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openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
Viktor Dukhovni 43341433a8 Suppress CT callback as appropriate 
Suppress CT callbacks with aNULL or PSK ciphersuites that involve
no certificates.  Ditto when the certificate chain is validated via
DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA records.  Also skip SCT processing
when the chain is fails verification.

Move and consolidate CT callbacks from libcrypto to libssl.  We
also simplify the interface to SSL_{,CTX_}_enable_ct() which can
specify either a permissive mode that just collects information or
a strict mode that requires at least one valid SCT or else asks to
abort the connection.

Simplified SCT processing and options in s_client(1) which now has
just a simple pair of "-noct" vs. "-ct" options, the latter enables
the permissive callback so that we can complete the handshake and
report all relevant information.  When printing SCTs, print the
validation status if set and not valid.

Signed-off-by: Rob Percival <robpercival@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-04-07 14:41:34 -04:00

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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p);
/*
* Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
{
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
* -1: Error
*/
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
{
long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite or for SRP
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
| SSL_kSRP)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ske_expected;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
return 1;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
} else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
&& s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
&& s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
&& mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
* from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
* the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
* the server is resuming.
*/
s->hit = 1;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
} else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
} else {
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
if (ske_expected < 0)
return 0;
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected
|| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
&& cert_req_allowed(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
return 1;
}
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
/*
* The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
* |tlsext_status_expected| is set
*/
if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
return 1;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
if (ske_expected < 0)
return 0;
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected
|| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
return 0;
}
/*
* client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
* when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Renegotiation - fall through */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
/*
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
* we will be sent
*/
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#else
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#endif
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
}
/*
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the client to the server.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->hit) {
/*
* We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
* messages unless we need to.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* client to the server.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
s->init_num = 0;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Disable buffering for SCTP */
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
#endif
/*
* turn on buffering for the next lot of output
*/
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
s->first_packet = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
return WORK_ERROR;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
else
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
return WORK_ERROR;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
return WORK_ERROR;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_B;
break;
default:
/* No post work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
else
return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
return tls_construct_finished(s,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
/* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
* In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
* configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
*/
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the server
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
/* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
#endif
default:
break;
}
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i;
int protverr;
unsigned long l;
int al = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
if (protverr != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
goto err;
}
if ((sess == NULL) ||
!ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
/*
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
* "ticket" without a session ID.
*/
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
(sess->not_resumable)) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3->client_random;
/*
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
size_t idx;
i = 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
if (p[idx]) {
i = 0;
break;
}
}
} else
i = 1;
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i = 0;
else
i = s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++) = i;
if (i != 0) {
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
p += i;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
/*
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
* use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
s2n(i, p);
p += i;
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++) = 1;
#else
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j = 0;
else
j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
*(p++) = 1 + j;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
*(p++) = comp->id;
}
#endif
*(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
/* TLS extensions */
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((p =
ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
l = p - d;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned int cookie_len;
PACKET cookiepkt;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
PACKET session_id;
size_t session_id_len;
const unsigned char *cipherchars;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
unsigned int compression;
unsigned int sversion;
int protverr;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
if (protverr != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
goto f_err;
}
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/* Get the session-id. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
|| session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
* EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
* servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
* is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
* we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
* server wants to resume.
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
s->session->tlsext_tick) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
session_id_len) == 0) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
} else {
/*
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
* didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
/* session_id_len could be 0 */
memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
session_id_len);
}
/* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
* version.
*/
s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
* or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
*/
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
if (i < 0) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
* set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (compression != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#else
if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (compression == 0)
comp = NULL;
else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
} else {
comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
}
if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
}
#endif
/* TLS extensions */
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/*
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
&& (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
(i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
&& i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_type = i;
X509_free(s->session->peer);
X509_up_ref(x);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
int al, j;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
#endif
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
save_param_start = *pkt;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
#endif
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
PACKET psk_identity_hint;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
} else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
/* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
/*
* Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
* options
*/
if (0) {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.g =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.s =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.B =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
DH *dh;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
dh = DH_new();
if (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
DH_free(dh);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(s->s3->peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
DH_free(dh);
goto err;
}
if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|| (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
|| (dh->pub_key =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
PACKET encoded_pt;
const unsigned char *ecparams;
int curve_nid;
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
* public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
if (curve_nid == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
# endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
PACKET params;
/*
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
* equals the length of the parameters.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const unsigned char *sigalgs;
int rv;
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0) {
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
md = EVP_md5_sha1();
} else {
md = EVP_sha1();
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if (j < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check signature length
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&params),
PACKET_remaining(&params)) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
const unsigned char *data;
const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
}
if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
ssl_set_default_md(s);
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
namestart = namebytes;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
name_len)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = NULL;
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return ret;
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned int ticklen;
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
if (ticklen == 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
/*
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
* one
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
/*
* Remove the old session from the cache
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
s->session);
} else {
/* We carry on if this fails */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
}
}
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned long resplen;
unsigned int type;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
|| type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
#endif
/*
* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
* the server
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
* |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
* message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
*/
if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (ret < 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
/* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only applies to renegotiation */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
&& s->renegotiate != 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
else
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
int n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
#endif
unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
int psk_err = 1;
/*
* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
* strnlen.
*/
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
size_t identitylen;
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
size_t psklen;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
goto memerr;
}
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
identitylen = strlen(identity);
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
goto memerr;
}
s2n(identitylen, p);
memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
p += identitylen;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
if (psk_err != 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
n = 0;
} else
#endif
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
size_t enclen;
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL)
goto memerr;
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
/*
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
q = p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p += 2;
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
n = enclen;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
s2n(n, q);
n += 2;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* send off the data */
n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n, p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
n += 2;
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
ckey = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
if ((skey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Generate encoding of client key */
encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
&encodedPoint, NULL);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
ckey = NULL;
n = encoded_pt_len;
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
/* Free allocated memory */
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL)
goto memerr;
/*
* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
peer_cert = s->session->peer;
if (!peer_cert) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
if (pkey_ctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
/* Generate session key */
|| RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
/*
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
/*
* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
* * would be used
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/*
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
* data
*/
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
shared_ukm) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*
* Encapsulate it into sequence
*/
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80) {
*(p++) = 0x81;
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
n = msglen + 3;
} else {
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
n = msglen + 2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
/* send off the data */
n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
s2n(n, p);
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
n += 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
n += pskhdrlen;
#endif
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (pms != NULL) {
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
}
return 1;
memerr:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Check for SRP */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
return 0;
}
int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n = 0;
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
n = 2;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key))
|| !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
}
#endif
s2n(u, p);
n += u + 2;
/* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto err;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
* cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
* certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
* adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
return 1;
}
WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int i;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
if (i == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(-1); We then get retied later
*/
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/* Shouldn't ever get here */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int idx;
#endif
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return (1);
/* This is the passed certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
idx = s->session->peer_type;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else {
return 1;
}
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
return 1;
}
#endif
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p)
{
int i, j = 0;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
q = p;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
continue;
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
p += j;
}
/*
* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
* applicable SCSVs.
*/
if (p != q) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
}
return (p - q);
}
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