4e63da0669
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve@openssl.org DTLS fragment retransmission bug.
1385 lines
35 KiB
C
1385 lines
35 KiB
C
/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
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/*
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* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
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* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
|
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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#endif
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static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
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static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
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static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
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{
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if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
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return(DTLSv1_server_method());
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else
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return(NULL);
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}
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IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
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dtls1_accept,
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ssl_undefined_function,
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dtls1_get_server_method)
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int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
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{
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BUF_MEM *buf;
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unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
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void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
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long num1;
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unsigned long alg_k;
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int ret= -1;
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int new_state,state,skip=0;
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RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
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ERR_clear_error();
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clear_sys_error();
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if (s->info_callback != NULL)
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cb=s->info_callback;
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else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
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cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
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/* init things to blank */
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s->in_handshake++;
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if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
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if (s->cert == NULL)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
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return(-1);
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}
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for (;;)
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{
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state=s->state;
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switch (s->state)
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{
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case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
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s->new_session=1;
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/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
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case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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s->server=1;
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if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
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if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
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if (s->init_buf == NULL)
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{
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if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
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{
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ret= -1;
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goto end;
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}
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if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
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{
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ret= -1;
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_buf=buf;
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}
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
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{
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ret= -1;
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_num=0;
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if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
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{
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/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
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* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
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*/
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if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
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}
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else
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{
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/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
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* we will just send a HelloRequest */
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s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
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}
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if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
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s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
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else
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s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
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s->shutdown=0;
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dtls1_start_timer(s);
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ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
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s->init_num=0;
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
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s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
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s->shutdown=0;
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ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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dtls1_stop_timer(s);
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s->new_session = 2;
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if (s->d1->send_cookie)
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s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
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else
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s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
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case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
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dtls1_start_timer(s);
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ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
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if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
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s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
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/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
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if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
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dtls1_start_timer(s);
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ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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if (s->hit)
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
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else
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
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/* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
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if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
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&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
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{
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dtls1_start_timer(s);
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ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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}
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else
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skip=1;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
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alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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/* clear this, it may get reset by
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* send_server_key_exchange */
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if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
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&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
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)
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/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
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* even when forbidden by protocol specs
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* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
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* be able to handle this) */
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s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
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else
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s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
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|
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/* only send if a DH key exchange or
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* RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
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if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
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/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
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* hint if provided */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
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#endif
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|| (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
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|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
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|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
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&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
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|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
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&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
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)
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)
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)
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)
|
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{
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dtls1_start_timer(s);
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ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
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}
|
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else
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skip=1;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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|
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case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
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if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
|
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!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
|
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/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
|
|
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
