5d5b3fba1f
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)
1337 lines
41 KiB
C
1337 lines
41 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
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#include "../ssl_locl.h"
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#include "statem_locl.h"
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int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
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X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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/* Add RI if renegotiating */
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if (!s->renegotiate)
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return 1;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
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s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
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X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
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return 1;
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/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
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/* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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/* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
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|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
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strlen(s->ext.hostname))
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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/* Add SRP username if there is one */
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if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
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/* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
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/* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
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|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
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|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
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strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
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{
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int i, end;
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unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
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STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
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/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
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if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
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return 0;
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cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
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end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
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for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
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const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
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alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
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alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
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if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
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|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
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|| c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
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break;
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}
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return i < end;
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}
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int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
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X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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const unsigned char *pformats;
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size_t num_formats;
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if (!use_ecc(s))
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return 1;
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/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
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tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
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/* Sub-packet for formats extension */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
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unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp;
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size_t num_curves = 0, i;
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if (!use_ecc(s))
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return 1;
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/*
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* Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
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*/
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/* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
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pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
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if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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pcurvestmp = pcurves;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
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/* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Copy curve ID if supported */
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for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
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if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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}
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if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
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unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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size_t ticklen;
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if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
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return 1;
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if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
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&& s->session->ext.tick != NULL
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&& s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
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} else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
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&& s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
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ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
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s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
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if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
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s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
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s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
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} else {
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ticklen = 0;
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}
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if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
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s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
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|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
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X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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size_t salglen;
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const uint16_t *salg;
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if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
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return 1;
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salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
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/* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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/* Sub-packet for the actual list */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
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int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
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unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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int i;
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/* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
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if (x != NULL)
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return 1;
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if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
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return 1;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
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/* Sub-packet for status request extension */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
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/* Sub-packet for the ids */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
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unsigned char *idbytes;
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OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
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int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
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if (idlen <= 0
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/* Sub-packet for an individual id */
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|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
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|| i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
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unsigned char *extbytes;
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int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
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if (extlen < 0) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
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|| i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
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!= extlen) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
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return 1;
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/*
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* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
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* for Next Protocol Negotiation
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*/
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
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if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
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return 1;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
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TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
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/* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
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return 1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
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int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
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X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
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int i, end;
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if (clnt == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
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/* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
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/* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
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for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
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const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
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sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
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if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
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/* Add an empty use_mki value */
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
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|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
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{
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if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
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return 1;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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|
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
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int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
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{
|
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if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
|
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return 1;
|
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|
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/* Not defined for client Certificates */
|
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if (x != NULL)
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return 1;
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|
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
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return 0;
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}
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|
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return 1;
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}
|
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#endif
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|
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int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
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{
|
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
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return 0;
|
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}
|
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|
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return 1;
|
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}
|
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|
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int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
|
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unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
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size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
|
|
if (reason != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
|
|
* we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
|
|
* reviewed later.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
|
|
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
|
|
if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. We only have two modes we know about
|
|
* at this stage, so we send both.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): Do we want this list to be configurable? For now we always
|
|
* just send both supported modes
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
|
|
static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *encoded_point;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *key_share_key;
|
|
size_t encodedlen;
|
|
|
|
key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
|
|
if (key_share_key == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the public key. */
|
|
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
|
|
&encoded_point);
|
|
if (encodedlen == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create KeyShareEntry */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
|
|
* going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
|
|
* we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
|
|
s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
|
|
size_t i, num_curves = 0;
|
|
const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int curve_id = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* key_share extension */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|
|
/* Extension data sub-packet */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
/* KeyShare list sub-packet */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
|
|
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen! */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
|
|
* now, just send one
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
|
|
curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
|
|
} else {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (curve_id == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
|
|
#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *padbytes;
|
|
size_t hlen;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
|
|
* code calculates the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
|
|
* appear last.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
|
|
/* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */
|
|
hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
|
|
* 2 bytes for length bytes)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (hlen >= 4)
|
|
hlen -= 4;
|
|
else
|
|
hlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Construct the pre_shared_key extension
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
|
|
uint32_t now, agesec, agems;
|
|
size_t hashsize, binderoffset, msglen;
|
|
unsigned char *binder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
|
|
* so don't add this extension.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
|| s->session->ext.ticklen == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
|
|
if (md == NULL) {
|
|
/* Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
|
|
* nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations
|
|
* follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch.
