9e78e6c3f8
appropriate code if any of them is defined.
1134 lines
31 KiB
C
1134 lines
31 KiB
C
/* crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
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/* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org), Geoff Thorpe
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* (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) and Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com)
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* for the OpenSSL project 2000.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/pem.h>
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/dso.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_NCIPHER
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/* Attribution notice: nCipher have said several times that it's OK for
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* us to implement a general interface to their boxes, and recently declared
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* their HWCryptoHook to be public, and therefore available for us to use.
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* Thanks, nCipher.
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*
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* The hwcryptohook.h included here is from May 2000.
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* [Richard Levitte]
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*/
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#ifdef FLAT_INC
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#include "hwcryptohook.h"
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#else
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#include "vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h"
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#endif
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static int hwcrhk_init(ENGINE *e);
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static int hwcrhk_finish(ENGINE *e);
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static int hwcrhk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
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/* Functions to handle mutexes */
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static int hwcrhk_mutex_init(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*, HWCryptoHook_CallerContext*);
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static int hwcrhk_mutex_lock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
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static void hwcrhk_mutex_unlock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
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static void hwcrhk_mutex_destroy(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
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/* BIGNUM stuff */
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static int hwcrhk_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/* RSA stuff */
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static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
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#endif
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/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
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static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
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/* DH stuff */
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/* This function is alised to mod_exp (with the DH and mont dropped). */
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static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
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const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
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/* RAND stuff */
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static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
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static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void);
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/* KM stuff */
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static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
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const char *passphrase);
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static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
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const char *passphrase);
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static void hwcrhk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
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int ind,long argl, void *argp);
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/* Interaction stuff */
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static int hwcrhk_get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
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int *len_io, char *buf,
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HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx,
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HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
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static void hwcrhk_log_message(void *logstr, const char *message);
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/* The definitions for control commands specific to this engine */
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#define HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
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#define HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1)
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#define HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2)
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static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN hwcrhk_cmd_defns[] = {
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{HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH,
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"SO_PATH",
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"Specifies the path to the 'hwcrhk' shared library",
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ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
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{HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK,
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"FORK_CHECK",
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"Turns fork() checking on or off (boolean)",
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ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
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{HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING,
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"THREAD_LOCKING",
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"Turns thread-safe locking on or off (boolean)",
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ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
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{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
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};
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
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static RSA_METHOD hwcrhk_rsa =
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{
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"nCipher RSA method",
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp,
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hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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0,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL
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};
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
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static DH_METHOD hwcrhk_dh =
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{
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"nCipher DH method",
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NULL,
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NULL,
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hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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0,
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NULL
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};
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#endif
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static RAND_METHOD hwcrhk_rand =
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{
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/* "nCipher RAND method", */
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NULL,
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hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
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hwcrhk_rand_status,
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};
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/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
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static const char *engine_hwcrhk_id = "chil";
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static const char *engine_hwcrhk_name = "nCipher hardware engine support";
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/* Internal stuff for HWCryptoHook */
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/* Some structures needed for proper use of thread locks */
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/* hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue
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into HWCryptoHook_Mutex */
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struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue
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{
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int lockid;
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};
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/* hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn
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struct HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue
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into HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext */
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struct HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue
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{
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void *any;
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};
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/* hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn
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struct HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue
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into HWCryptoHook_CallerContext */
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struct HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue
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{
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void *any;
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};
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/* The MPI structure in HWCryptoHook is pretty compatible with OpenSSL
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BIGNUM's, so lets define a couple of conversion macros */
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#define BN2MPI(mp, bn) \
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{mp.size = bn->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG); mp.buf = (unsigned char *)bn->d;}
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#define MPI2BN(bn, mp) \
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{mp.size = bn->dmax * sizeof(BN_ULONG); mp.buf = (unsigned char *)bn->d;}
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#if 0 /* Card and password management is not yet supported */
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/* HWCryptoHook callbacks. insert_card() and get_pass() are not yet
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defined, because we haven't quite decided on the proper form yet.
