b8f304f70d
The previous change for Windows wasn't quite right. Corrected to use %HOME%, %USERPROFILE% and %SYSTEMPROFILE%, in that order. Also adding the default home for VMS, SYS$LOGIN: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
337 lines
9.6 KiB
C
337 lines
9.6 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "e_os.h"
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
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# include <unixio.h>
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#endif
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#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
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# include <sys/types.h>
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
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# include <sys/stat.h>
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# include <fcntl.h>
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/*
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* Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
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* and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
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* below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
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* would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
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* is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
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*/
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# if !defined(S_ISBLK)
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# if defined(_S_IFBLK)
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# define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & _S_IFBLK)
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# elif defined(S_IFBLK)
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# define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & S_IFBLK)
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# elif defined(_WIN32)
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# define S_ISBLK(m) 0 /* no concept of block devices on Windows */
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# endif
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# endif
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# if !defined(S_ISCHR)
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# if defined(_S_IFCHR)
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# define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & _S_IFCHR)
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# elif defined(S_IFCHR)
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# define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & S_IFCHR)
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# endif
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# endif
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#endif
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#ifdef _WIN32
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# define stat _stat
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# define chmod _chmod
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# define open _open
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# define fdopen _fdopen
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#endif
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#undef BUFSIZE
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#define BUFSIZE 1024
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#define RAND_DATA 1024
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
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/*
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* Misc hacks needed for specific cases.
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*
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* __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically)
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* to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what. We know that
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* stdio function return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it).
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* Additionally, we create a similar char pointer type for the sake of
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* vms_setbuf below.
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*/
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# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
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# pragma pointer_size save
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# pragma pointer_size 32
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# endif
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typedef char *char_ptr32;
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# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
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# pragma pointer_size restore
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# endif
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/*
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* On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation
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* with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here.
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* Since we know that the FILE* really is a 32-bit pointer expanded to
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* 64 bits, we also know it's safe to convert it back to a 32-bit pointer.
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* As for the buffer parameter, we only use NULL here, so that passes as
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* well...
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*/
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static void vms_setbuf(FILE *fp, char *buf)
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{
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setbuf((__FILE_ptr32)fp, (char_ptr32)buf);
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}
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/*
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* This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
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* passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89
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*/
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static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
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(__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
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# define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
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# define fopen(fname,mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS)
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# define setbuf(fp,buf) vms_setbuf((fp), (buf))
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#endif
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#define RFILE ".rnd"
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/*
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* Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
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* devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c
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*/
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int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
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{
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/*-
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* If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
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* if bytes == -1, read complete file.
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*/
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unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
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struct stat sb;
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#endif
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int i, ret = 0, n;
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FILE *in;
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if (file == NULL)
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return (0);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
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/*
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* struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be
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* initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire
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* structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from
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* applications such as Valgrind.
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*/
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memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
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if (stat(file, &sb) < 0)
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return (0);
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RAND_add(&sb, sizeof(sb), 0.0);
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#endif
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if (bytes == 0)
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return (ret);
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in = fopen(file, "rb");
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if (in == NULL)
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goto err;
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#if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
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if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
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/*
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* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of
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* bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O
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* because we will waste system entropy.
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*/
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bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */
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setbuf(in, NULL); /* don't do buffered reads */
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}
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#endif
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for (;;) {
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if (bytes > 0)
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n = (bytes < BUFSIZE) ? (int)bytes : BUFSIZE;
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else
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n = BUFSIZE;
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i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
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if (i <= 0)
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break;
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RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i);
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ret += i;
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if (bytes > 0) {
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bytes -= n;
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if (bytes <= 0)
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break;
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}
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}
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fclose(in);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
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err:
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return (ret);
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}
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int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
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{
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unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
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int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0;
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FILE *out = NULL;
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int n;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
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struct stat sb;
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i = stat(file, &sb);
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if (i != -1) {
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# if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
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if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
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/*
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* this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we
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* "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random
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* device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device
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* causes problems.
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*/
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return (1);
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}
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# endif
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}
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#endif
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#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
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{
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# ifndef O_BINARY
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# define O_BINARY 0
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# endif
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/*
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* chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
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* should be restrictive from the start
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*/
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int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
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if (fd != -1)
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out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
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/*
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* VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
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* the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
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* existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
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* as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
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* condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
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* for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
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* the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
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* conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
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* will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
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* and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
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* at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
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* remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
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* concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
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* application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
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* rand file in a concurrent use situation.
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*/
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out = fopen(file, "rb+");
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#endif
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if (out == NULL)
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out = fopen(file, "wb");
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if (out == NULL)
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goto err;
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#if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
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chmod(file, 0600);
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#endif
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n = RAND_DATA;
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for (;;) {
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i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n;
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n -= BUFSIZE;
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if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0)
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rand_err = 1;
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i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out);
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if (i <= 0) {
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ret = 0;
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break;
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}
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ret += i;
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if (n <= 0)
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break;
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}
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fclose(out);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
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err:
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return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
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}
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const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
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{
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char *s = NULL;
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#ifdef __OpenBSD__
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struct stat sb;
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#endif
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if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
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s = getenv("RANDFILE");
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if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size) {
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if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size)
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return NULL;
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} else {
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
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/*
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* We use the same env variables as GetTempFile() - but that function
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* uses TCHARs, but getenv() gives us chars so its easier to do it this
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* way
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*/
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if ((s = getenv("HOME")) == NULL
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&& (s = getenv("USERPROFILE")) == NULL) {
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s = getenv("SYSTEMROOT");
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}
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#else
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if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
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s = getenv("HOME");
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#endif
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#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
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if (s == NULL) {
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s = DEFAULT_HOME;
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}
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#endif
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if (s && *s && strlen(s) + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) {
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OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
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OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "/", size);
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#endif
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OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size);
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} else
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buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */
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}
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#ifdef __OpenBSD__
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/*
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* given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a
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* stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom
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* instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random
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* data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't
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* available.
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*/
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if (!buf[0])
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if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
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return (NULL);
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}
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if (stat(buf, &sb) == -1)
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if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
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return (NULL);
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}
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#endif
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return (buf);
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}
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