9ccadf1c6f
client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the client will at least see that alert.
1227 lines
33 KiB
C
1227 lines
33 KiB
C
/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
|
|
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* This package is an SSL implementation written
|
|
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
|
*
|
|
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
|
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
|
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
|
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
|
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
|
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
|
* the code are not to be removed.
|
|
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
|
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
|
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
|
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
|
* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
|
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
|
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
|
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
|
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
|
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
|
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
*
|
|
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
|
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
|
* copied and put under another distribution licence
|
|
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
|
*/
|
|
/* ====================================================================
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
*
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
|
* distribution.
|
|
*
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
|
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
|
*
|
|
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
|
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
|
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
|
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
|
|
*
|
|
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
|
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
|
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
|
*
|
|
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
|
* acknowledgment:
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
|
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
|
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
|
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
|
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
* ====================================================================
|
|
*
|
|
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
|
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
|
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <errno.h>
|
|
#define USE_SOCKETS
|
|
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
|
|
#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
|
|
|
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
unsigned int len);
|
|
static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
unsigned int len);
|
|
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
|
|
static int do_compress(SSL *ssl);
|
|
static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
|
|
static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* used only by ssl3_get_record */
|
|
static int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
|
|
* packet by another n bytes.
|
|
* The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
|
|
* by s->packet and s->packet_length.
|
|
* (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
|
|
* [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
|
|
*/
|
|
int i,off,newb;
|
|
|
|
if (!extend)
|
|
{
|
|
/* start with empty packet ... */
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
|
|
s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
|
|
s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
|
|
s->packet_length = 0;
|
|
/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
|
|
{
|
|
s->packet_length+=n;
|
|
s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
|
|
s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
|
|
return(n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* else we need to read more data */
|
|
if (!s->read_ahead)
|
|
max=n;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* avoid buffer overflow */
|
|
int max_max = SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE - s->packet_length;
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
|
|
max_max += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
|
|
if (max > max_max)
|
|
max = max_max;
|
|
}
|
|
if (n > max) /* does not happen */
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
off = s->packet_length;
|
|
newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
|
|
/* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
|
|
* 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
|
|
* 'newb' extra ones at the end */
|
|
if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
|
|
{
|
|
/* off > 0 */
|
|
memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
|
|
s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (newb < n)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
|
|
* to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
|
|
|
|
clear_sys_error();
|
|
if (s->rbio != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
|
|
i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
|
|
i = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
|
|
return(i);
|
|
}
|
|
newb+=i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
|
|
s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
|
|
s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
|
|
s->packet_length += n;
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return(n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Call this to get a new input record.
|
|
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
|
|
* or non-blocking IO.
|
|
* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
|
|
*/
|
|
/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
|
|
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
|
|
int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
short version;
|
|
unsigned int mac_size;
|
|
int clear=0,extra;
|
|
|
|
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
|
|
sess=s->session;
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
|
|
extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
|
|
else
|
|
extra=0;
|
|
|
|
again:
|
|
/* check if we have the header */
|
|
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
|
|
(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
|
|
{
|
|
n=ssl3_read_n(s,SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE,0);
|
|
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
|
|
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
|
|
|
|
p=s->packet;
|
|
|
|
/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
|
|
rr->type= *(p++);
|
|
ssl_major= *(p++);
|
|
ssl_minor= *(p++);
|
|
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
|
|
n2s(p,rr->length);
|
|
|
|
/* Lets check version */
|
|
if (s->first_packet)
|
|
{
|
|
s->first_packet=0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (version != s->version)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
/* Send back error using their
|
|
* version number :-) */
|
|
s->version=version;
|
|
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length >
|
|
(unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length > (s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
|
|
{
|
|
/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
|
|
i=rr->length;
|
|
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
|
|
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
|
|
/* now n == rr->length,
|
|
* and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
|
|
|
|
/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
|
|
* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
|
|
*/
|
|
rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
|
|
* rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
|
|
* need to be copied into rr->data by either
|
|
* the decryption or by the decompression
|
|
* When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
|
|
* rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
|
