
surewarehk_load_privkey(e, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Everything's fine. */
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (rsaHndidx == -1)
|
|
rsaHndidx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
|
|
"SureWareHook RSA key handle",
|
|
NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free);
|
|
# endif
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
if (dsaHndidx == -1)
|
|
dsaHndidx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
|
|
"SureWareHook DSA key handle",
|
|
NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free);
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (surewarehk_dso)
|
|
DSO_free(surewarehk_dso);
|
|
surewarehk_dso = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Free = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e)
|
|
{
|
|
int to_return = 1;
|
|
if (surewarehk_dso == NULL) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH, ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED);
|
|
to_return = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p_surewarehk_Finish();
|
|
if (!DSO_free(surewarehk_dso)) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
|
|
to_return = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
if (logstream)
|
|
BIO_free(logstream);
|
|
surewarehk_dso = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Free = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
|
|
p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL;
|
|
return to_return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void surewarehk_error_handling(char *const msg, int func, int ret)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE:
|
|
ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK:
|
|
ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE:
|
|
ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_SIZE_TOO_LARGE_OR_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_INVALID_PAD:
|
|
ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 1: /* nothing */
|
|
msg[0] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
if (*msg) {
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1, msg);
|
|
if (logstream) {
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
|
|
BIO_write(logstream, msg, strlen(msg));
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_rand_bytes";
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes(msg, buf, num);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES, ret);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret == 1 ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_rand_seed";
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed(msg, buf, num);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED, ret);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
|
|
{
|
|
surewarehk_rand_seed(buf, num);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static EVP_PKEY *sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
|
|
char *hptr, unsigned long el,
|
|
char keytype)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
RSA *rsatmp = NULL;
|
|
# endif
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
DSA *dsatmp = NULL;
|
|
# endif
|
|
char msg[64] = "sureware_load_public";
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey || !p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
switch (keytype) {
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
case 1:
|
|
/*RSA*/
|
|
/* set private external reference */
|
|
rsatmp = RSA_new_method(e);
|
|
RSA_set_ex_data(rsatmp, rsaHndidx, hptr);
|
|
rsatmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
|
|
|
|
/* set public big nums */
|
|
rsatmp->e = BN_new();
|
|
rsatmp->n = BN_new();
|
|
bn_expand2(rsatmp->e, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
bn_expand2(rsatmp->n, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
if (!rsatmp->e || rsatmp->e->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) ||
|
|
!rsatmp->n || rsatmp->n->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey(msg, key_id, el,
|
|
(unsigned long *)rsatmp->n->d,
|
|
(unsigned long *)rsatmp->e->d);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC, ret);
|
|
if (ret != 1) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC,
|
|
ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* normalise pub e and pub n */
|
|
rsatmp->e->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(rsatmp->e);
|
|
rsatmp->n->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(rsatmp->n);
|
|
/* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */
|
|
res = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rsatmp);
|
|
break;
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
case 2:
|
|
/*DSA*/
|
|
/* set private/public external reference */
|
|
dsatmp = DSA_new_method(e);
|
|
DSA_set_ex_data(dsatmp, dsaHndidx, hptr);
|
|
/*
|
|
* dsatmp->flags |= DSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* set public key */
|
|
dsatmp->pub_key = BN_new();
|
|
dsatmp->p = BN_new();
|
|
dsatmp->q = BN_new();
|
|
dsatmp->g = BN_new();
|
|
bn_expand2(dsatmp->pub_key, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
bn_expand2(dsatmp->p, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
bn_expand2(dsatmp->q, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
bn_expand2(dsatmp->g, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
if (!dsatmp->pub_key
|
|
|| dsatmp->pub_key->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
|
|
|| !dsatmp->p || dsatmp->p->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
|
|
|| !dsatmp->q || dsatmp->q->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)
|
|
|| !dsatmp->g || dsatmp->g->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey(msg, key_id, el,
|
|
(unsigned long *)dsatmp->
|
|
pub_key->d,
|
|
(unsigned long *)dsatmp->p->d,
|
|
(unsigned long *)dsatmp->q->d,
|
|
(unsigned long *)dsatmp->g->d);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC, ret);
|
|
if (ret != 1) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC,
|
|
ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* set parameters */
|
|
/* normalise pubkey and parameters in case of */
|
|
dsatmp->pub_key->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(dsatmp->pub_key);
|
|
dsatmp->p->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(dsatmp->p);
|
|
dsatmp->q->top = 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(dsatmp->q);
|
|
dsatmp->g->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(dsatmp->g);
|
|
|
|
/* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */
|
|
res = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(res, dsatmp);
|
|
break;
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC,
|
|
ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
return res;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (res)
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(res);
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (rsatmp)
|
|
RSA_free(rsatmp);
|
|
# endif
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
if (dsatmp)
|
|
DSA_free(dsatmp);
|
|
# endif
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
|
|
UI_METHOD *ui_method,
|
|
void *callback_data)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
unsigned long el = 0;
|
|
char *hptr = NULL;
|
|
char keytype = 0;
|
|
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_load_privkey";
|
|
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey(msg, key_id, &hptr, &el, &keytype);
|
|
if (ret != 1) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1, msg);
|
|
} else
|
|
res = sureware_load_public(e, key_id, hptr, el, keytype);
|
|
}
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
|
|
UI_METHOD *ui_method,
|
|
void *callback_data)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