|
|
* We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places
|
|
* in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue.
|
|
*/
|
|
now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
|
|
agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
|
|
/* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
|
|
* good enough.
|
|
*/
|
|
agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
|
|
|
|
if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If
|
|
* so we just ignore it.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to
|
|
* be mod 2^32.
|
|
*/
|
|
agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
|
|
|
|
hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
|
|
|
|
/* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
|
|
s->session->ext.ticklen)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, hashsize, &binder)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
|
|
* calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
|
|
*/
|
|
|| !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
|
|
|
|
if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, binder,
|
|
s->session, 1) != 1) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
#else
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
|
|
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
|
|
size_t ilen;
|
|
const unsigned char *data;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for logic errors */
|
|
assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0);
|
|
assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the length byte */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
|
|
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Consistency check */
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
|
|
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the extension matches */
|
|
if (ilen != expected_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
|
|
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
|
|
|| memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
|
|
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
|
|
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
|
|
|| memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
|
|
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
|
|
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
|
|
if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_early_data_info(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long max_early_data;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA_INFO,
|
|
SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int ecpointformats_len;
|
|
PACKET ecptformatlist;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
|
|
s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
|
|
s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
|
|
if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
|
|
s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
|
|
ecpointformats_len)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
|
|
!s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
|
|
s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
|
|
* request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->ext.status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
|
|
|| (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
/* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
|
|
* the chain. We ignore any other repsonses.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (chainidx != 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, al);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
|
|
s->ext.status_expected = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
|
|
* callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
|
|
* need to let control continue to flow to that.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
|
|
size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
|
|
|
|
/* Simply copy it off for later processing */
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
|
|
s->ext.scts = NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->ext.scts_len = size;
|
|
if (size > 0) {
|
|
s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
|
|
if (s->ext.scts == NULL
|
|
|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
|
|
PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), al) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
/*
|
|
* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
|
|
* elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
|
|
* fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET tmp_protocol;
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *selected;
|
|
unsigned char selected_len;
|
|
PACKET tmppkt;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* We must have requested it. */
|
|
if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The data must be valid */
|
|
tmppkt = *pkt;
|
|
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&tmppkt)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
|
|
PACKET_data(pkt),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
|
|
s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
|
|
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
|
|
* a single Serverhello
|
|
*/
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
|
|
s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
|
|
if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
|
|
s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
|
|
s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
/* We must have requested it. */
|
|
if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*-
|
|
* The extension data consists of:
|
|
* uint16 list_length
|
|
* uint8 proto_length;
|
|
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
|
|
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int id, ct, mki;
|
|
int i;
|
|
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
|
|
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mki != 0) {
|
|
/* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
|
|
clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
|
|
if (clnt == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
|
|
* presumably offered)
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
|
|
prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
|
|
|
|
if (prof->id == id) {
|
|
s->srtp_profile = prof;
|
|
*al = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
|
|
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
|
|
s->ext.use_etm = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
|
|
if (!s->hit)
|
|
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
|
|
unsigned int group_id;
|
|
PACKET encoded_pt;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check */
|
|
if (ckey == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((context & EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
|
|
unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL;
|
|
size_t i, num_curves;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
|
|
* already sent in the first ClientHello
|
|
*/
|
|
if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Validate the selected group is one we support */
|
|
pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
|
|
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
|
|
if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves))
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i >= num_curves
|
|
|| !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
|
|
* key_share!
|
|
*/
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
|
|
if (skey == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
|
|
size_t chainidx, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
|
|
unsigned int identity;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|