0c994d54af
Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally: While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal' are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only. To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this ambiguity: #include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal' #include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal' This commit moves the private crypto headers from 'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto' As a result, the include directives become unambiguous #include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal' #include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto' hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped. The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially; they are joined into a single file. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
278 lines
7.7 KiB
C
278 lines
7.7 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
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const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
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unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
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#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
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/* TLS KDF pkey context structure */
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typedef struct {
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/* Digest to use for PRF */
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const EVP_MD *md;
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/* Secret value to use for PRF */
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unsigned char *sec;
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size_t seclen;
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/* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
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unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
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size_t seedlen;
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} TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX;
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static int pkey_tls1_prf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
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if ((kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx))) == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx->data = kctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static void pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
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OPENSSL_free(kctx);
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}
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static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
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{
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TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD:
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kctx->md = p2;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET:
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if (p1 < 0)
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return 0;
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if (kctx->sec != NULL)
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OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
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kctx->seedlen = 0;
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kctx->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
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if (kctx->sec == NULL)
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return 0;
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kctx->seclen = p1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED:
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if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - kctx->seedlen))
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return 0;
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memcpy(kctx->seed + kctx->seedlen, p2, p1);
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kctx->seedlen += p1;
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return 1;
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default:
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return -2;
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}
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}
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static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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const char *type, const char *value)
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{
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if (value == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
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return 0;
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}
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if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) {
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TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
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if (md == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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kctx->md = md;
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return 1;
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}
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if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE);
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return -2;
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}
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static int pkey_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
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size_t *keylen)
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{
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TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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if (kctx->md == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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if (kctx->sec == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
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return 0;
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}
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if (kctx->seedlen == 0) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SEED);
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return 0;
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}
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return tls1_prf_alg(kctx->md, kctx->sec, kctx->seclen,
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kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen,
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key, *keylen);
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}
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const EVP_PKEY_METHOD tls1_prf_pkey_meth = {
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EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF,
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0,
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pkey_tls1_prf_init,
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0,
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pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup,
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0, 0,
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0, 0,
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0,
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0,
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0,
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0,
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0, 0,
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0, 0, 0, 0,
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0, 0,
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0, 0,
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0,
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pkey_tls1_prf_derive,
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pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl,
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pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str
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};
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static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
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const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
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unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
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{
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int chunk;
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EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL;
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unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t A1_len;
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int ret = 0;
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chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
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if (!ossl_assert(chunk > 0))
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goto err;
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ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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ctx_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
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goto err;
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
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mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
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if (mac_key == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
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goto err;
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if (seed != NULL && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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for (;;) {
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/* Reinit mac contexts */
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if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len))
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goto err;
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if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (seed && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
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goto err;
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if (olen > (size_t)chunk) {
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size_t mac_len;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &mac_len))
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goto err;
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out += mac_len;
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olen -= mac_len;
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/* calc the next A1 value */
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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} else { /* last one */
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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memcpy(out, A1, olen);
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break;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_tmp);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
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return ret;
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}
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static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
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const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
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unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
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{
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if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
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size_t i;
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unsigned char *tmp;
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if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
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seed, seed_len, out, olen))
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return 0;
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if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
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seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
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OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
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return 0;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
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out[i] ^= tmp[i];
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OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
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return 1;
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}
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if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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