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openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
Robin Seggelmann 025f7dbdd1 DTLS/SCTP Finished Auth Bug 
PR: 2808

With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key.  Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
(cherry picked from commit 9fb523adce)
(cherry picked from commit b9ef52b078)
2013-11-01 22:44:20 +00:00

1722 lines
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/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
/*
* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
return(DTLSv1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
dtls1_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_get_server_method)
int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
unsigned long alg_k;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
int listen;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
#endif
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
listen = s->d1->listen;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->d1->listen = listen;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake
* mode and prevent stream identifier other
* than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
#endif
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
* ...but not with SCTP :-)
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
#endif
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */
if (listen)
{
memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
}
/* If we're just listening, stop here */
if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
ret = 2;
s->d1->listen = 0;
/* Set expected sequence numbers
* to continue the handshake.
*/
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
goto end;
}
break;
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK:
if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK:
ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if (ret < 0) goto end;
if (ret == 0)
{
if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK)
{
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
}
s->state=s->d1->next_state;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
s->renegotiate = 2;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
}
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
|| (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
{
s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
{
s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
}
#endif
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
{
s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
}
#endif
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */
if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))
{
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
}
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
}
else {
/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
* have not asked for it :-) */
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
snprintf((char *) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
*/
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified */
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_md5,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK;
else
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (!s->hit)
{
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
}
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
#endif
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
{
s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
}
#endif
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
#if 0
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
#endif
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
/* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
/* next message is server hello */
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
s->in_handshake--;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake
* mode and prevent stream identifier other
* than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
#endif
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
/* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit
* requests for it */
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int msg_len;
unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)
{
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
*(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
msg_len = p - msg;
dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned int sl;
unsigned long l;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=s->s3->server_random;
ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
* session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
* old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
* back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
*/
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
*(p++)=sl;
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
p+=sl;
/* put the cipher */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
return -1;
i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++)=0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++)=0;
else
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
#endif
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j,num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int al,i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
CERT *cert;
BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4],kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
cert=s->cert;
buf=s->init_buf;
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
n=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
{
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if(rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
r[0]=rsa->n;
r[1]=rsa->e;
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kEDH)
{
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
DH_free(dh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
{
if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
(dh->priv_key == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
r[0]=dh->p;
r[1]=dh->g;
r[2]=dh->pub_key;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
{
const EC_GROUP *group;
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
}
if (ecdhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
if (ecdhp == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
{
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
* keys over named (not generic) curves. For
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
*/
if ((curve_id =
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
== 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key.
* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
if (encodedlen == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
* In this situation, we need four additional bytes
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
n = 4 + encodedlen;
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
*/
r[0]=NULL;
r[1]=NULL;
r[2]=NULL;
r[3]=NULL;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK)
{
/* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
n+=2+nr[i];
}
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL))
== NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
}
else
{
pkey=NULL;
kn=0;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
}
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
s2n(nr[i],p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
p+=nr[i];
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
{
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
* [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
* the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
*p = 0;
p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
p += 1;
memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
encodedlen);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
p += encodedlen;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK)
{
/* copy PSK identity hint */
s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
}
#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
/* n is the length of the params, they start at
* &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space
* at the end. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
q=md_buf;
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(u,p);
n+=u+2;
}
else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
n+=i+2;
}
else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
/* let's do ECDSA */
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
n+=i+2;
}
else
#endif
{
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
* it off */
s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned int msg_len;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
{
buf=s->init_buf;
d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
d[0]=n;
p+=n;
n++;
off=n;
p+=2;
n+=2;
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl=0;
if (sk != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]);
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
n+=2+j;
nl+=2+j;
}
else
{
d=p;
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
n+=j;
nl+=j;
}
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]);
s2n(nl,p);
d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
l2n3(n,d);
s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
* it off */
s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
/* XXX: what to do about this? */
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->init_num += 4;
#endif
/* XDTLS: set message header ? */
msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
return(-1);
}
int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long l;
X509 *x;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
{
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
if (x == NULL)
{
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
}
l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
{
unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
int len, slen;
unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
/* get session encoding length */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
* too long
*/
if (slen > 0xFF00)
return -1;
/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) +
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
return -1;
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
if (!senc)
return -1;
p = senc;
i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
* it does all the work otherwise use generated values
* from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
{
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
&hctx, 1) < 0)
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
}
else
{
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
p += 16;
/* output IV */
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
/* Encrypt session data */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
p += len;
EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
p += len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
/* Ticket length */
p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num= len;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
s->init_off=0;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
/* XDTLS: set message header ? */
msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#endif
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