d24c6a34ce
TLSv1.3 freezes the record layer version and ensures that it is always set to TLSv1.0. Some implementations check this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
1674 lines
55 KiB
C
1674 lines
55 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#define USE_SOCKETS
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#include "../ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "record_locl.h"
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#ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
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# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
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#endif
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#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
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!( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
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defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
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defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
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)
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# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
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# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
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#endif
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void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
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{
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rl->s = s;
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RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
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SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
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}
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void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
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{
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rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
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/*
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* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
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* previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
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* that right?
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*/
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rl->packet = NULL;
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rl->packet_length = 0;
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rl->wnum = 0;
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memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
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rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
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memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
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rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
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rl->wpend_tot = 0;
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rl->wpend_type = 0;
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rl->wpend_ret = 0;
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rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
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SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
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ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
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rl->numrpipes = 0;
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SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
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RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
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RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
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if (rl->d)
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DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
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}
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void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
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{
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if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
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ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
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if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
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ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
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SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
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}
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int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
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{
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return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
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}
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int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
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{
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return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
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&& SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
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}
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int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf,
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size_t len)
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{
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rl->packet_length = len;
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if (len != 0) {
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rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
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if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
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if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
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return 0;
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}
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rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
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SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
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return 1;
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}
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void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
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{
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memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
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}
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void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
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{
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memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
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}
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size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
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{
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size_t i, num = 0;
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if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
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return 0;
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for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
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if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
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!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
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return 0;
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num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
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}
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return num;
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}
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void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
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{
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ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
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}
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void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
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{
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SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
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}
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const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
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{
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switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
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case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
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return "read header";
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case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
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return "read body";
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case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
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return "read done";
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default:
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return "unknown";
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}
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}
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const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
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{
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switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
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case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
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return "RH";
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case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
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return "RB";
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case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
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return "RD";
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default:
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return "unknown";
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}
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}
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/*
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* Return values are as per SSL_read()
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*/
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int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
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size_t *readbytes)
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{
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/*
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* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
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* packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
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* s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
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* s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
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* s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
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* if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
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* clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
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*/
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size_t len, left, align = 0;
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unsigned char *pkt;
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SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
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if (n == 0)
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return 0;
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rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
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if (rb->buf == NULL)
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if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
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return -1;
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left = rb->left;
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#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
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align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
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#endif
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if (!extend) {
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/* start with empty packet ... */
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if (left == 0)
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rb->offset = align;
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else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
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/*
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* check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
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* alignment...
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*/
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pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
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if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
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&& (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
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/*
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* Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
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* is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
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* whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
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* effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
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* overrun can be triggered.
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*/
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memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
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rb->offset = align;
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}
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}
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s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
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s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
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/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
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}
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len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
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pkt = rb->buf + align;
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/*
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* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
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* pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
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*/
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if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
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memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
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s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
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rb->offset = len + align;
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}
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/*
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* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
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* operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
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* the buffer).
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*/
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
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if (left == 0 && extend)
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return 0;
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if (left > 0 && n > left)
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n = left;
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}
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/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
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if (left >= n) {
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s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
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rb->left = left - n;
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rb->offset += n;
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*readbytes = n;
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return 1;
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}
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/* else we need to read more data */
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if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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/* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
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if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
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/* ignore max parameter */
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max = n;
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else {
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if (max < n)
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max = n;
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if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
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max = rb->len - rb->offset;
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}
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while (left < n) {
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size_t bioread = 0;
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int ret;
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/*
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* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
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* need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
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* possible)
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*/
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clear_sys_error();
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if (s->rbio != NULL) {
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s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
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/* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
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ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
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if (ret >= 0)
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bioread = ret;
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} else {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
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ret = -1;
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}
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if (ret <= 0) {
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rb->left = left;
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if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
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if (len + left == 0)
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ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
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return ret;
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}
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left += bioread;
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/*
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* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
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* underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
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* byte oriented as in the TLS case.
