464774d75f
Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.
Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.
RT#2958
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0bd649336)
3583 lines
121 KiB
C
3583 lines
121 KiB
C
/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
|
|
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* This package is an SSL implementation written
|
|
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
|
*
|
|
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
|
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
|
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
|
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
|
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
|
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
|
* the code are not to be removed.
|
|
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
|
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
|
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
|
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
|
* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
|
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
|
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
|
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
|
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
|
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
|
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
*
|
|
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
|
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
|
* copied and put under another distribution licence
|
|
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
|
*/
|
|
/* ====================================================================
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
*
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
|
* distribution.
|
|
*
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
|
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
|
*
|
|
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
|
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
|
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
|
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
|
|
*
|
|
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
|
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
|
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
|
*
|
|
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
|
* acknowledgment:
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
|
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
|
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
|
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
|
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
* ====================================================================
|
|
*
|
|
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
|
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
|
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
/* ====================================================================
|
|
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
|
|
*
|
|
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
|
|
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
|
|
*
|
|
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
|
* license provided above.
|
|
*
|
|
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
|
|
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
/* ====================================================================
|
|
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
|
|
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
|
* license.
|
|
*
|
|
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
|
|
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
|
|
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
|
|
*
|
|
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
|
|
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
|
|
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
|
|
*
|
|
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
|
|
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
|
|
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
|
|
* to make use of the Contribution.
|
|
*
|
|
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
|
|
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
|
|
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
|
|
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
|
|
* OTHERWISE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
|
|
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
|
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
|
|
#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
|
|
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/x509.h>
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
# include <openssl/dh.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
#include <openssl/md5.h>
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
|
|
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
|
|
|
|
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
return (SSLv3_server_method());
|
|
else
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
|
|
ssl3_accept,
|
|
ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
|
|
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
|
|
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
|
|
* login name
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
clear_sys_error();
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
/* init things to blank */
|
|
s->in_handshake++;
|
|
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
|
|
SSL_clear(s);
|
|
|
|
if (s->cert == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
|
|
* don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
|
|
* handshakes anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
|
|
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
|
|
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
state = s->state;
|
|
|
|
switch (s->state) {
|
|
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
|
|
s->renegotiate = 1;
|
|
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
|
|
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
|
case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
|
|
|
s->server = 1;
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
|
|
|
|
if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
|
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
|
|
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
s->init_buf = buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
|
|
* output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
|
|
} else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
|
|
!(s->options &
|
|
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
|
|
* support secure renegotiation.
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
|
|
* HelloRequest
|
|
*/
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
|
|
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
|
|
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
|
|
{
|
|
int al;
|
|
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* callback indicates firther work to be done
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is not really an error but the only means to for
|
|
* a client to detect whether srp is supported.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
s->renegotiate = 2;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
|
|
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
|
|
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
|
|
if (!
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.
|
|
new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
|
|
SSL_aSRP))
|
|
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
} else {
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
} else
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clear this, it may get reset by
|
|
* send_server_key_exchange
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
|
|
* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
|
|
* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
|
|
* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
|
|
* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
|
|
* key exchange.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (0
|
|
/*
|
|
* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
|
|
* provided
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|
|
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
|
|
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|
|
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|
|
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
|
|
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
|
|
8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
|
|
if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
|
|
/*
|
|
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
|
|
* during re-negotiation:
|
|
*/
|
|
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
|
|
/*
|
|
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
|
|
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
|
|
* RFC 2246):
|
|
*/
|
|
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
|
/*
|
|
* ... except when the application insists on
|
|
* verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
|
|
* this for SSL 3)
|
|
*/
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
|
|
/*
|
|
* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
|
|
*/
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
|
|
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
|
|
/*
|
|
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
|
|
* are omitted
|
|
*/
|
|
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
/* no cert request */
|
|
skip = 1;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
|
|
* using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
|
|
* documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
|
|
* resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
|
|
* BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
|
|
* unconditionally.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
|
|
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
if (ret == 2) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
|
|
* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
|
|
* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
|
|
* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
} else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
if (!s->session->peer)
|
|
break;
|
|
/*
|
|
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
|
|
* digest cached records.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
int offset = 0;
|
|
int dgst_num;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
|
|
* it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
|
|
* CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
|
|
* step
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
|
|
int dgst_size;
|
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_type
|
|
(s->
|
|
s3->handshake_dgst
|
|
[dgst_num]),
|
|
&(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.cert_verify_md
|
|
[offset]));
|
|
dgst_size =
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
|
|
if (dgst_size < 0) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += dgst_size;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
|
|
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
|
|
* first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
|
|
* cautious.
