c1ebe0509a
This is a missing accessor in order to obtain PSS parameters from an RSA key, which should also be available in 1.1.1. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10568)
493 lines
11 KiB
C
493 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
|
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
|
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
|
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
|
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
|
#include "internal/refcount.h"
|
|
#include "crypto/bn.h"
|
|
#include <openssl/engine.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
|
#include "crypto/evp.h"
|
|
#include "rsa_local.h"
|
|
|
|
RSA *RSA_new(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return RSA_new_method(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
return rsa->meth;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
|
|
* to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
|
|
*/
|
|
const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
|
|
mtmp = rsa->meth;
|
|
if (mtmp->finish)
|
|
mtmp->finish(rsa);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
|
|
rsa->engine = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
rsa->meth = meth;
|
|
if (meth->init)
|
|
meth->init(rsa);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret->references = 1;
|
|
ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
|
|
if (ret->lock == NULL) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ret);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
|
|
if (engine) {
|
|
if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret->engine = engine;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret->engine) {
|
|
ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
|
|
if (ret->meth == NULL) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
RSA_free(ret);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void RSA_free(RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (r == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
|
|
REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
|
|
|
|
if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
|
|
r->meth->finish(r);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
|
|
|
|
BN_free(r->n);
|
|
BN_free(r->e);
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->d);
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->p);
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->q);
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
|
|
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
|
|
BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
|
|
BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
|
|
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
|
|
return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
|
|
{
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
|
|
/* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
|
|
int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
|
|
|
|
if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return BN_security_bits(bits, -1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
|
|
* parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
|
|
* left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
|
|
|| (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (n != NULL) {
|
|
BN_free(r->n);
|
|
r->n = n;
|
|
}
|
|
if (e != NULL) {
|
|
BN_free(r->e);
|
|
r->e = e;
|
|
}
|
|
if (d != NULL) {
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->d);
|
|
r->d = d;
|
|
BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
|
|
* parameters MUST be non-NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
|
|
|| (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL) {
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->p);
|
|
r->p = p;
|
|
BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
if (q != NULL) {
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->q);
|
|
r->q = q;
|
|
BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
|
|
* parameters MUST be non-NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
|
|
|| (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
|
|
|| (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (dmp1 != NULL) {
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
|
|
r->dmp1 = dmp1;
|
|
BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
if (dmq1 != NULL) {
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
|
|
r->dmq1 = dmq1;
|
|
BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
if (iqmp != NULL) {
|
|
BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
|
|
r->iqmp = iqmp;
|
|
BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
|
|
* and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
|
|
*/
|
|
int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
|
|
BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
|
|
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
|
|
if (prime_infos == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
|
|
old = r->prime_infos;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
|
|
pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
|
|
if (pinfo == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
|
|
BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
|
|
BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
|
|
BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
|
|
pinfo->r = primes[i];
|
|
pinfo->d = exps[i];
|
|
pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
|
|
BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
} else {
|
|
rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
|
|
r->prime_infos = old;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (old != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
|
|
* also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
|
|
* be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
|
|
* with other *set0* functions: just free it...
|
|
*/
|
|
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
/* r, d, t should not be freed */
|
|
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
|
|
const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
|
|
{
|
|
if (n != NULL)
|
|
*n = r->n;
|
|
if (e != NULL)
|
|
*e = r->e;
|
|
if (d != NULL)
|
|
*d = r->d;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
|
|
{
|
|
if (p != NULL)
|
|
*p = r->p;
|
|
if (q != NULL)
|
|
*q = r->q;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
int pnum;
|
|
|
|
pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
|
|
if (pnum <= 0)
|
|
pnum = 0;
|
|
return pnum;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
|
|
{
|
|
int pnum, i;
|
|
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
|
|
|
if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* return other primes
|
|
* it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
|
|
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
|
|
primes[i] = pinfo->r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
|
|
const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
|
|
const BIGNUM **iqmp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (dmp1 != NULL)
|
|
*dmp1 = r->dmp1;
|
|
if (dmq1 != NULL)
|
|
*dmq1 = r->dmq1;
|
|
if (iqmp != NULL)
|
|
*iqmp = r->iqmp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
|
|
const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
|
|
{
|
|
int pnum;
|
|
|
|
if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* return other primes */
|
|
if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
|
|
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
|
|
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
|
|
if (exps != NULL)
|
|
exps[i] = pinfo->d;
|
|
if (coeffs != NULL)
|
|
coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->e;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->d;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->q;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->dmp1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->dmq1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->iqmp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->pss;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
r->flags &= ~flags;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->flags & flags;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
r->flags |= flags;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
/* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
|
|
return r->version;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return r->engine;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
|
|
if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL
|
|
&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
|
|
&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
|
|
}
|