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*/
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
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if (n > left)
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n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
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}
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}
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/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
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rb->offset += n;
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rb->left = left - n;
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s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
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s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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*readbytes = n;
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
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* not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
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*/
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int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
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size_t *written)
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{
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const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
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size_t tot;
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size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
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size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
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#endif
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SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
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int i;
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size_t tmpwrit;
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s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
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/*
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* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
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* than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
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* non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
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* this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
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* possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
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* promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
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* report the error in a way the user will notice
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*/
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if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
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return -1;
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}
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s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
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if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
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i = s->handshake_func(s);
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if (i < 0)
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return i;
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if (i == 0) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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/*
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* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
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* will happen with non blocking IO
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*/
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if (wb->left != 0) {
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i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
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&tmpwrit);
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if (i <= 0) {
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/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
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s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
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return i;
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}
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tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
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}
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
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/*
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* Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
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* better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
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* jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
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* compromise is considered worthy.
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*/
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if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
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len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
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s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
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!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
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EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
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EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
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unsigned char aad[13];
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EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
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size_t packlen;
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int packleni;
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/* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
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if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
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max_send_fragment -= 512;
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if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
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ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
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packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
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EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
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(int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
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|
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if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
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packlen *= 8;
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else
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packlen *= 4;
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if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return -1;
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}
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} else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
|
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/* free jumbo buffer */
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ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
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*written = tot;
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return 1;
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}
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n = (len - tot);
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for (;;) {
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if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
|
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/* free jumbo buffer */
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ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
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break;
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}
|
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|
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if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
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i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
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if (i <= 0) {
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s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
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return i;
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}
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}
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|
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if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
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nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
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else
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nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
|
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|
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memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
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aad[8] = type;
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aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
|
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aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
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aad[11] = 0;
|
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aad[12] = 0;
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mb_param.out = NULL;
|
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mb_param.inp = aad;
|
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mb_param.len = nw;
|
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|
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packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
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EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
|
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sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
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packlen = (size_t)packleni;
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if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
|
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/* free jumbo buffer */
|
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ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
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break;
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}
|
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|
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mb_param.out = wb->buf;
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mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
|
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mb_param.len = nw;
|
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|
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
|
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EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
|
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sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
|
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return -1;
|
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|
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s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
|
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if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