|
|
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
|
|
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
|
|
* the client's Finished message is read.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
|
|
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
|
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
|
|
* already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
|
|
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
|
|
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
|
|
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
|
|
* the client's Finished message is read.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
|
|
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
|
{
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
|
|
s->method->
|
|
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
|
s->method->
|
|
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
|
|
} else
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
|
/* clean a few things up */
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
s->init_buf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* remove buffering on output */
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
|
|
* HelloRequest */
|
|
s->renegotiate = 0;
|
|
s->new_session = 0;
|
|
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
|
|
/* s->server=1; */
|
|
s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_ERR:
|
|
default:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
|
|
if (s->debug) {
|
|
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
|
|
new_state = s->state;
|
|
s->state = state;
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
|
|
s->state = new_state;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skip = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
end:
|
|
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
|
|
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
|
|
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
|
|
return ssl_do_write(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
|
|
unsigned int cookie_len;
|
|
long n;
|
|
unsigned long id;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
unsigned char *q;
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
|
|
goto retry_cert;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
|
|
* TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
|
|
* switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
|
|
* will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
|
}
|
|
s->first_packet = 1;
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
s->first_packet = 0;
|
|
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
|
|
* for session id length
|
|
*/
|
|
if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
|
|
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
|
|
*/
|
|
s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
|
|
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
|
|
: (s->client_version < s->version)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
|
|
!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
|
|
* number
|
|
*/
|
|
s->version = s->client_version;
|
|
}
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
|
|
* return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
|
|
* cookie length...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
|
|
|
|
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (cookie_length == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* load the client random */
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/* get the session-id */
|
|
j = *(p++);
|
|
|
|
if (p + j > d + n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->hit = 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
|
|
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
|
|
* ignore resumption requests with flag
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
|
|
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
|
|
* for security won't even compile against older library versions).
|
|
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
|
|
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
|
|
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((s->new_session
|
|
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
|
|
* version.
|
|
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
|
|
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
|
|
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
|
|
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
|
|
* will abort the handshake with an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
|
|
* session */
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
} else if (i == -1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
else { /* i == 0 */
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += j;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/* cookie stuff */
|
|
if (p + 1 > d + n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
cookie_len = *(p++);
|
|
|
|
if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
|
|
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
|
|
* does not cause an overflow.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
|
|
/* too much data */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
|
|
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
|
|
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
|
|
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
|
|
cookie_len) == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
|
|
}
|
|
/* default verification */
|
|
else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
|
|
ret = -2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += cookie_len;
|
|
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
|
|
/* Select version to use */
|
|
if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
|
|
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
|
|
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
|
|
s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
|
|
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
|
|
s->version = s->client_version;
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
|
|
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
|
|
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
|
|
s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
s->version = s->client_version;
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p + 2 > d + n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
|
|
if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
|
|
/* not enough data */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
|
|
#endif
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
|
|
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (c->id == id) {
|
|
j = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
|
|
* CVE-2010-4180.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if 0
|
|
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
|
|
&& (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
|
|
* cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
|
|
* might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
|
|
* chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
|
|
* connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
|
|
*/
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
|
|
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
|
|
s->session->cipher = c;
|
|
j = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (j == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
|
|
* to reuse it
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* compression */
|
|
i = *(p++);
|
|
if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
|
|
/* not enough data */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
q = p;
|
|
#endif
|
|
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
|
|
if (p[j] == 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += i;
|
|
if (j >= i) {
|
|
/* no compress */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
/* TLS extensions */
|
|
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
|
|
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