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log_message() just adds an entry in the error stack. I don't know
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if that's good or bad... */
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static int insert_card(const char *prompt_info,
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const char *wrong_info,
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HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx,
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HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
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static int get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
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int *len_io, char *buf,
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HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx,
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HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
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#endif
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static BIO *logstream = NULL;
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static pem_password_cb *password_callback = NULL;
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#if 0
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static void *password_callback_userdata = NULL;
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#endif
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static int disable_mutex_callbacks = 0;
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/* Stuff to pass to the HWCryptoHook library */
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static HWCryptoHook_InitInfo hwcrhk_globals = {
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0, /* Flags */
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&logstream, /* logstream */
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sizeof(BN_ULONG), /* limbsize */
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0, /* mslimb first: false for BNs */
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-1, /* msbyte first: use native */
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0, /* Max mutexes, 0 = no small limit */
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0, /* Max simultaneous, 0 = default */
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/* The next few are mutex stuff: we write wrapper functions
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around the OS mutex functions. We initialise them to 0
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here, and change that to actual function pointers in hwcrhk_init()
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if dynamic locks are supported (that is, if the application
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programmer has made sure of setting up callbacks bafore starting
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this engine) *and* if disable_mutex_callbacks hasn't been set by
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a call to ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING). */
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sizeof(HWCryptoHook_Mutex),
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0,
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0,
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0,
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0,
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/* The next few are condvar stuff: we write wrapper functions
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round the OS functions. Currently not implemented and not
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and absolute necessity even in threaded programs, therefore
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0'ed. Will hopefully be implemented some day, since it
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enhances the efficiency of HWCryptoHook. */
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0, /* sizeof(HWCryptoHook_CondVar), */
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0, /* hwcrhk_cv_init, */
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0, /* hwcrhk_cv_wait, */
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0, /* hwcrhk_cv_signal, */
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0, /* hwcrhk_cv_broadcast, */
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0, /* hwcrhk_cv_destroy, */
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hwcrhk_get_pass, /* pass phrase */
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0, /* insert_card, */ /* insert a card */
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hwcrhk_log_message /* Log message */
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};
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/* Now, to our own code */
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/* As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking
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* (indeed - the lock will already be held by our caller!!!) */
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ENGINE *ENGINE_ncipher()
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{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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const DH_METHOD *meth2;
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#endif
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ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
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if(!ret)
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return NULL;
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if(!ENGINE_set_id(ret, engine_hwcrhk_id) ||
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!ENGINE_set_name(ret, engine_hwcrhk_name) ||
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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!ENGINE_set_RSA(ret, &hwcrhk_rsa) ||
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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!ENGINE_set_DH(ret, &hwcrhk_dh) ||
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#endif
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!ENGINE_set_RAND(ret, &hwcrhk_rand) ||
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!ENGINE_set_BN_mod_exp(ret, hwcrhk_mod_exp) ||
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!ENGINE_set_init_function(ret, hwcrhk_init) ||
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!ENGINE_set_finish_function(ret, hwcrhk_finish) ||
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!ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ret, hwcrhk_ctrl) ||
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!ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ret, hwcrhk_load_privkey) ||
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!ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ret, hwcrhk_load_pubkey) ||
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!ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ret, hwcrhk_cmd_defns))
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{
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ENGINE_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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/* We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly
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* to the cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use
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* those functions. NB: We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or
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* anything "more generic" because something like the RSAref
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* code may not hook properly, and if you own one of these
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* cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
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* anyway! */
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meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
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hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
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hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
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hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;
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hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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/* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */
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meth2 = DH_OpenSSL();
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hwcrhk_dh.generate_key = meth2->generate_key;
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hwcrhk_dh.compute_key = meth2->compute_key;
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#endif
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return ret;
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}
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/* This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading
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* the HWCryptoHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an
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* init() or finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're
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* operating with global locks, so this should be thread-safe
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* implicitly. */
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static DSO *hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
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static HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwcrhk_context = 0;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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static int hndidx_rsa = -1; /* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */
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#endif
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/* These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has
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* successfully (un)loaded. */
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static HWCryptoHook_Init_t *p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
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static HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
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static HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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static HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
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#endif
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static HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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static HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
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static HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
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static HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
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#endif
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static HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
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/* Used in the DSO operations. */
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static const char def_HWCRHK_LIBNAME[] = "nfhwcrhk";
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static const char *HWCRHK_LIBNAME = def_HWCRHK_LIBNAME;
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_Init = "HWCryptoHook_Init";
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_Finish = "HWCryptoHook_Finish";
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_ModExp = "HWCryptoHook_ModExp";
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSA = "HWCryptoHook_RSA";
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#endif
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = "HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes";
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey";
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey";
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey";
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#endif
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static const char *n_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = "HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT";
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|
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/* HWCryptoHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the
|
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* higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no
|
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* error checking, take a look lower down where these functions are
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|
* called, the checking and error handling is probably down there. */
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|
|
/* utility function to obtain a context */
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static int get_context(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle *hac)
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|
{
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char tempbuf[1024];
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HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
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rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
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rmsg.size = 1024;
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*hac = p_hwcrhk_Init(&hwcrhk_globals, sizeof(hwcrhk_globals), &rmsg,
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NULL);
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if (!*hac)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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/* similarly to release one. */
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static void release_context(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hac)
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{
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p_hwcrhk_Finish(hac);
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}
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|
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/* (de)initialisation functions. */
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|
static int hwcrhk_init(ENGINE *e)
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{
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HWCryptoHook_Init_t *p1;
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HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *p2;
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|
HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *p3;
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|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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|
HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *p4;
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HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *p5;
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HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *p6;
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HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *p7;
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#endif
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HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *p8;
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HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *p9;
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if(hwcrhk_dso != NULL)
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|
{
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|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
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|
goto err;
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|
}
|
|
/* Attempt to load libnfhwcrhk.so/nfhwcrhk.dll/whatever. */
|
|
hwcrhk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, HWCRHK_LIBNAME, NULL, 0);
|
|
if(hwcrhk_dso == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if(!(p1 = (HWCryptoHook_Init_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_Init)) ||
|
|
!(p2 = (HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_Finish)) ||
|
|
!(p3 = (HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_ModExp)) ||
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
!(p4 = (HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSA)) ||
|
|
!(p5 = (HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey)) ||
|
|
!(p6 = (HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey)) ||
|
|
!(p7 = (HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey)) ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
!(p8 = (HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RandomBytes)) ||