|
|
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
|
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(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
|
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/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
|
|
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
|
|
* and in RFC 2246): */
|
|
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
|
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
|
|
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
|
|
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
|
|
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
|
|
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|
|
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
|
|
{
|
|
/* no cert request */
|
|
skip=1;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
|
|
/* number of bytes to be flushed */
|
|
num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
|
|
if (num1 > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
|
|
num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
|
|
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
|
|
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
if (ret == 2)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
|
|
else {
|
|
/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
|
|
* have not asked for it :-) */
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
|
|
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
|
|
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
|
|
* message is not sent.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
|
|
* a client cert, it can be verified */
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
NID_md5,
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
NID_sha1,
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
|
|
|
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
|
|
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
|
|
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
|
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
|
|
|
|
ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
|
{
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
|
|
ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
|
/* clean a few things up */
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
s->init_buf=NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* remove buffering on output */
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
|
|
{
|
|
/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
|
|
|
|
s->new_session=0;
|
|
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
|
|
/* s->server=1; */
|
|
s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
|
|
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
|
|
/* next message is server hello */
|
|
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
|
|
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->debug)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
|
|
{
|
|
new_state=s->state;
|
|
s->state=state;
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
|
|
s->state=new_state;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skip=0;
|
|
}
|
|
end:
|
|
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
|
|
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
|
|
{
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
/* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit
|
|
* requests for it */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int msg_len;
|
|
unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)
|
|
{
|
|
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
|
|
*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb != NULL &&
|
|
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
|
|
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* else the cookie is assumed to have
|
|
* been initialized by the application */
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
|
|
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
|
|
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
|
|
msg_len = p - msg;
|
|
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
|
|
DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
|
|
|
|
s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num=p-buf;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
int i;
|
|
unsigned int sl;
|
|
unsigned long l,Time;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
|
|
{
|
|
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p=s->s3->server_random;
|
|
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
|
|
l2n(Time,p);
|
|
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
|
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
|
d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
|
|
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* Random stuff */
|
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
|
|
* session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
|
|
* old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
|
|
* back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
|
|
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
|
|
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
|
|
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
|
|
s->session->session_id_length=0;
|
|
|
|
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*(p++)=sl;
|
|
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
|
|
p+=sl;
|
|
|
|
/* put the cipher */
|
|
i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
/* put the compression method */
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
else
|
|
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
l=(p-d);
|
|
d=buf;
|
|
|
|
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num=p-buf;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
|
|
{
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
unsigned char *q;
|
|
int j,num;
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned int u;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
int encodedlen = 0;
|
|
int curve_id = 0;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
int al,i;
|
|
unsigned long type;
|
|
int n;
|
|
CERT *cert;
|
|
BIGNUM *r[4];
|
|
int nr[4],kn;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
|
|
{
|
|
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
cert=s->cert;
|
|
|
|
buf=s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
|
|
n=0;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
{
|
|
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
|
|
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if(rsa == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
|
|
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rsa == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
r[0]=rsa->n;
|
|
r[1]=rsa->e;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEDH)
|
|
{
|
|
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
|
|
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if (dhp == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
|
|
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
|
|
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
|
|
{
|
|
if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
|
|
dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
|
|
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
|
|
(dh->priv_key == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
r[0]=dh->p;
|
|
r[1]=dh->g;
|
|
r[2]=dh->pub_key;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
|
|
{
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
|
|
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
|
|
if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
}
|
|
if (ecdhp == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
|
|
if (ecdhp == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ecdh = ecdhp;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
|
|
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
|
|
{
|
|
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
|
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
|
|
* keys over named (not generic) curves. For
|
|
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((curve_id =
|
|
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
|
|
== 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the public key.
|
|
* First check the size of encoding and
|
|
* allocate memory accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
|
|
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (encodedlen == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
|
|
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
|
|
* In this situation, we need four additional bytes
|
|
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
|
|
* structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
n = 4 + encodedlen;
|
|
|
|
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
|
|
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
|
|
*/
|
|
r[0]=NULL;
|
|
r[1]=NULL;
|
|
r[2]=NULL;
|
|
r[3]=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_kPSK)
|
|
{
|
|
/* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
|
|
n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
|
n+=2+nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
|
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
|
== NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
pkey=NULL;
|
|
kn=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
s2n(nr[i],p);
|
|
BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
|
|
p+=nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
|
|
{
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
|
|
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
|
|
* [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
|
|
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
|
|
* the actual encoded point itself
|
|
*/
|
|
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = 0;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = curve_id;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = encodedlen;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
|
|
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
|
|
encodedlen);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
p += encodedlen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_kPSK)
|
|
{
|
|
/* copy PSK identity hint */
|
|
s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
|
|
strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
|
|
p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* not anonymous */
|
|
if (pkey != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* n is the length of the params, they start at
|
|
* &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space
|
|
* at the end. */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
{
|
|
q=md_buf;
|
|
j=0;
|
|
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
|
|
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i);
|
|
q+=i;
|
|
j+=i;
|
|
}
|
|
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
|
|
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(u,p);
|
|
n+=u+2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
|
{
|
|
/* lets do DSS */
|
|
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
|
|
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(i,p);
|
|
n+=i+2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
|
{
|
|
/* let's do ECDSA */
|
|
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
|
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(i,p);
|
|
n+=i+2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
|
|
SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
|
|
|
|
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
|
|
* it off */
|
|
s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
err:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
int i,j,nl,off,n;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
unsigned int msg_len;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
|
|
{
|
|
buf=s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
|
p++;
|
|
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
|
|
d[0]=n;
|
|
p+=n;
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
off=n;
|
|
p+=2;
|
|
n+=2;
|
|
|
|
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
|
nl=0;
|
|
if (sk != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
|
|
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n+j+2))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]);
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
|
|
{
|
|
s2n(j,p);
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
|
|
n+=2+j;
|
|
nl+=2+j;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
d=p;
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
|
|
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
|
|
n+=j;
|
|
nl+=j;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* else no CA names */
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]);
|
|
s2n(nl,p);
|
|
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
|
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
|
s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
|
|
s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
|
|
|
|
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
|
|
* it off */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
/* XXX: what to do about this? */
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
s->init_num += 4;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: set message header ? */
|
|
msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
err:
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
|
|
{
|
|
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
|
|
if (x == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
|
|
s->init_num=(int)l;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|