|
|
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
|
|
* processing to use it in key derivation.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *pos;
|
|
pos = s->s3->server_random;
|
|
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
|
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
|
|
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
|
|
&pref_cipher,
|
|
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
|
|
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
ciphers = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
|
|
pref_cipher =
|
|
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->ciphers,
|
|
SSL_get_ciphers
|
|
(s));
|
|
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
|
|
|
|
if (s->cipher_list)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
|
|
|
|
if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
|
|
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
|
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
|
|
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
|
|
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
|
|
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
|
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
|
|
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
|
|
/* Can't disable compression */
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Look for resumed compression method */
|
|
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
|
|
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
|
|
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
|
|
for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
|
|
if (q[m] == comp_id)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (m >= i) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (s->hit)
|
|
comp = NULL;
|
|
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
|
|
/* See if we have a match */
|
|
int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
|
|
|
|
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
|
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
|
|
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
|
|
v = comp->id;
|
|
for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
|
|
if (v == q[o]) {
|
|
done = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (done)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (done)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
|
else
|
|
comp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
/*
|
|
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
|
* using compression.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
|
|
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
|
|
if (ciphers == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphers = NULL;
|
|
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
|
|
retry_cert:
|
|
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
|
|
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
|
|
if (rv == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv < 0) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
}
|
|
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
|
|
|
|
if (c == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Session-id reuse */
|
|
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
|
|
sk = s->session->ciphers;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
|
|
if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
|
|
nc = c;
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
|
|
ec = c;
|
|
}
|
|
if (nc != NULL)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
|
|
else if (ec != NULL)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
|
|
else
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* we now have the following setup.
|
|
* client_random
|
|
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
|
|
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
|
|
* compression - basically ignored right now
|
|
* ssl version is set - sslv3
|
|
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
|
|
* s->hit - session reuse flag
|
|
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
|
|
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
ret = -ret;
|
|
if (0) {
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers != NULL)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
|
return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int i, sl;
|
|
int al = 0;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
|
|
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
p = s->s3->server_random;
|
|
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
|
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
|
|
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* Random stuff */
|
|
memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* There are several cases for the session ID to send
|
|
* back in the server hello:
|
|
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
|
|
* we send back the old session ID.
|
|
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
|
|
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
|
|
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
|
|
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
|
|
* session ID.
|
|
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
|
|
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
|
|
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
|
|
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
|
|
* to send back.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
|
|
&& !s->hit)
|
|
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*(p++) = sl;
|
|
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
|
|
p += sl;
|
|
|
|
/* put the cipher */
|
|
i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
/* put the compression method */
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
*(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((p =
|
|
ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
|
|
&al)) == NULL) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
l = (p - d);
|
|
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
|
|
return ssl_do_write(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
|
|
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
|
|
return ssl_do_write(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
unsigned char *q;
|
|
int j, num;
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned int u;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
int encodedlen = 0;
|
|
int curve_id = 0;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int al, i;
|
|
unsigned long type;
|
|
int n;
|
|
CERT *cert;
|
|
BIGNUM *r[4];
|
|
int nr[4], kn;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
|
|
type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
cert = s->cert;
|
|
|
|
buf = s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
|
|
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
|
|
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
|
|
cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = rsa->n;
|
|
r[1] = rsa->e;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
|
|
dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
|
|
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if (dhp == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
|
|
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
|
|
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
|
|
if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
|
|
dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
|
|
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = dh->p;
|
|
r[1] = dh->g;
|
|
r[2] = dh->pub_key;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
|
|
ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
|
|
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
|
|
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
|
|
int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
|
|
if (nid != NID_undef)
|
|
ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
|
|
} else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
|
|
ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
|
|
