26a3a48d65
like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names on some operating systems or other packages. That is reason enough to change the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_. This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
491 lines
13 KiB
C
491 lines
13 KiB
C
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#ifndef RSA_NULL
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static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
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static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
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static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
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static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
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static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
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static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
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static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
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static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
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"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
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RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
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RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
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RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
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RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
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RSA_eay_mod_exp,
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BN_mod_exp_mont,
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RSA_eay_init,
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RSA_eay_finish,
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0,
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NULL,
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};
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RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
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{
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return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
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}
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static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
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{
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BIGNUM f,ret;
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int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
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unsigned char *buf=NULL;
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BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
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BN_init(&f);
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BN_init(&ret);
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if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
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num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
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if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
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{
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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switch (padding)
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{
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
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break;
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#ifndef NO_SHA
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case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
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i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
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break;
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#endif
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case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
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i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
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break;
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
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break;
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default:
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (i <= 0) goto err;
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if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
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if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
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{
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if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
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goto err;
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}
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
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rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
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/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
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* length of the modulus */
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j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
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i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
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for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
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to[k]=0;
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r=num;
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err:
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if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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BN_clear_free(&f);
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BN_clear_free(&ret);
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if (buf != NULL)
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{
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memset(buf,0,num);
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OPENSSL_free(buf);
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}
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return(r);
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}
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static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
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{
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BIGNUM f,ret;
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int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
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unsigned char *buf=NULL;
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BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
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BN_init(&f);
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BN_init(&ret);
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if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
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num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
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if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
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{
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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switch (padding)
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{
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
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break;
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
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break;
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case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
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default:
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (i <= 0) goto err;
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if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
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if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
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RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
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if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
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if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
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((rsa->p != NULL) &&
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(rsa->q != NULL) &&
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(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
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(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
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(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
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{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
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else
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{
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
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}
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
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if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
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/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
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* length of the modulus */
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j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
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i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
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for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
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to[k]=0;
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r=num;
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err:
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if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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BN_clear_free(&ret);
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BN_clear_free(&f);
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if (buf != NULL)
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{
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memset(buf,0,num);
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OPENSSL_free(buf);
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}
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return(r);
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}
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static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
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{
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BIGNUM f,ret;
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int j,num=0,r= -1;
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unsigned char *p;
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unsigned char *buf=NULL;
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BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
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BN_init(&f);
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BN_init(&ret);
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ctx=BN_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
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num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
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if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
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{
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
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* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
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if (flen > num)
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{
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
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goto err;
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}
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/* make data into a big number */
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if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
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if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
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RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
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if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
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/* do the decrypt */
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if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
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((rsa->p != NULL) &&
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(rsa->q != NULL) &&
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(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
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(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
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(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
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{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
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else
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{
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
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goto err;
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}
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
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if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
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p=buf;
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j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
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switch (padding)
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{
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
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break;
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#ifndef NO_SHA
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case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
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break;
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#endif
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case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
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break;
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
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break;
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default:
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (r < 0)
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
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err:
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if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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BN_clear_free(&f);
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BN_clear_free(&ret);
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if (buf != NULL)
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{
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memset(buf,0,num);
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OPENSSL_free(buf);
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}
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return(r);
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}
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static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
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unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
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{
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BIGNUM f,ret;
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int i,num=0,r= -1;
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unsigned char *p;
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unsigned char *buf=NULL;
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BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
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BN_init(&f);
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BN_init(&ret);
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ctx=BN_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
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num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
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buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
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if (buf == NULL)
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{
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
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* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
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if (flen > num)
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{
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
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goto err;
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}
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if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
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/* do the decrypt */
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if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
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{
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if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
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goto err;
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}
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
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rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
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p=buf;
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i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
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switch (padding)
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{
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
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break;
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
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break;
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default:
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (r < 0)
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
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err:
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if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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BN_clear_free(&f);
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BN_clear_free(&ret);
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if (buf != NULL)
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{
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memset(buf,0,num);
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OPENSSL_free(buf);
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}
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return(r);
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}
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static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
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{
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BIGNUM r1,m1;
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int ret=0;
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BN_CTX *ctx;
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if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
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BN_init(&m1);
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BN_init(&r1);
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
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{
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if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
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{
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if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p,
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ctx))
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goto err;
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}
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if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
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{
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if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q,
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ctx))
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
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rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
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if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
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rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
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if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
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/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
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* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
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if (r0->neg)
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if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
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if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
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if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
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/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
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* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
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* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
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* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
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* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
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* they ensure p > q [steve]
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*/
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if (r0->neg)
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if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
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if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
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|
if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
err:
|
|
BN_clear_free(&m1);
|
|
BN_clear_free(&r1);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
|
|
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
|
|
if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
|
|
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
|
|
if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
|
|
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|