|
|
|
/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
|
|
* rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
|
|
|
|
/* check is not needed I believe */
|
|
if (rr->length > (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
|
|
rr->data=rr->input;
|
|
|
|
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
|
|
if (enc_err <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (enc_err == 0)
|
|
/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
|
|
goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
|
|
{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
|
|
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->read_hash == NULL))
|
|
clear=1;
|
|
|
|
if (!clear)
|
|
{
|
|
mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
|
|
{
|
|
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
#else
|
|
goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
|
|
if (rr->length < mac_size)
|
|
{
|
|
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
#else
|
|
goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
rr->length-=mac_size;
|
|
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
|
|
if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* r->length is now just compressed */
|
|
if (s->expand != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rr->length >
|
|
(unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!do_uncompress(s))
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length > (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->off=0;
|
|
/* So at this point the following is true
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
|
|
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
|
|
* after use :-).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
|
|
s->packet_length=0;
|
|
|
|
/* just read a 0 length packet */
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
|
|
/* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
|
|
* SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
|
|
* failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
|
|
* we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
|
|
* might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
|
|
|
rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
|
|
i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
else
|
|
rr->length=i;
|
|
rr->data=rr->comp;
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_compress(SSL *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
|
|
|
|
wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
|
|
i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
|
|
wr->input,(int)wr->length);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
else
|
|
wr->length=i;
|
|
|
|
wr->input=wr->data;
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
|
|
* It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
|
|
unsigned int tot,n,nw;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
tot=s->s3->wnum;
|
|
s->s3->wnum=0;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
|
|
{
|
|
i=s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0) return(i);
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n=(len-tot);
|
|
for (;;)
|
|
{
|
|
if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
|
|
nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
else
|
|
nw=n;
|
|
|
|
i=do_ssl3_write(s,type,&(buf[tot]),nw);
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->wnum=tot;
|
|
return(i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((i == (int)n) ||
|
|
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
|
|
{
|
|
return(tot+i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n-=i;
|
|
tot+=i;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p,*plen;
|
|
int i,mac_size,clear=0;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
|
|
/* first check is there is a SSL3_RECORD still being written
|
|
* out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
|
|
if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
|
|
return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
|
|
{
|
|
i=ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
return(i);
|
|
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0) return(len);
|
|
|
|
wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
|
|
wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
|
|
sess=s->session;
|
|
|
|
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->write_hash == NULL))
|
|
clear=1;
|
|
|
|
if (clear)
|
|
mac_size=0;
|
|
else
|
|
mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
|
|
|
|
p=wb->buf;
|
|
|
|
/* write the header */
|
|
*(p++)=type&0xff;
|
|
wr->type=type;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
|
|
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* record where we are to write out packet length */
|
|
plen=p;
|
|
p+=2;
|
|
|
|
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
|
|
wr->data=p;
|
|
wr->length=(int)len;
|
|
wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
|
|
|
|
/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
|
|
* wr->data */
|
|
|
|
/* first we compress */
|
|
if (s->compress != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!do_compress(s))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
|
|
wr->input=wr->data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
|
|
* from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
|
|
* wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
|
|
|
|
if (mac_size != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
|
|
wr->length+=mac_size;
|
|
wr->input=p;
|
|
wr->data=p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
|
|
|
|
/* record length after mac and block padding */
|
|
s2n(wr->length,plen);
|
|
|
|
/* we should now have
|
|
* wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
|
|
* wr->length long */
|
|
wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
|
|
wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
/* Now lets setup wb */
|
|
wb->left=wr->length;
|
|
wb->offset=0;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_type=type;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
|
|
|
|
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
|
|
return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
|
|
err:
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
|
|
static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* XXXX */
|
|
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
|
|
|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
|
|
!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
|
|
|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (;;)
|
|
{
|
|
clear_sys_error();
|
|
if (s->wbio != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
|
|
i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
|
|
(char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
|
|
(unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
|
|
i= -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (i <= 0)
|
|
return(i);
|
|
s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
|
|
s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
|
|
* 'type' is one of the following:
|
|
*
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
|
|
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
|
|
*
|
|
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
|
|
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
|
|
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
|
|
* a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
|
|
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
|
|
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
|
|
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
|
|
* Change cipher spec protocol
|
|
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
|
|
* Alert protocol
|
|
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
|
|
* Handshake protocol
|
|
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
|
|
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
|
|
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
|
|
* Application data protocol
|
|
* none of our business
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
|
|
{
|
|
int al,i,j,ret;
|
|
unsigned int n;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
|
void (*cb)()=NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
|
|
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
|
|
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
|
|
unsigned char *dst = buf;
|
|
unsigned int k;
|
|
|
|