|
|
int j = 6;
|
|
while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wb->offset = 0;
|
|
wb->left = packlen;
|
|
|
|
s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
|
|
s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
|
|
s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
|
|
s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
|
|
|
|
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
|
|
/* free jumbo buffer */
|
|
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
|
|
}
|
|
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
if (tmpwrit == n) {
|
|
/* free jumbo buffer */
|
|
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
|
|
*written = tot + tmpwrit;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
n -= tmpwrit;
|
|
tot += tmpwrit;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (tot == len) { /* done? */
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
*written = tot;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = (len - tot);
|
|
|
|
split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
|
|
* 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
|
|
* processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
|
|
* explicit IVs
|
|
*/
|
|
maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
|
|
if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
|
|
* shouldn't get here
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (maxpipes == 0
|
|
|| s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
|
|
|| !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
|
|
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
|
|
|| !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
|
|
maxpipes = 1;
|
|
if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
|
|
|| split_send_fragment == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
|
|
* fragments so we shouldn't get here
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
|
|
size_t numpipes, j;
|
|
|
|
if (n == 0)
|
|
numpipes = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
|
|
if (numpipes > maxpipes)
|
|
numpipes = maxpipes;
|
|
|
|
if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have enough data to completely fill all available
|
|
* pipelines
|
|
*/
|
|
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
|
|
pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
|
|
tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
|
|
remain = n % numpipes;
|
|
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
|
|
pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
|
|
if (j < remain)
|
|
pipelens[j]++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
|
|
&tmpwrit);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
|
|
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tmpwrit == n ||
|
|
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
|
|
* in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
|
|
!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
*written = tot + tmpwrit;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n -= tmpwrit;
|
|
tot += tmpwrit;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
|
|
int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
|
|
{
|
|
WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
|
|
SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
|
|
WPACKET *thispkt;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
|
|
unsigned char *recordstart;
|
|
int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
|
|
size_t prefix_len = 0;
|
|
int eivlen = 0;
|
|
size_t align = 0;
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
|
|
size_t j;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
|
|
totlen += pipelens[j];
|
|
/*
|
|
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
|
|
* will happen with non blocking IO
|
|
*/
|
|
if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
|
|
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
sess = s->session;
|
|
|
|
if ((sess == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
|
|
clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
|
|
mac_size = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
|
|
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
|
|
if (mac_size < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
|
|
* http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
|
|
* prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
|
|
* 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
|
|
* payload)
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t tmppipelen = 0;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (prefix_len >
|
|
(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
|
|
/* insufficient space */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (create_empty_fragment) {
|
|
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
|
|
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
|
|
/*
|
|
* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
|
|
* multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
|
|
* payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
|
|
*/
|
|
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
|
|
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
wpinited = 1;
|
|
} else if (prefix_len) {
|
|
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
|
|
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
|
|
+ prefix_len, NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
wpinited = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
|
|
thispkt = &pkt[j];
|
|
|
|
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
|
|
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
|
|
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
|
|
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
wpinited++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
|
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
|
|
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
|
|
/* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
|
|
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
if (eivlen <= 1)
|
|
eivlen = 0;
|
|
} else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
|
|
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
|
|
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
} else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
|
|
eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
totlen = 0;
|
|
/* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
|
|
memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
|
|
unsigned int version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
|
|
unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
|
|
size_t maxcomplen;
|
|
unsigned int rectype;
|
|
|
|
thispkt = &pkt[j];
|
|
thiswr = &wr[j];
|
|
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
|
|
/*
|
|
* In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
|
|
* record type
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
|
|
rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
rectype = type;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
|
|
* and record version number > TLS 1.0
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
|
|
&& !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
version = TLS1_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
|
|
if (s->compress != NULL)
|
|
pipelens[j] += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
|
|
|
|
/* write the header */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
|
|
|| (eivlen > 0
|
|
&& !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
|
|
|| (maxcomplen > 0
|
|
&& !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
|
|
&compressdata))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
|
|
totlen += pipelens[j];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
|
|
* thiswr->data
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* first we compress */
|
|
if (s->compress != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
|
|
* For now, use no padding
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
|
|
* wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
|
|
* in the wb->buf
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
|
|
unsigned char *mac;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
|
|
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
|
|
* This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
|
|
* AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
|
NULL)
|
|
/*
|
|
* We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
|
|
* sub-packet
|
|
*/
|
|
|| !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
|
|
recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
|
|
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
|
|
size_t origlen;
|
|
|
|
thispkt = &pkt[j];
|
|
thiswr = &wr[j];
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
|
|
/* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
|
|
|| origlen > thiswr->length
|
|
|| (thiswr->length > origlen
|
|
&& !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
|
|
thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
|
|
unsigned char *mac;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
|
|
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback) {
|
|
recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
|
|
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
|
|
SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
|
|
* is thiswr->length long
|
|
*/
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
|
|
* debugging */
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
if (create_empty_fragment) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
|
|
* out anything here
|
|
*/
|
|
if (j > 0) {
|
|
/* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
*written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now let's set up wb */
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
|
|
prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
|
|
* retries later
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
|
|
s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
|
|
s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
|
|
s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
|
|
|
|
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
|
|
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
|
|
err:
|
|
for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
|
|
WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
|
|
*
|
|
* Return values are as per SSL_write()
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
|
|
size_t *written)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
|
|
size_t currbuf = 0;
|
|
size_t tmpwrit = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
|
|
|| ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
|
|
!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
|
|
|| (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
/* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
|
|
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
|
|
&& currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
|
|
currbuf++;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
clear_sys_error();
|
|
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
|
|
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
|
|
i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
|
|
&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
|
|
[SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
|
|
(unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
|
|
if (i >= 0)
|
|
tmpwrit = i;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
|
|
i = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
|
|
if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
|
|
continue;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
*written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else if (i <= 0) {
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
|
|
* using a datagram service
|
|
*/
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
|
|
}
|
|
return (i);
|
|
}
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
|
|
* 'type' is one of the following:
|
|
*
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
|
|
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
|
|
*
|
|
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
|
|
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
|
|
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
|
|
* messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
|
|
* argument is non NULL.
