751 lines
23 KiB
C
751 lines
23 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
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# ifndef NDEBUG
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# define NDEBUG
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# endif
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#endif
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "e_os.h"
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#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS))
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# include <sys/time.h>
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#endif
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#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
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# include <time.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/async.h>
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#include "rand_lcl.h"
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
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# include <openssl/fips.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef BN_DEBUG
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# define PREDICT
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#endif
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/* #define PREDICT 1 */
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#define STATE_SIZE 1023
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static int state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
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static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
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static double entropy = 0;
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static int initialized = 0;
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static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
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* holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND (to
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* prevent double locking) */
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/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
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/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
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static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
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#ifdef PREDICT
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int rand_predictable = 0;
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#endif
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static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
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static void rand_cleanup(void);
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static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
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static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
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static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
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static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
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#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
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static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
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#endif
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static int rand_status(void);
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static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
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rand_seed,
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rand_nopseudo_bytes,
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rand_cleanup,
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rand_add,
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#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
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rand_pseudo_bytes,
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#else
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NULL,
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#endif
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rand_status
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};
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RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
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{
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return (&rand_meth);
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}
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static void rand_cleanup(void)
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{
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OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
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state_num = 0;
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state_index = 0;
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OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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md_count[0] = 0;
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md_count[1] = 0;
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entropy = 0;
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initialized = 0;
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}
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static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
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{
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int i, j, k, st_idx;
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long md_c[2];
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unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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EVP_MD_CTX *m;
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int do_not_lock;
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int rv = 0;
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if (!num)
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return 1;
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/*
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* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
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*
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* The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
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* the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
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* function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
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* is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
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* (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
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* the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
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* (which is incremented after each use).
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* The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
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* 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
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* hash function.
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*/
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m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (m == NULL)
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goto err;
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/* check if we already have the lock */
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if (crypto_lock_rand) {
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CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
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CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
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CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
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do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
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} else
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do_not_lock = 0;
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if (!do_not_lock)
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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st_idx = state_index;
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/*
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* use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
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* seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
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* _some_ difference
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*/
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md_c[0] = md_count[0];
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md_c[1] = md_count[1];
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memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
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/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
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state_index += num;
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if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
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state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
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state_num = STATE_SIZE;
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} else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
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if (state_index > state_num)
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state_num = state_index;
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}
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/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
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/*
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* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
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* will use now, but other threads may use them as well
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*/
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md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
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if (!do_not_lock)
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
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j = (num - i);
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j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
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if (!MD_Init(m))
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goto err;
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if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
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goto err;
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k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
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if (k > 0) {
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if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k))
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goto err;
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if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
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goto err;
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} else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j))
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goto err;
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/* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
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if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j))
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goto err;
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/*
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* We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
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* to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not,
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* it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get
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* really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very
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* insecure keys.
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*/
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if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
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goto err;
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if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
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goto err;
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md_c[1]++;
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buf = (const char *)buf + j;
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for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
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/*
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* Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
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* of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
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* local_md (itermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
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* could hurt performance more than necessary given that
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* conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
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* random state.
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*/
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state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
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if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
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st_idx = 0;
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}
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}
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if (!do_not_lock)
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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/*
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* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
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* thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
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* counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
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* md.
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*/
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for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
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md[k] ^= local_md[k];
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}
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if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
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entropy += add;
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if (!do_not_lock)
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
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assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
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#endif
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rv = 1;
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err:
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
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return rv;
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}
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static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
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{
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return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
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}
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static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
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{
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static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
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int i, j, k, st_num, st_idx;
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int num_ceil;
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int ok;
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long md_c[2];
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unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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EVP_MD_CTX *m;
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#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
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pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
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#endif
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time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
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int do_stir_pool = 0;
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/* time value for various platforms */
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
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FILETIME tv;
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# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
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SYSTEMTIME t;
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GetSystemTime(&t);
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SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
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# else
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GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
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# endif
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#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
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struct timespec tv;
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clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
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#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)
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unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
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tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
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#else
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struct timeval tv;
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gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
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#endif
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#ifdef PREDICT
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if (rand_predictable) {
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static unsigned char val = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
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buf[i] = val++;
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return (1);
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}
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#endif
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if (num <= 0)
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return 1;
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m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (m == NULL)
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goto err_mem;
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/* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
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num_ceil =
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(1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
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/*
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* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
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*
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* For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
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*
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* Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
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* the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
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* be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
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* (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
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* in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
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* bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
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*
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* Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
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* caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
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* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
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* global 'md'.
