267 lines
6.3 KiB
Raku
267 lines
6.3 KiB
Raku
#! /usr/bin/env perl
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# Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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#
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# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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# ====================================================================
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# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
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# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
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# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
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# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
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# ====================================================================
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# September 2010.
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#
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# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
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# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
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# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Performance
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# was measured to be ~18 cycles per processed byte on z10, which is
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# almost 40% better than gcc-generated code. It should be noted that
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# 18 cycles is worse result than expected: loop is scheduled for 12
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# and the result should be close to 12. In the lack of instruction-
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# level profiling data it's impossible to tell why...
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# November 2010.
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#
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# Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs"
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# feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit
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# instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy
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# application context. The feature is not specific to any particular
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# processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code
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# remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform
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# 2.8x better than 32-bit code generated by gcc 4.3.
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# March 2011.
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#
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# Support for hardware KIMD-GHASH is verified to produce correct
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# result and therefore is engaged. On z196 it was measured to process
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# 8KB buffer ~7 faster than software implementation. It's not as
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# impressive for smaller buffer sizes and for smallest 16-bytes buffer
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# it's actually almost 2 times slower. Which is the reason why
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# KIMD-GHASH is not used in gcm_gmult_4bit.
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$flavour = shift;
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if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
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$SIZE_T=4;
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$g="";
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} else {
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$SIZE_T=8;
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$g="g";
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}
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while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
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open STDOUT,">$output";
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$softonly=0;
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$Zhi="%r0";
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$Zlo="%r1";
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$Xi="%r2"; # argument block
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$Htbl="%r3";
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$inp="%r4";
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$len="%r5";
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$rem0="%r6"; # variables
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$rem1="%r7";
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$nlo="%r8";
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$nhi="%r9";
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$xi="%r10";
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$cnt="%r11";
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$tmp="%r12";
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$x78="%r13";
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$rem_4bit="%r14";
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$sp="%r15";
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$code.=<<___;
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.text
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.globl gcm_gmult_4bit
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.align 32
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gcm_gmult_4bit:
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___
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$code.=<<___ if(!$softonly && 0); # hardware is slow for single block...
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larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
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lg %r0,0(%r1)
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tmhl %r0,0x4000 # check for message-security-assist
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jz .Lsoft_gmult
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lghi %r0,0
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lg %r1,24(%r1) # load second word of kimd capabilities vector
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tmhh %r1,0x4000 # check for function 65
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jz .Lsoft_gmult
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stg %r0,16($sp) # arrange 16 bytes of zero input
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stg %r0,24($sp)
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lghi %r0,65 # function 65
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la %r1,0($Xi) # H lies right after Xi in gcm128_context
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la $inp,16($sp)
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lghi $len,16
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.long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,$inp
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brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion"
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br %r14
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.align 32
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.Lsoft_gmult:
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___
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$code.=<<___;
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stm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
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aghi $Xi,-1
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lghi $len,1
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lghi $x78,`0xf<<3`
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larl $rem_4bit,rem_4bit
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lg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) # Xi
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j .Lgmult_shortcut
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.type gcm_gmult_4bit,\@function
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.size gcm_gmult_4bit,(.-gcm_gmult_4bit)
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.globl gcm_ghash_4bit
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.align 32
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gcm_ghash_4bit:
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___
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$code.=<<___ if(!$softonly);
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larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P
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lg %r0,0(%r1)
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tmhl %r0,0x4000 # check for message-security-assist
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jz .Lsoft_ghash
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lghi %r0,0
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la %r1,16($sp)
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.long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,%r4
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lg %r1,24($sp)
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tmhh %r1,0x4000 # check for function 65
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jz .Lsoft_ghash
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lghi %r0,65 # function 65
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la %r1,0($Xi) # H lies right after Xi in gcm128_context
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.long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,$inp
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brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion"
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br %r14
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.align 32
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.Lsoft_ghash:
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___
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$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/);
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llgfr $len,$len
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___
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$code.=<<___;
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stm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
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aghi $Xi,-1
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srlg $len,$len,4
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lghi $x78,`0xf<<3`
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larl $rem_4bit,rem_4bit
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lg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) # Xi
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lg $Zhi,0+1($Xi)
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lghi $tmp,0
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.Louter:
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xg $Zhi,0($inp) # Xi ^= inp
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xg $Zlo,8($inp)
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xgr $Zhi,$tmp
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stg $Zlo,8+1($Xi)
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stg $Zhi,0+1($Xi)
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.Lgmult_shortcut:
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lghi $tmp,0xf0
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sllg $nlo,$Zlo,4
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srlg $xi,$Zlo,8 # extract second byte
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ngr $nlo,$tmp
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lgr $nhi,$Zlo
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lghi $cnt,14
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ngr $nhi,$tmp
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lg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl)
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lg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl)
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sllg $nlo,$xi,4
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sllg $rem0,$Zlo,3
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ngr $nlo,$tmp
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ngr $rem0,$x78
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ngr $xi,$tmp
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sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60
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srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4
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srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4
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xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl)
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xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl)
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lgr $nhi,$xi
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sllg $rem1,$Zlo,3
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xgr $Zlo,$tmp
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ngr $rem1,$x78
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sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60
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j .Lghash_inner
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.align 16
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.Lghash_inner:
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srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4
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srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4
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xg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl)
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llgc $xi,0($cnt,$Xi)
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xg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl)
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sllg $nlo,$xi,4
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xg $Zhi,0($rem0,$rem_4bit)
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nill $nlo,0xf0
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sllg $rem0,$Zlo,3
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xgr $Zlo,$tmp
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ngr $rem0,$x78
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nill $xi,0xf0
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sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60
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srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4
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srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4
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xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl)
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xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl)
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lgr $nhi,$xi
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xg $Zhi,0($rem1,$rem_4bit)
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sllg $rem1,$Zlo,3
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xgr $Zlo,$tmp
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ngr $rem1,$x78
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sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60
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brct $cnt,.Lghash_inner
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srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4
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srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4
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xg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl)
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xg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl)
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sllg $xi,$Zlo,3
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xg $Zhi,0($rem0,$rem_4bit)
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xgr $Zlo,$tmp
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ngr $xi,$x78
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sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60
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srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4
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srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4
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xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl)
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xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl)
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xgr $Zlo,$tmp
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xg $Zhi,0($rem1,$rem_4bit)
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lg $tmp,0($xi,$rem_4bit)
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la $inp,16($inp)
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sllg $tmp,$tmp,4 # correct last rem_4bit[rem]
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brctg $len,.Louter
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xgr $Zhi,$tmp
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stg $Zlo,8+1($Xi)
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stg $Zhi,0+1($Xi)
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lm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
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br %r14
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.type gcm_ghash_4bit,\@function
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.size gcm_ghash_4bit,(.-gcm_ghash_4bit)
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.align 64
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rem_4bit:
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.long `0x0000<<12`,0,`0x1C20<<12`,0,`0x3840<<12`,0,`0x2460<<12`,0
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.long `0x7080<<12`,0,`0x6CA0<<12`,0,`0x48C0<<12`,0,`0x54E0<<12`,0
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.long `0xE100<<12`,0,`0xFD20<<12`,0,`0xD940<<12`,0,`0xC560<<12`,0
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.long `0x9180<<12`,0,`0x8DA0<<12`,0,`0xA9C0<<12`,0,`0xB5E0<<12`,0
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.type rem_4bit,\@object
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.size rem_4bit,(.-rem_4bit)
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.string "GHASH for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
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___
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$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
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print $code;
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close STDOUT;
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