unsigned long el = 0;
|
|
char *hptr = NULL;
|
|
char keytype = 0;
|
|
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_load_pubkey";
|
|
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* call once to identify if DSA or RSA */
|
|
ret = p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey(msg, key_id, &el, &keytype);
|
|
if (ret != 1) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1, msg);
|
|
} else
|
|
res = sureware_load_public(e, key_id, hptr, el, keytype);
|
|
}
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This cleans up an RSA/DSA KM key(do not destroy the key into the hardware)
|
|
* , called when ex_data is freed
|
|
*/
|
|
static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
|
|
int idx, long argl, void *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Free) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_EX_FREE, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
} else
|
|
p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# if 0
|
|
/* not currently used (bug?) */
|
|
/*
|
|
* This cleans up an DH KM key (destroys the key into hardware), called when
|
|
* ex_data is freed
|
|
*/
|
|
static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
|
|
int idx, long argl, void *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Free) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DH_EX_FREE,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
} else
|
|
p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* return number of decrypted bytes
|
|
*/
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
|
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0, tlen;
|
|
char *buf = NULL, *hptr = NULL;
|
|
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_rsa_priv_dec";
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
}
|
|
/* extract ref to private key */
|
|
else if (!(hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx))) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
|
|
SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* analyse what padding we can do into the hardware */
|
|
if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
|
/* do it one shot */
|
|
ret =
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg, flen, (unsigned char *)from, &tlen,
|
|
to, hptr, SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
|
|
ret);
|
|
if (ret != 1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret = tlen;
|
|
} else { /* do with no padding into hardware */
|
|
|
|
ret =
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg, flen, (unsigned char *)from, &tlen,
|
|
to, hptr, SUREWARE_NO_PAD);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
|
|
ret);
|
|
if (ret != 1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* intermediate buffer for padding */
|
|
if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(tlen)) == NULL) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(buf, to, tlen); /* transfert to into buf */
|
|
switch (padding) { /* check padding in software */
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
|
|
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
|
|
ret =
|
|
RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, tlen, (unsigned char *)buf,
|
|
tlen, tlen, NULL, 0);
|
|
break;
|
|
# endif
|
|
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
|
|
ret =
|
|
RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, tlen, (unsigned char *)buf, flen,
|
|
tlen);
|
|
break;
|
|
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
|
|
ret =
|
|
RSA_padding_check_none(to, tlen, (unsigned char *)buf, flen,
|
|
tlen);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
|
|
SUREWARE_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
|
|
SUREWARE_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
if (buf) {
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, tlen);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buf);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Does what OpenSSL rsa_priv_enc does.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
|
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0, tlen;
|
|
char *hptr = NULL;
|
|
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_rsa_sign";
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_SIGN, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
}
|
|
/* extract ref to private key */
|
|
else if (!(hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx))) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_SIGN,
|
|
SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
|
|
} else {
|
|
switch (padding) {
|
|
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: /* do it in one shot */
|
|
ret =
|
|
p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign(msg, flen, (unsigned char *)from, &tlen,
|
|
to, hptr, SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_SIGN,
|
|
ret);
|
|
break;
|
|
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
|
|
default:
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_SIGN,
|
|
SUREWARE_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ret == 1 ? tlen : ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
/* DSA sign and verify */
|
|
static DSA_SIG *surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *from, int flen,
|
|
DSA *dsa)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
char *hptr = NULL;
|
|
DSA_SIG *psign = NULL;
|
|
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_dsa_do_sign";
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* extract ref to private key */
|
|
else if (!(hptr = DSA_get_ex_data(dsa, dsaHndidx))) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,
|
|
SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((psign = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
psign->r = BN_new();
|
|
psign->s = BN_new();
|
|
bn_expand2(psign->r, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
bn_expand2(psign->s, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
if (!psign->r || psign->r->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) ||
|
|
!psign->s || psign->s->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret = p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign(msg, flen, from,
|
|
(unsigned long *)psign->r->d,
|
|
(unsigned long *)psign->s->d, hptr);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,
|
|
ret);
|
|
}
|
|
psign->r->top = 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(psign->r);
|
|
psign->s->top = 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(psign->s);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (psign) {
|
|
DSA_SIG_free(psign);
|
|
psign = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return psign;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
|
|
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_modexp";
|
|
if (!p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp) {
|
|
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MODEXP, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
} else {
|
|
bn_expand2(r, m->top);
|
|
if (r && r->dmax == m->top) {
|
|
/* do it */
|
|
ret = p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp(msg,
|
|
m->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
|
|
(unsigned long *)m->d,
|
|
p->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
|
|
(unsigned long *)p->d,
|
|
a->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
|
|
(unsigned long *)a->d,
|
|
(unsigned long *)r->d);
|
|
surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MODEXP, ret);
|
|
if (ret == 1) {
|
|
/* normalise result */
|
|
r->top = m->top;
|
|
bn_fix_top(r);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare */
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
|