s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
}
|
|
if (ecdhp == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
|
|
if (ecdhp == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
|
|
ecdh = ecdhp;
|
|
else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
|
|
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
|
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
|
|
* (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
|
|
* non-zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((curve_id =
|
|
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
|
|
== 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
|
|
* allocate memory accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
|
|
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (encodedlen == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
|
|
* ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
|
|
* additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
|
|
* structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
n = 4 + encodedlen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
|
|
* can set these to NULLs
|
|
*/
|
|
r[0] = NULL;
|
|
r[1] = NULL;
|
|
r[2] = NULL;
|
|
r[3] = NULL;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
|
|
*/
|
|
n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
|
|
r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
|
|
r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
|
|
r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
|
nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
|
|
n += 1 + nr[i];
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
n += 2 + nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
|
|
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
|
|
== NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
} else {
|
|
pkey = NULL;
|
|
kn = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
|
|
*p = nr[i];
|
|
p++;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
s2n(nr[i], p);
|
|
BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
|
|
p += nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
|
|
* this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
|
|
* CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
|
|
* point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
|
|
*/
|
|
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = 0;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = curve_id;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = encodedlen;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
|
|
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
p += encodedlen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
/* copy PSK identity hint */
|
|
s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
|
|
strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
|
|
strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
|
|
p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* not anonymous */
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
|
|
* points to the space at the end.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
q = md_buf;
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
|
|
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
|
|
? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
|
|
q += i;
|
|
j += i;
|
|
}
|
|
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
|
|
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(u, p);
|
|
n += u + 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (md) {
|
|
/* send signature algorithm */
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
|
|
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(i, p);
|
|
n += i + 2;
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return ssl_do_write(s);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int i, j, nl, off, n;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
|
|
buf = s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
|
|
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
|
p++;
|
|
n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
|
|
d[0] = n;
|
|
p += n;
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
const unsigned char *psigs;
|
|
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
|
|
s2n(nl, p);
|
|
memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
|
|
p += nl;
|
|
n += nl + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
off = n;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
|
|
sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
|
nl = 0;
|
|
if (sk != NULL) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
|
|
name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
|
|
j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
|
|
(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
|
|
s2n(j, p);
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
|
|
n += 2 + j;
|
|
nl += 2 + j;
|
|
} else {
|
|
d = p;
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
|
|
j -= 2;
|
|
s2n(j, d);
|
|
j += 2;
|
|
n += j;
|
|
nl += j;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* else no CA names */
|
|
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
|
|
s2n(nl, p);
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
*(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
s->init_num += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
|
|
return ssl_do_write(s);
|
|
err:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, al, ok;
|
|
long n;
|
|
unsigned long alg_k;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
|
|
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
|
|
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
int decrypt_len;
|
|
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
|
|
size_t j;
|
|
|
|
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
|
|
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
|
|
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
|
|
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
|
|
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
if (n != i + 2) {
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else
|
|
p -= 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
n = i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
|
|
* that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
|
|
* size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
|
|
* actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
|
|
* bound is sufficient to be safe.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
|
|
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
|
|
* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
|
|
* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
|
|
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
|
|
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
decrypt_len =
|
|
RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
|
|
* be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
decrypt_good =
|
|
constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
|
|
* version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
|
|
* Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
|
|
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
|
|
* check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
|
|
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
|
|
*/
|
|
version_good =
|
|
constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
|
|
version_good &=
|
|
constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
|
|
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
|
|
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
|
|
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
|
|
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
|
|
* protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
|
|
* clients.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
|
|
unsigned char workaround_good;
|
|
workaround_good =
|
|
constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
|
|
workaround_good &=
|
|
constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
|
|
version_good |= workaround_good;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
|
|
* remain non-zero (0xff).
