openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 96384e613a FIPS: Fix compiler errors in rsa_chk.c when building with -DFIPS_MODE
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8843)
2019-04-30 14:02:22 +02:00

240 lines
6.5 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "rsa_locl.h"
int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
{
return RSA_check_key_ex(key, NULL);
}
/*
* NOTE: Key validation requires separate checks to be able to be accessed
* individually. These should be visible from the PKEY API..
* See rsa_sp800_56b_check_public, rsa_sp800_56b_check_private and
* rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair.
*/
int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
return rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(key)
&& rsa_sp800_56b_check_private(key)
&& rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(key, NULL, -1, RSA_bits(key));
#else
BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
BN_CTX *ctx;
int ret = 1, ex_primes = 0, idx;
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
if (key->p == NULL || key->q == NULL || key->n == NULL
|| key->e == NULL || key->d == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
/* multi-prime? */
if (key->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(key->prime_infos);
if (ex_primes <= 0
|| (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(BN_num_bits(key->n))) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY);
return 0;
}
}
i = BN_new();
j = BN_new();
k = BN_new();
l = BN_new();
m = BN_new();
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL
|| m == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
ret = -1;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_one(key->e)) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
}
if (!BN_is_odd(key->e)) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
}
/* p prime? */
if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME);
}
/* q prime? */
if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
}
/* r_i prime? */
for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
if (BN_is_prime_ex(pinfo->r, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME);
}
}
/* n = p*q * r_3...r_i? */
if (!BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
if (!BN_mul(i, i, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
}
if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) {
ret = 0;
if (ex_primes)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX,
RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES);
else
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
}
/* d*e = 1 mod \lambda(n)? */
if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
/* now compute k = \lambda(n) = LCM(i, j, r_3 - 1...) */
if (!BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
if (!BN_sub(k, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mul(l, l, k, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_gcd(m, m, k, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx)) { /* remainder is 0 */
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_is_one(i)) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
}
if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL) {
/* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
}
/* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */
if (!BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
}
/* iqmp = q^-1 mod p? */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, key->q, key->p, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q);
}
}
for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
/* d_i = d mod (r_i - 1)? */
if (!BN_sub(i, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(j, pinfo->d) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
}
/* t_i = R_i ^ -1 mod r_i ? */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, pinfo->pp, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(i, pinfo->t) != 0) {
ret = 0;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R);
}
}
err:
BN_free(i);
BN_free(j);
BN_free(k);
BN_free(l);
BN_free(m);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
}