openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record_tls13.c
Matt Caswell 7426cd343d Ensure that we write out alerts correctly after early_data
If we sent early_data and then received back an HRR, the enc_write_ctx
was stale resulting in errors if an alert needed to be sent.

Thanks to Quarkslab for reporting this.

In any case it makes little sense to encrypt alerts using the
client_early_traffic_secret, so we add special handling for alerts sent
after early_data. All such alerts are sent in plaintext.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6887)
2018-08-08 10:16:58 +01:00

193 lines
6.4 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "record_locl.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
/*-
* tls13_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for
* internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* short etc).
* 1: if the record encryption was successful.
* -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
int tls13_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
size_t ivlen, taglen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
unsigned char *staticiv;
unsigned char *seq;
int lenu, lenf;
SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
uint32_t alg_enc;
WPACKET wpkt;
if (n_recs != 1) {
/* Should not happen */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Support pipelining */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (sending) {
ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
staticiv = s->write_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
} else {
ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
staticiv = s->read_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
}
if (ctx == NULL
|| (rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& s->statem.enc_write_state
== ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS)) {
memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
rec->input = rec->data;
return 1;
}
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
if (s->session != NULL && s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0) {
alg_enc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
} else {
if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
&& s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
alg_enc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
}
} else {
/*
* To get here we must have selected a ciphersuite - otherwise ctx would
* be NULL
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
alg_enc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
}
if (alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) {
if (alg_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
if (sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen,
NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_AESGCM) {
taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_CHACHA20) {
taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!sending) {
/*
* Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
* well as the tag
*/
if (rec->length < taglen + 1)
return 0;
rec->length -= taglen;
}
/* Set up IV */
if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
/* Should not happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
/* Increment the sequence counter */
for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) {
++seq[loop - 1];
if (seq[loop - 1] != 0)
break;
}
if (loop == 0) {
/* Sequence has wrapped */
return -1;
}
/* TODO(size_t): lenu/lenf should be a size_t but EVP doesn't support it */
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
|| (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
taglen,
rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
return -1;
}
/* Set up the AAD */
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + taglen)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
|| hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
|| !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
return -1;
}
/*
* For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
* any AAD.
*/
if (((alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) != 0
&& EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
|| (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
return -1;
}
if (sending) {
/* Add the tag */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen,
rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
rec->length += taglen;
}
return 1;
}