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openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
Matt Caswell 8eed7e873b Convert rand code to new threading API 
Replace the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND and CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 locks with new thread
API style locks.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-03-09 01:14:57 +00:00

756 lines
24 KiB
C
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "e_os.h"
#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS))
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
# include <time.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/async.h>
#include "rand_lcl.h"
#include "internal/threads.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
#ifdef BN_DEBUG
# define PREDICT
#endif
/* #define PREDICT 1 */
#define STATE_SIZE 1023
static int state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
static double entropy = 0;
static int initialized = 0;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */
static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0;
/* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */
/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid;
#ifdef PREDICT
int rand_predictable = 0;
#endif
static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
static void rand_cleanup(void);
static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
#endif
static int rand_status(void);
static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
rand_seed,
rand_nopseudo_bytes,
rand_cleanup,
rand_add,
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
rand_pseudo_bytes,
#else
NULL,
#endif
rand_status
};
static void do_rand_lock_init(void)
{
rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
}
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
return (&rand_meth);
}
static void rand_cleanup(void)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
state_num = 0;
state_index = 0;
OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
md_count[0] = 0;
md_count[1] = 0;
entropy = 0;
initialized = 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock);
}
static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
{
int i, j, k, st_idx;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX *m;
int do_not_lock;
int rv = 0;
if (!num)
return 1;
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
*
* The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
* the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
* function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
* is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
* (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
* the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
* (which is incremented after each use).
* The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
* 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
* hash function.
*/
m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (m == NULL)
goto err;
CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init);
/* check if we already have the lock */
if (crypto_lock_rand) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
} else
do_not_lock = 0;
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
st_idx = state_index;
/*
* use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
* seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
* _some_ difference
*/
md_c[0] = md_count[0];
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
state_index += num;
if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
state_num = STATE_SIZE;
} else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
if (state_index > state_num)
state_num = state_index;
}
/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
/*
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
* will use now, but other threads may use them as well
*/
md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
j = (num - i);
j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
if (!MD_Init(m))
goto err;
if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
if (k > 0) {
if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k))
goto err;
if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
goto err;
} else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j))
goto err;
/* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j))
goto err;
/*
* We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
* to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not,
* it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get
* really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very
* insecure keys.
*/
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
goto err;
if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
goto err;
md_c[1]++;
buf = (const char *)buf + j;
for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
/*
* Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
* of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
* local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
* could hurt performance more than necessary given that
* conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
* random state.
*/
state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
st_idx = 0;
}
}
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
* thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
* counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
* md.
*/
for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}
if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
entropy += add;
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
rv = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
return rv;
}
static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i, j, k, st_num, st_idx;
int num_ceil;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX *m;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
int do_stir_pool = 0;
/* time value for various platforms */
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
FILETIME tv;
# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
SYSTEMTIME t;
GetSystemTime(&t);
SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
# else
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
# endif
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
struct timespec tv;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)
unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
#else
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
#ifdef PREDICT
if (rand_predictable) {
static unsigned char val = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
buf[i] = val++;
return (1);
}
#endif
if (num <= 0)
return 1;
m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (m == NULL)
goto err_mem;
/* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
num_ceil =
(1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
*
* For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
*
* Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
* the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
* be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
* (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
* in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
* bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
*
* Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
* caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
* global 'md'.
*/
CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init);
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure
* we don't pause and cause a deadlock
*/
ASYNC_block_pause();
/* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
locking_threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
if (!initialized) {
RAND_poll();
initialized = 1;
}
if (!stirred_pool)
do_stir_pool = 1;
ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
if (!ok) {
/*
* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
* output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
* to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
* seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
* because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
* randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
* we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
* input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
* entropy limit has been reached.
*/
entropy -= num;
if (entropy < 0)
entropy = 0;
}
if (do_stir_pool) {
/*
* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
* better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
* distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
* function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
* suitable for this purpose.
*/
int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
while (n > 0) {
#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
#endif
#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
/*
* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
* rand_add expects to have something to hash.
*/
rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
if (ok)
stirred_pool = 1;
}
st_idx = state_index;
st_num = state_num;
md_c[0] = md_count[0];
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
state_index += num_ceil;
if (state_index > state_num)
state_index %= state_num;
/*
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
* ours (but other threads may use them too)
*/
md_count[0] += 1;
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
while (num > 0) {
/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
num -= j;
if (!MD_Init(m))
goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
goto err;
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
goto err;
curr_time = 0;
rand_hw_seed(m);
}
if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
goto err;
k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
if (k > 0) {
if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
goto err;
if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
goto err;
} else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
goto err;
if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
/* may compete with other threads */
state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
if (st_idx >= st_num)
st_idx = 0;
if (i < j)
*(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
}
}
if (!MD_Init(m)
|| !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))
|| !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
*/
ASYNC_block_pause();
if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
goto err;
}
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
if (ok)
return (1);
else if (pseudo)
return 0;
else {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
"https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
return (0);
}
err:
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
return 0;
err_mem:
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
return 0;
}
static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
}
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
/*
* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
*/
static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
}
#endif
static int rand_status(void)
{
CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur;
int ret;
int do_not_lock;
CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init);
cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
/*
* check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
* implementation calls RAND_status())
*/
if (crypto_lock_rand) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
} else
do_not_lock = 0;
if (!do_not_lock) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine
*/
ASYNC_block_pause();
/*
* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
*/
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
locking_threadid = cur;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
}
if (!initialized) {
RAND_poll();
initialized = 1;
}
ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
if (!do_not_lock) {
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
* currently supports rdrand.
*/
/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND)
# define RDRAND_CALLS 4
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
int i;
if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
return;
for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) {
size_t rnd;
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
if (rnd == 0)
return;
MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t));
}
}
/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
{
size_t rnd;
if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
return;
while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) {
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
if (rnd == 0)
return;
*((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
buf += sizeof(size_t);
num -= sizeof(size_t);
}
if (num) {
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
if (rnd == 0)
return;
while (num) {
*buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
rnd >>= 8;
buf++;
num--;
}
}
}
#else
static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
return;
}
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
{
return;
}
#endif
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