|
|
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
|
|
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
|
|
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
|
|
* Change cipher spec protocol
|
|
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
|
|
* Alert protocol
|
|
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
|
|
* Handshake protocol
|
|
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
|
|
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
|
|
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
|
|
* Application data protocol
|
|
* none of our business
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
|
|
{
|
|
int al, i, j, ret;
|
|
size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
|
|
/* Not initialized yet */
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
|
|
&& (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
|
|
&& (type !=
|
|
SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
|
|
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
|
|
unsigned char *dst = buf;
|
|
unsigned int k;
|
|
|
|
/* peek == 0 */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
|
|
*dst++ = *src++;
|
|
len--;
|
|
s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
|
|
s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
|
|
|
|
if (recvd_type != NULL)
|
|
*recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
|
|
*readbytes = n;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
|
|
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return i;
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
start:
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
|
|
* rr[i].type - is the type of record
|
|
* rr[i].data, - data
|
|
* rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
|
|
* rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
|
|
num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
/* get new records if necessary */
|
|
if (num_recs == 0) {
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
|
|
if (num_recs == 0) {
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Skip over any records we have already read */
|
|
for (curr_rec = 0;
|
|
curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
|
|
curr_rec++) ;
|
|
if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
|
|
RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
|
|
num_recs = 0;
|
|
curr_rec = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (num_recs == 0);
|
|
rr = &rr[curr_rec];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
|
|
* record that isn't an alert.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
|
|
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
|
|
s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
|
|
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
|
|
&& (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
|
|
* 'peek' mode)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
|
|
|| (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
|
|
&& type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
|
|
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
|
|
* SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
|
|
* doing a handshake for the first time
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
|
|
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
|
|
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
|
|
&& s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (recvd_type != NULL)
|
|
*recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
totalbytes = 0;
|
|
do {
|
|
if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
|
|
n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
|
|
else
|
|
n = len - totalbytes;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
|
|
buf += n;
|
|
if (peek) {
|
|
/* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
|
|
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
|
|
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
|
|
s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
|
|
|| (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
|
|
curr_rec++;
|
|
rr++;
|
|
}
|
|
totalbytes += n;
|
|
} while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
|
|
&& totalbytes < len);
|
|
if (totalbytes == 0) {
|
|
/* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
|
|
&& (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
|
|
&& SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
|
|
ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
|
|
*readbytes = totalbytes;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
|
|
* then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
|
|
* were actually expecting a CCS).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
|
|
* record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
|
|
* initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
|
|
* |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
|
|
&& (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
|
|
* we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
|
|
* (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
|
|
* other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->version = rr->rec_version;
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
|
|
* that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
|
|
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
|
|
size_t *dest_len = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
|
|
} else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
|
|
dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
|
|
n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
|
|
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
|
|
n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
|
|
|
|
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
|
|
while (n-- > 0) {
|
|
dest[(*dest_len)++] =
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
goto start; /* fragment was too small */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): Temporarily we will just ignore NewSessionTicket messages.
|
|
* Later we will want to process them.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4
|
|
&& s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
* s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
|
|
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
|
|
if ((!s->server) &&
|
|
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
|
|
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
|
|
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
|
|
s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
|
|
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
|
|
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
|
|
!s->s3->renegotiate) {
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
|
|
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return i;
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
|
|
/* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the case where we try to read application data,
|
|
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
|
|
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
|
|
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Does this ever happen? */
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
|
|
* again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
|
|
*/
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
|
|
* allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
|
|
* experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->server &&
|
|
SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
|
|
!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
|
|
(s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
|
|
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
|
|
(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
|
|
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
|
|
!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
|
|
int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
|
|
int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
|
|
|
|
s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
|
|
s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
|
|
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
|
|
s->rlayer.alert_count++;
|
|
if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
|
|
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
|
|
* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
|
|
* alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
|
|
* presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
|
|
* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
|
|
* the peer refused it where we carry on.
|
|
*/
|
|
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
|
|
else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
char tmp[16];
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
|
|
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
|
|
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
|
|
* shutdown */
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
|
|
&& !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
|
|
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
|
|
s->renegotiate = 1;
|
|
s->new_session = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
i = s->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return i;
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
|
|
/* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the case where we try to read application data, but we
|
|
* trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
|
|
* option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
|
|
* problems in the blocking world
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/*
|
|
* TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
|
|
* TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
|
|
* TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
|
|
* no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
|
|
* record types, using up resources processing them.
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
/*
|
|
* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
|
|
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
|
|
* that should not happen when type != rr->type
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
|
|
/*
|
|
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
|
|
* application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
|
|
* (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
|
|
* application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
|
|
* started), we will indulge it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* not reached */
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
++seq[i];
|
|
if (seq[i] != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
|
|
* format and false otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
|
|
{
|
|
return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
|
|
{
|
|
return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
|
|
}
|