|
|
!(p9 = (HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *)
|
|
DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT)))
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Copy the pointers */
|
|
p_hwcrhk_Init = p1;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_Finish = p2;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_ModExp = p3;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSA = p4;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = p5;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = p6;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = p7;
|
|
#endif
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = p8;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = p9;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if the application decided to support dynamic locks,
|
|
and if it does, use them. */
|
|
if (disable_mutex_callbacks == 0 &&
|
|
CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_callback() != NULL &&
|
|
CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_callback() != NULL &&
|
|
CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_callback() != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
hwcrhk_globals.mutex_init = hwcrhk_mutex_init;
|
|
hwcrhk_globals.mutex_acquire = hwcrhk_mutex_lock;
|
|
hwcrhk_globals.mutex_release = hwcrhk_mutex_unlock;
|
|
hwcrhk_globals.mutex_destroy = hwcrhk_mutex_destroy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try and get a context - if not, we may have a DSO but no
|
|
* accelerator! */
|
|
if(!get_context(&hwcrhk_context))
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Everything's fine. */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
|
|
hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
|
|
"nFast HWCryptoHook RSA key handle",
|
|
NULL, NULL, hwcrhk_ex_free);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if(hwcrhk_dso)
|
|
DSO_free(hwcrhk_dso);
|
|
hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int hwcrhk_finish(ENGINE *e)
|
|
{
|
|
int to_return = 1;
|
|
if(hwcrhk_dso == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_FINISH,ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED);
|
|
to_return = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
release_context(hwcrhk_context);
|
|
if(!DSO_free(hwcrhk_dso))
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_FINISH,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
|
|
to_return = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
if (logstream)
|
|
BIO_free(logstream);
|
|
hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
|
|
p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
|
|
return to_return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int hwcrhk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
|
|
{
|
|
int to_return = 1;
|
|
|
|
switch(cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
case HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH:
|
|
if(hwcrhk_dso)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_CTRL,ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if(p == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_CTRL,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
HWCRHK_LIBNAME = (const char *)p;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM:
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bio = (BIO *)p;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
if (logstream)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO_free(logstream);
|
|
logstream = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CRYPTO_add(&bio->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO) > 1)
|
|
logstream = bio;
|
|
else
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_CTRL,ENGINE_R_BIO_WAS_FREED);
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_PASSWORD_CALLBACK:
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
password_callback = (pem_password_cb *)f;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
break;
|
|
/* this enables or disables the "SimpleForkCheck" flag used in the
|
|
* initialisation structure. */
|
|
case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK:
|
|
case HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK:
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
if(i)
|
|
hwcrhk_globals.flags |=
|
|
HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck;
|
|
else
|
|
hwcrhk_globals.flags &=
|
|
~HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
break;
|
|
/* This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing"
|
|
* the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from
|
|
* within the library (or were provided to the library from the
|
|
* calling application). This is to remove any baggage for
|
|
* applications not using multithreading. */
|
|
case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING:
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
disable_mutex_callbacks = 1;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING:
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
disable_mutex_callbacks = ((i == 0) ? 0 : 1);
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* The command isn't understood by this engine */
|
|
default:
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_CTRL,
|
|
ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
|
|
to_return = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return to_return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
|
|
const char *passphrase)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
RSA *rtmp = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
HWCryptoHook_MPI e, n;
|
|
HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
|
|
HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(!hwcrhk_context)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle));
|
|
if (!hptr)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey(hwcrhk_context, key_id, hptr,
|
|
&rmsg, NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_CHIL_ERROR);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1,rmsg.buf);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!*hptr)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_NO_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
rtmp = RSA_new_method(eng);
|
|
RSA_set_ex_data(rtmp, hndidx_rsa, (char *)hptr);
|
|
rtmp->e = BN_new();
|
|
rtmp->n = BN_new();
|
|
rtmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
|
|
MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
|
|
MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
|
|
if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)
|
|
!= HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,ENGINE_R_CHIL_ERROR);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1,rmsg.buf);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bn_expand2(rtmp->e, e.size/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
bn_expand2(rtmp->n, n.size/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
|
|
MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
|
|
|
|
if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg))
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_CHIL_ERROR);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1,rmsg.buf);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
rtmp->e->top = e.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(rtmp->e);
|
|
rtmp->n->top = n.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(rtmp->n);
|
|
|
|
res = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rtmp);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!res)
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DISABLED);
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (res)
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(res);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (rtmp)
|
|
RSA_free(rtmp);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
|
|
const char *passphrase)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
res = hwcrhk_load_privkey(eng, key_id, passphrase);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
switch(res->type)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
{
|
|
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
|
|
rsa = res->pkey.rsa;
|
|
res->pkey.rsa = RSA_new();
|
|
res->pkey.rsa->n = rsa->n;
|
|
res->pkey.rsa->e = rsa->e;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
|
|
ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (res)
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(res);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* A little mod_exp */
|
|
static int hwcrhk_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
|
|
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