/* peek == 0 */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
|
|
{
|
|
*dst++ = *src++;
|
|
len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
|
|
|
|
if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
|
|
{
|
|
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
|
|
i=s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0) return(i);
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
start:
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
/* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
|
|
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
|
|
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
|
|
|
|
/* get new packet if necessary */
|
|
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
|
|
{
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
|
|
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
|
|
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
|
|
* (even in 'peek' mode) */
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
|
|
{
|
|
rr->length=0;
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
|
|
{
|
|
/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
|
|
* are doing a handshake for the first time */
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
|
|
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len <= 0) return(len);
|
|
|
|
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
|
|
n = rr->length;
|
|
else
|
|
n = (unsigned int)len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
|
|
if (!peek)
|
|
{
|
|
rr->length-=n;
|
|
rr->off+=n;
|
|
if (rr->length == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
rr->off=0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return(n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
|
|
* message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
|
|
|
|
/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
|
|
* fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
|
|
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
|
|
{
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
|
|
{
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
|
|
dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dest_maxlen > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
|
|
if (rr->length < n)
|
|
n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
|
|
|
|
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
|
|
while (n-- > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
|
|
rr->length--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
|
|
goto start; /* fragment was too small */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
* s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
|
|
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
|
|
|
|
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
|
|
if ((!s->server) &&
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
|
|
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
|
|
(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
|
|
!s->s3->renegotiate)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
|
|
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
|
|
{
|
|
i=s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0) return(i);
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
|
|
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
|
|
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
|
|
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
|
|
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
|
|
* now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
|
|
{
|
|
int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
|
|
int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb=s->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
|
|
{
|
|
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
|
|
{
|
|
char tmp[16];
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
|
|
BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
|
|
s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
|
|
{
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
rr->length=0;
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
|
|
{
|
|
/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
|
|
* exactly what the record payload has to look like */
|
|
if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
|
|
(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
|
|
{
|
|
i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->length=0;
|
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
|
|
if (!do_change_cipher_spec(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
else
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
|
|
if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
|
|
{
|
|
if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
|
|
{
|
|
#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
|
|
* because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
|
|
* protocol violations): */
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
|
|
?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
|
|
:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->new_session=1;
|
|
}
|
|
i=s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0) return(i);
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
|
|
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
|
|
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
|
|
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
|
|
bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (rr->type)
|
|
{
|
|
default:
|
|
#ifndef NO_TLS
|
|
/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
|
|
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
|
|
* of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
|
|
* should not happen when type != rr->type */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
|
|
/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
|
|
* but have application data. If the library was
|
|
* running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
|
|
* is set) and it makes sense to read application data
|
|
* at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
|
|
* we will indulge it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
|
|
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
|
|
((
|
|
(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
|
|
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
|
|
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
|
|
) || (
|
|
(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
|
|
(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
|
|
(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
|
)
|
|
))
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* not reached */
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
const char *sender;
|
|
int slen;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
|
|
i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
|
|
else
|
|
i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
/* we have to record the message digest at
|
|
* this point so we can get it before we read
|
|
* the finished message */
|
|
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
|
|
{
|
|
sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
|
|
slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
|
|
slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
|
|
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
|
|
desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
|
|
desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
|
|
if (desc < 0) return;
|
|
/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
|
|
if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
|
|
s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
|
|
s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
|
|
if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
|
|
ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
|
|
/* else data is still being written out, we will get written
|
|
* some time in the future */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i,j;
|
|
void (*cb)()=NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
|
|
i=do_ssl3_write(s,SSL3_RT_ALERT,&s->s3->send_alert[0],2);
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
|
|
* If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
|
|
* we will not worry too much. */
|
|
if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
|
|
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb=s->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return(i);
|
|
}
|