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*/
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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/*
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* We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure
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* we don't pause and cause a deadlock
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*/
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ASYNC_block_pause();
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/* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
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CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
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crypto_lock_rand = 1;
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if (!initialized) {
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RAND_poll();
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initialized = 1;
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}
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if (!stirred_pool)
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do_stir_pool = 1;
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ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
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if (!ok) {
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/*
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* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
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* output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
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* to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
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* seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
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* because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
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* randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
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* we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
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* input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
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* entropy limit has been reached.
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*/
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entropy -= num;
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if (entropy < 0)
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entropy = 0;
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}
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if (do_stir_pool) {
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/*
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* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
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* better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
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* distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
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* function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
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* suitable for this purpose.
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*/
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int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
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while (n > 0) {
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#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
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# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
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#endif
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#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
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/*
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* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
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* rand_add expects to have something to hash.
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*/
|
|
rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
|
|
n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ok)
|
|
stirred_pool = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
st_idx = state_index;
|
|
st_num = state_num;
|
|
md_c[0] = md_count[0];
|
|
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
|
|
memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
|
|
|
|
state_index += num_ceil;
|
|
if (state_index > state_num)
|
|
state_index %= state_num;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
|
|
* ours (but other threads may use them too)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
md_count[0] += 1;
|
|
|
|
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
|
|
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
|
|
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
|
|
|
|
while (num > 0) {
|
|
/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
|
|
j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
|
|
num -= j;
|
|
if (!MD_Init(m))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
|
|
if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
|
|
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
curr_pid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
|
|
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
curr_time = 0;
|
|
rand_hw_seed(m);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
|
|
if (k > 0) {
|
|
if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
|
|
/* may compete with other threads */
|
|
state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
|
|
if (st_idx >= st_num)
|
|
st_idx = 0;
|
|
if (i < j)
|
|
*(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!MD_Init(m)
|
|
|| !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))
|
|
|| !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
|
|
*/
|
|
ASYNC_block_pause();
|
|
if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) {
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
|
|
if (ok)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
else if (pseudo)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
else {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
|
|
"http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
err_mem:
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
|
{
|
|
return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
|
|
/*
|
|
* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
|
{
|
|
return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int rand_status(void)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
int do_not_lock;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
|
|
/*
|
|
* check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
|
|
* implementation calls RAND_status())
|
|
*/
|
|
if (crypto_lock_rand) {
|
|
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
|
|
do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
|
|
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
|
|
} else
|
|
do_not_lock = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!do_not_lock) {
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine
|
|
*/
|
|
ASYNC_block_pause();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
|
|
*/
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
|
|
CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
|
|
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!initialized) {
|
|
RAND_poll();
|
|
initialized = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
|
|
|
|
if (!do_not_lock) {
|
|
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
|
|
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
|
|
|
|
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
|
|
* currently supports rdrand.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
|
|
|
|
#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
|
|
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
|
|
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
|
|
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND)
|
|
|
|
# define RDRAND_CALLS 4
|
|
|
|
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
|
|
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
|
|
|
|
static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
|
|
return;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) {
|
|
size_t rnd;
|
|
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
|
|
if (rnd == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
|
|
|
|
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t rnd;
|
|
if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
|
|
return;
|
|
while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) {
|
|
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
|
|
if (rnd == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
*((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
|
|
buf += sizeof(size_t);
|
|
num -= sizeof(size_t);
|
|
}
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
|
|
if (rnd == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
while (num) {
|
|
*buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
|
|
rnd >>= 8;
|
|
buf++;
|
|
num--;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|