char tempbuf[1024];
|
|
HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
|
|
/* Since HWCryptoHook_MPI is pretty compatible with BIGNUM's,
|
|
we use them directly, plus a little macro magic. We only
|
|
thing we need to make sure of is that enough space is allocated. */
|
|
HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_p, m_n, m_r;
|
|
int to_return, ret;
|
|
|
|
to_return = 0; /* expect failure */
|
|
rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
|
|
rmsg.size = 1024;
|
|
|
|
if(!hwcrhk_context)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Prepare the params */
|
|
bn_expand2(r, m->top); /* Check for error !! */
|
|
BN2MPI(m_a, a);
|
|
BN2MPI(m_p, p);
|
|
BN2MPI(m_n, m);
|
|
MPI2BN(r, m_r);
|
|
|
|
/* Perform the operation */
|
|
ret = p_hwcrhk_ModExp(hwcrhk_context, m_a, m_p, m_n, &m_r, &rmsg);
|
|
|
|
/* Convert the response */
|
|
r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(r);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is
|
|
telling us that falling back to software computation
|
|
might be a good thing. */
|
|
if(ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1,rmsg.buf);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
to_return = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
return to_return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
char tempbuf[1024];
|
|
HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
|
|
HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
|
|
int to_return = 0, ret;
|
|
|
|
if(!hwcrhk_context)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This provides support for nForce keys. Since that's opaque data
|
|
all we do is provide a handle to the proper key and let HWCryptoHook
|
|
take care of the rest. */
|
|
if ((hptr = (HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *) RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa))
|
|
!= NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_r;
|
|
|
|
if(!rsa->n)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
|
|
ENGINE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
|
|
rmsg.size = 1024;
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare the params */
|
|
bn_expand2(r, rsa->n->top); /* Check for error !! */
|
|
BN2MPI(m_a, I);
|
|
MPI2BN(r, m_r);
|
|
|
|
/* Perform the operation */
|
|
ret = p_hwcrhk_RSA(m_a, *hptr, &m_r, &rmsg);
|
|
|
|
/* Convert the response */
|
|
r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(r);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is
|
|
telling us that falling back to software computation
|
|
might be a good thing. */
|
|
if(ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1,rmsg.buf);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_p, m_q, m_dmp1, m_dmq1, m_iqmp, m_r;
|
|
|
|
if(!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
|
|
ENGINE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
|
|
rmsg.size = 1024;
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare the params */
|
|
bn_expand2(r, rsa->n->top); /* Check for error !! */
|
|
BN2MPI(m_a, I);
|
|
BN2MPI(m_p, rsa->p);
|
|
BN2MPI(m_q, rsa->q);
|
|
BN2MPI(m_dmp1, rsa->dmp1);
|
|
BN2MPI(m_dmq1, rsa->dmq1);
|
|
BN2MPI(m_iqmp, rsa->iqmp);
|
|
MPI2BN(r, m_r);
|
|
|
|
/* Perform the operation */
|
|
ret = p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT(hwcrhk_context, m_a, m_p, m_q,
|
|
m_dmp1, m_dmq1, m_iqmp, &m_r, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Convert the response */
|
|
r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
|
|
bn_fix_top(r);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is
|
|
telling us that falling back to software computation
|
|
might be a good thing. */
|
|
if(ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1,rmsg.buf);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* If we're here, we must be here with some semblance of success :-) */
|
|
to_return = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
return to_return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
|
|
static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
|
|
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return hwcrhk_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */
|
|
static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
|
|
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
|
|
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return hwcrhk_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Random bytes are good */
|
|
static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
|
{
|
|
char tempbuf[1024];
|
|
HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
|
|
int to_return = 0; /* assume failure */
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
|
|
rmsg.size = 1024;
|
|
|
|
if(!hwcrhk_context)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes(hwcrhk_context, buf, num, &rmsg);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is
|
|
telling us that falling back to software computation
|
|
might be a good thing. */
|
|
if(ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES,ENGINE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES,ENGINE_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1,rmsg.buf);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
to_return = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
return to_return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This cleans up an RSA KM key, called when ex_data is freed */
|
|
|
|
static void hwcrhk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
|
|
int ind,long argl, void *argp)
|
|
{
|
|
char tempbuf[1024];
|
|
HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
|
|
int ret;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
|
|
rmsg.size = 1024;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
hptr = (HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *) item;
|
|
if(hptr)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey(*hptr, NULL);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(hptr);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Mutex calls: since the HWCryptoHook model closely follows the POSIX model
|
|
* these just wrap the POSIX functions and add some logging.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int hwcrhk_mutex_init(HWCryptoHook_Mutex* mt,
|
|
HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx)
|
|
{
|
|
mt->lockid = CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid();
|
|
if (mt->lockid == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int hwcrhk_mutex_lock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *mt)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(mt->lockid);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void hwcrhk_mutex_unlock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(mt->lockid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void hwcrhk_mutex_destroy(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *mt)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(mt->lockid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int hwcrhk_get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
|
|
int *len_io, char *buf,
|
|
HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx,
|
|
HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx)
|
|
{
|
|
int l = 0;
|
|
char prompt[1024];
|
|
|
|
if (password_callback == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_HWCRHK_GET_PASS,ENGINE_R_NO_CALLBACK);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (prompt_info)
|
|
{
|
|
strncpy(prompt, "Card: \"", sizeof(prompt));
|
|
l += 5;
|
|
strncpy(prompt + l, prompt_info, sizeof(prompt) - l);
|
|
l += strlen(prompt_info);
|
|
if (l + 2 < sizeof(prompt))
|
|
{
|
|
strncpy(prompt + l, "\"\n", sizeof(prompt) - l);
|
|
l += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (l < sizeof(prompt) - 1)
|
|
{
|
|
strncpy(prompt, "Enter Passphrase <enter to cancel>:",
|
|
sizeof(prompt) - l);
|
|
l += 35;
|
|
}
|
|
prompt[l] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
/* I know, passing on the prompt instead of the user data *is*
|
|
a bad thing. However, that's all we have right now.
|
|
-- Richard Levitte */
|
|
*len_io = password_callback(buf, *len_io, 0, prompt);
|
|
if(!*len_io)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void hwcrhk_log_message(void *logstr, const char *message)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *lstream = NULL;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
|
|
if (logstr)
|
|
lstream=*(BIO **)logstr;
|
|
if (lstream)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO_write(lstream, message, strlen(message));
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_NCIPHER */
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
|