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openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
Matt Caswell 6594189fa1 Merge early_data_info extension into early_data 
As per draft-19

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
2017-03-16 14:20:38 +00:00

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/*
* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
/*
* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned int ilen;
const unsigned char *data;
/* Parse the length byte */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
/* Check that the extension matches */
if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
}
if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
return 1;
}
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/*
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
* syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
* such.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
*
* Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
* i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
|| servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
|| !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else {
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
* fall back to a full handshake.
*/
s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
&& PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET srp_I;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
|| PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
* upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
*/
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
&s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
&s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
!s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
/* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
if (x != NULL)
return 1;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
*/
s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
return 1;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/*
* We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
* to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
*/
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else {
s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
PACKET responder_id;
const unsigned char *id_data;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
|| PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
/* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
(int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
if (id == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->ext.ocsp.exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/*
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*/
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
return 1;
}
#endif
/*
* Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
* extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
* value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
do {
/* Protocol names can't be empty. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
|| PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
&s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
int i, srtp_pref;
PACKET subpkt;
/* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
return 1;
/* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
/* Search all profiles for a match initially */
srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/*
* Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
* current match.
* If no profiles have been have been configured then this
* does nothing.
*/
for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
if (sprof->id == id) {
s->srtp_profile = sprof;
srtp_pref = i;
break;
}
}
}
/* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
s->ext.use_etm = 1;
return 1;
}
/*
* Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
* the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
* If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
PACKET psk_kex_modes;
unsigned int mode;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
|| PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
}
#endif
return 1;
}
/*
* Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
* the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
* If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
int group_nid, found = 0;
unsigned int curve_flags;
if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
return 1;
/* Sanity check */
if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/* Get our list of supported curves */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Get the clients list of supported curves.
* TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received
* supported_groups!
*/
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
* rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
*/
if (found)
continue;
/* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
/* Share not suitable */
continue;
}
group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
if (group_nid == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
/* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 0;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
} else {
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
group_nid) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
}
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
found = 1;
}
#endif
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET supported_groups_list;
/* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
&s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
&s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/* The extension must always be empty */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET identities, binders, binder;
size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
unsigned int id, i;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
/*
* If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
* ignore this extension
*/
if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
& (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
return 1;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
PACKET identity;
unsigned long ticket_agel;
int ret;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
|| !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess);
if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
continue;
md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
if (md == NULL) {
/*
* Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session.
* Ignore it
*/
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
sess = NULL;
continue;
}
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal.
* Ignored for now
*/
break;
}
if (sess == NULL)
return 1;
binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize
|| tls_psk_do_binder(s, md,
(const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL,
sess, 0) != 1) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
/*
* For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the client does
* it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age is longer than ours
* (our ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the
* client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to our age
* calculation to adjust for rounding errors.
*/
if (sess->timeout >= agesec
&& agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
&& ticket_age <= agems + 1000
&& ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
/*
* Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it for early
* data
*/
s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = sess;
return 1;
err:
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
return 0;
}
/*
* Add the server's renegotiation binding
*/
int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
|| s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
&& (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
const unsigned char *plist;
size_t plistlen;
if (!using_ecc)
return 1;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
return 1;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->ext.status_expected)
return 1;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
* send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
* separate message
*/
if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
int ret;
int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
return 1;
ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->ext.use_etm)
return 1;
/*
* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
* for other cases too.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
s->ext.use_etm = 0;
return 1;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned char *encodedPoint;
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
if (ckey == NULL) {
/* No key_share received from client */
if (s->hello_retry_request) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Must be resuming. */
if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Generate encoding of server key */
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
/* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#endif
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
};
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
|| (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (context == EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
if (s->max_early_data == 0)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->hit)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
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