|
|
*/
|
|
decrypt_good &= version_good;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
|
|
* decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
|
|
* contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
|
|
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
|
|
p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
|
|
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
p,
|
|
sizeof
|
|
(rand_premaster_secret));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
|
|
int idx = -1;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
|
|
if (n > 1) {
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (n && n != i + 2) {
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
p -= 2;
|
|
i = (int)n;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
|
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
|
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
|
|
if (idx >= 0) {
|
|
skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
|
|
if ((skey == NULL) ||
|
|
(skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
|
|
} else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else
|
|
dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
|
|
|
|
if (n == 0L) {
|
|
/* Get pubkey from cert */
|
|
EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
if (clkey) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
|
|
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
|
|
}
|
|
if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
|
|
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
|
|
} else
|
|
pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
|
|
if (pub == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
BN_clear_free(pub);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
|
|
if (dh_clnt)
|
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
|
else
|
|
BN_clear_free(pub);
|
|
pub = NULL;
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
p, i);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
|
|
if (dh_clnt)
|
|
return 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
|
|
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
|
|
krb5_data enc_ticket;
|
|
krb5_data authenticator;
|
|
krb5_data enc_pms;
|
|
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
|
|
int padl, outl;
|
|
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
|
|
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!kssl_ctx)
|
|
kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
enc_ticket.length = i;
|
|
|
|
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
|
|
p += enc_ticket.length;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
authenticator.length = i;
|
|
|
|
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
|
|
p += authenticator.length;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
enc_pms.length = i;
|
|
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
|
|
p += enc_pms.length;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
|
|
*/
|
|
if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
|
|
enc_pms.length + 6)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
|
|
&kssl_err)) != 0) {
|
|
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
|
|
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
if (kssl_err.text)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
|
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
|
|
* return authtime == 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
|
|
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
|
|
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
|
|
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
if (kssl_err.text)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
|
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
|
|
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
|
|
if (enc == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
|
|
(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
outl += padl;
|
|
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
|
|
&& (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
|
|
* the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
|
|
* the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
|
|
* ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
|
|
* bytes instead of the protocol version. If
|
|
* SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
|
|
* (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
|
|
* cipher)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
pms, outl);
|
|
|
|
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
|
|
size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
|
|
if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
|
|
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
|
|
memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
|
|
len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
|
|
* but it caused problems for apache.
|
|
* kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
|
|
* if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
|
|
*/
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
int field_size = 0;
|
|
const EC_KEY *tkey;
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
|
|
|
|
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
|
|
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
|
|
/* use the certificate */
|
|
tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
|
|
* ServerKeyExchange msg.
|
|
*/
|
|
tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
|
|
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
|
|
!EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Let's get client's public key */
|
|
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n == 0L) {
|
|
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
|
|
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
|
|
== NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
|
|
* using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
|
|
* code is never executed. When that support is added, we
|
|
* ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
|
|
* authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
|
|
* checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
|
|
pkey.ec)) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
|
|
* ClientKeyExchange message.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get encoded point length */
|
|
i = *p;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
if (n != 1 + i) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
|
|
* to the start
|
|
*/
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
|
|
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
|
|
if (field_size <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
|
|
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
|
|
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the master secret */
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
p, i);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
unsigned char *t = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
|
|
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
|
|
int psk_err = 1;
|
|
char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
|
|
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
if (n != i + 2) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
|
|
memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
|
|
psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
|
|
psk_or_pre_ms,
|
|
sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
} else if (psk_len == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* PSK related to the given identity not found
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
|
|
pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
|
|
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
|
|
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
|
|
s2n(psk_len, t);
|
|
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
|
|
t += psk_len;
|
|
s2n(psk_len, t);
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
|
|
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
|
|
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
|
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
psk_or_pre_ms,
|
|
pre_ms_len);
|
|
psk_err = 0;
|
|
psk_err:
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
|
|
if (psk_err != 0)
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
int param_len;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
param_len = i + 2;
|
|
if (param_len > n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
|
|
|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
|
|
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
|
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += i;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
|
|
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
|
|
unsigned long alg_a;
|
|
int Ttag, Tclass;
|
|
long Tlen;
|
|
|
|
/* Get our certificate private key */
|
|
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
|
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
|
|
|
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
|
|
/*
|
|
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
|
|
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
|
|
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
|
|
* client certificate for authorization only.
