00a4c14214
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS). That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled. The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the point that we need to use it. However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented) message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get removed. Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number (starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future. However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything greater than that in the queue is just left there. So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At that point all the queues are flushed. An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion. I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be an issue. A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0 to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future. Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send that could get orphaned would typically be 15. The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of "orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k. Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be orphaned per connection. As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed. Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have to open many simultaneous connections. Issue reported by Quan Luo. CVE-2016-2179 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
526 lines
15 KiB
C
526 lines
15 KiB
C
/* ssl/d1_lib.c */
|
|
/*
|
|
* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
|
|
* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* ====================================================================
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
*
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
|
* distribution.
|
|
*
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
|
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
|
|
*
|
|
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
|
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
|
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
|
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
|
|
*
|
|
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
|
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
|
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
|
*
|
|
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
|
* acknowledgment:
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
|
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
|
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
|
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
|
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
* ====================================================================
|
|
*
|
|
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
|
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
|
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#define USE_SOCKETS
|
|
#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
|
#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
|
|
# include <sys/timeb.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
|
|
const char dtls1_version_str[] = "DTLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
|
|
int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client);
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
|
|
dtls1_enc,
|
|
tls1_mac,
|
|
tls1_setup_key_block,
|
|
tls1_generate_master_secret,
|
|
tls1_change_cipher_state,
|
|
tls1_final_finish_mac,
|
|
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
|
|
tls1_cert_verify_mac,
|
|
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
tls1_alert_code,
|
|
tls1_export_keying_material,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for
|
|
* http, the cache would over fill
|
|
*/
|
|
return (60 * 60 * 2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
DTLS1_STATE *d1;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_new(s))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if ((d1 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d1)) == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
memset(d1, 0, sizeof *d1);
|
|
|
|
/* d1->handshake_epoch=0; */
|
|
|
|
d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
|
|
d1->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
|
|
d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
|
|
d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
|
|
d1->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
|
|
|
|
if (s->server) {
|
|
d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d1->link_mtu = 0;
|
|
d1->mtu = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || !d1->processed_rcds.q
|
|
|| !d1->buffered_messages || !d1->sent_messages
|
|
|| !d1->buffered_app_data.q) {
|
|
if (d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)
|
|
pqueue_free(d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
|
|
if (d1->processed_rcds.q)
|
|
pqueue_free(d1->processed_rcds.q);
|
|
if (d1->buffered_messages)
|
|
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
|
|
if (d1->sent_messages)
|
|
pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
|
|
if (d1->buffered_app_data.q)
|
|
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_app_data.q);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(d1);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->d1 = d1;
|
|
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
pitem *item = NULL;
|
|
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
|
|
|
|
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
|
|
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
|
|
if (rdata->rbuf.buf) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
|
|
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
|
|
if (rdata->rbuf.buf) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
|
|
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
|
|
if (rdata->rbuf.buf) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
|
|
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
pitem *item = NULL;
|
|
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
|
|
|
|
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
|
|
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
|
|
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
pitem *item = NULL;
|
|
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
|
|
|
|
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
|
|
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
|
|
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl3_free(s);
|
|
|
|
dtls1_clear_queues(s);
|
|
|
|
pqueue_free(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
|
|
pqueue_free(s->d1->processed_rcds.q);
|
|
pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
|
|
pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
|
|
pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
|
|
s->d1 = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
|
|
pqueue processed_rcds;
|
|
pqueue buffered_messages;
|
|
pqueue sent_messages;
|
|
pqueue buffered_app_data;
|
|
unsigned int mtu;
|
|
unsigned int link_mtu;
|
|
|
|
if (s->d1) {
|
|
unprocessed_rcds = s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q;
|
|
processed_rcds = s->d1->processed_rcds.q;
|
|
buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
|
|
sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
|
|
buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q;
|
|
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
|
|
link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
|
|
|
|
dtls1_clear_queues(s);
|
|
|
|
memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*(s->d1)));
|
|
|
|
if (s->server) {
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
|
|
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
|
|
s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
|
|
s->d1->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
|
|
s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
|
|
s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
|
|
s->d1->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl3_clear(s);
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
|
|
s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
|
|
else
|
|
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
|
|
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
|
|
ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
|
|
break;
|
|
case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
|
|
ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
|
|
/*
|
|
* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol is the
|
|
* highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, as version
|
|
* negotiation may have changed s->method).
|
|
*/
|
|
#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
|
|
# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* Just one protocol version is supported so far; fail closed if the
|
|
* version is not as expected.
|
|
*/
|
|
return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
|
|
case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
|
|
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
|
|
return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
|
|
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
|
|
/*
|
|
* We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
|
|
* We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
|
|
*/
|
|
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
s->d1->mtu = larg;
|
|
return larg;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* As it's impossible to use stream ciphers in "datagram" mode, this
|
|
* simple filter is designed to disengage them in DTLS. Unfortunately
|
|
* there is no universal way to identify stream SSL_CIPHER, so we have
|
|
* to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one
|
|
* available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added...
|
|
*/
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
|
|
{
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
|
|
|
|
if (ciph != NULL) {
|
|
if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ciph;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
/* Disable timer for SCTP */
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
|
|
memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
|
|
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
|
|
s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set timeout to current time */
|
|
get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
|
|
|
|
/* Add duration to current time */
|
|
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
|
|
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
|
|
{
|
|
struct timeval timenow;
|
|
|
|
/* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
|
|
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get current time */
|
|
get_current_time(&timenow);
|
|
|
|
/* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
|
|
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
|
|
(s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
|
|
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
|
|
memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
|
|
return timeleft;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
|
|
memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
|
|
timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
|
|
timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
|
|
if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
|
|
timeleft->tv_sec--;
|
|
timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
|
|
* because of small devergences with socket timeouts.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
|
|
memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return timeleft;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
struct timeval timeleft;
|
|
|
|
/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
|
|
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
|
|
if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Timer expired, so return true */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
|
|
if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
|
|
s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Reset everything */
|
|
memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
|
|
memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
|
|
s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
|
|
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
|
|
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
|
|
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int mtu;
|
|
|
|
s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
|
|
|
|
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
|
|
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
|
|
&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
|
|
mtu =
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
|
|
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
|
|
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
|
|
if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dtls1_double_timeout(s);
|
|
|
|
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
|
|
if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) {
|
|
s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
|
|
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
|
|
return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
|
|
struct _timeb tb;
|
|
_ftime(&tb);
|
|
t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
|
|
t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
|
|
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
|
|
struct timeb tb;
|
|
ftime(&tb);
|
|
t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
|
|
t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
|
|
#else
|
|
gettimeofday(t, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
|
|
SSL_clear(s);
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
|
|
s->d1->listen = 1;
|
|
|
|
ret = SSL_accept(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|