|
|
*/
|
|
client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
if (client_pub_pkey) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
/* Decrypt session key */
|
|
if (ASN1_get_object
|
|
((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
|
|
n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|
|
|| Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto gerr;
|
|
}
|
|
start = p;
|
|
inlen = Tlen;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
|
|
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto gerr;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Generate master secret */
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
premaster_secret, 32);
|
|
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
|
|
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
else
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
gerr:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
else
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
|
|
err:
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
|
|
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
|
|
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
|
|
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
int al, ok, ret = 0;
|
|
long n;
|
|
int type = 0, i, j;
|
|
X509 *peer;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
|
|
* a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
|
|
* NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
|
|
* if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
|
|
* DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
|
|
* CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
|
|
peer = s->session->peer;
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
|
|
type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
|
|
|
|
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
|
|
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
|
|
/*
|
|
* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
|
|
* length field
|
|
*/
|
|
if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
|
|
pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
|
|
i = 64;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
|
|
if (rv == -1) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else if (rv == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
n -= 2;
|
|
}
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
n -= 2;
|
|
if (i > n) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
long hdatalen = 0;
|
|
void *hdata;
|
|
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
|
|
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
|
|
EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|
|
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
|
|
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
|
|
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
|
|
pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
|
|
j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
|
|
if (j <= 0) {
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
|
|
j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
|
|
if (j <= 0) {
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
|
|
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
|
|
unsigned char signature[64];
|
|
int idx;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
|
|
if (i != 64) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
|
|
}
|
|
for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
|
|
signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
|
|
}
|
|
j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
|
|
32);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
if (j <= 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
if (0) {
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
end:
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
|
|
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
|
|
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
|
|
const unsigned char *p, *q;
|
|
unsigned char *d;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
|
|
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n2l3(p, llen);
|
|
if (llen + 3 != n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
|
|
n2l3(p, l);
|
|
if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
q = p;
|
|
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
|
|
if (x == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (p != (q + l)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
nc += l + 3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
|
|
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
|
|
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
|
|
* arrive here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
|
|
* certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
if (0) {
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (x != NULL)
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
if (sk != NULL)
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
|
|
cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
|
|
if (cpk == NULL) {
|
|
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
|
|
return ssl_do_write(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
|
|
int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
|
HMAC_CTX hctx;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
|
|
unsigned char *p, *macstart;
|
|
const unsigned char *const_p;
|
|
int len, slen_full, slen;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char key_name[16];
|
|
|
|
/* get session encoding length */
|
|
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
|
|
* long
|
|
*/
|
|
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
|
|
if (!senc) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
|
|
|
|
p = senc;
|
|
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
|
|
*/
|
|
const_p = senc;
|
|
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
|
|
if (sess == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
|
|
|
|
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
|
|
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = senc;
|
|
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
|
* follows handshake_header_length +
|
|
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
|
|
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
|
|
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
|
|
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
|
|
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
|
|
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
|
|
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
|
|
&hctx, 1) < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
|
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
|
|
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
|
|
* for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
|
|
* new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
|
|
*/
|
|
l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
|
|
|
|
/* Skip ticket length for now */
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
/* Output key name */
|
|
macstart = p;
|
|
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
|
|
p += 16;
|
|
/* output IV */
|
|
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
|
|
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
|
/* Encrypt session data */
|
|
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
p += len;
|
|
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
p += len;
|
|
|
|
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
|
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
|
|
/* Total length */
|
|
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
|
|
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
|
|
s2n(len - 6, p);
|
|
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
|
|
return ssl_do_write(s);
|
|
err:
|
|
if (senc)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
|
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
|
|
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
|
|
* + (ocsp response)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
*(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
|
|
/* message length */
|
|
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
|
|
/* status type */
|
|
*(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
|
|
/* length of OCSP response */
|
|
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
|
|
/* actual response */
|
|
memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
|
|
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
/*
|
|
* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
|
|
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok;
|
|
int proto_len, padding_len;
|
|
long n;
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
|
|
* extension in their ClientHello
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
|
|
SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* See the payload format below */
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
|
|
SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
|
|
* this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
|
|
* ssl3_get_finished).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n < 2) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* The payload looks like:
|
|
* uint8 proto_len;
|
|
* uint8 proto[proto_len];
|
|
* uint8 padding_len;
|
|
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_len = p[0];
|
|
if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
|
|
if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
|
|
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
#endif
|