018fcbec38
- Mostly missing fall thru comments - And uninitialized value used in sslapitest.c Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3440)
3627 lines
113 KiB
C
3627 lines
113 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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*
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license provided above.
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*
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
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* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include "../ssl_locl.h"
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#include "statem_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
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static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
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static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
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static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
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static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
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WPACKET *pkt);
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/*
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* Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
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*
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* Return values are:
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* 1: Yes
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* 0: No
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*/
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static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
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{
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/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
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if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
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&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
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|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
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return 0;
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|
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return 1;
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}
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|
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/*
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* Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
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*
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* Return values are:
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* 1: Yes
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* 0: No
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*/
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static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
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{
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long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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|
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/*
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* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
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* ciphersuite or for SRP
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*/
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if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
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| SSL_kSRP)) {
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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|
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/*
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* ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
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* handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
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* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
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* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
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*
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* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
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* (transition not allowed)
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*/
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static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
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{
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OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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|
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/*
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* Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
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* yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
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* ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
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*/
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switch (st->hand_state) {
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default:
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break;
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case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
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/*
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* This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
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* thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
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*/
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
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if (s->hit) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
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return 1;
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}
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_OK:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
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return 1;
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}
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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}
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/* No valid transition found */
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
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* handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
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* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
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* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
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*
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* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
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* (transition not allowed)
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*/
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int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
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{
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OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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int ske_expected;
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/*
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* Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
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* we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
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*/
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if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
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if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
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goto err;
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return 1;
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}
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switch (st->hand_state) {
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default:
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break;
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case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
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return 1;
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}
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
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if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
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st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
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/*
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* We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
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* data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
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* HelloRetryRequest.
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*/
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
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return 1;
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}
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
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if (s->hit) {
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if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
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return 1;
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}
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} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
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st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
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return 1;
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} else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
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&& s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
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&& s->session->ext.tick != NULL
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&& mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
/*
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* Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
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* from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
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* the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
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* the server is resuming.
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*/
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s->hit = 1;
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
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return 1;
|
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} else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
|
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& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
|
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
|
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
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return 1;
|
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}
|
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} else {
|
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ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
|
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/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
|
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if (ske_expected
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|| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
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&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
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return 1;
|
|
}
|
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} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
|
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&& cert_req_allowed(s)) {
|
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
|
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return 1;
|
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} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
|
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
|
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return 1;
|
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}
|
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}
|
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}
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break;
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|
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case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
|
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/*
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* The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
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* |ext.status_expected| is set
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*/
|
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if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
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return 1;
|
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}
|
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/* Fall through */
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|
|
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case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
|
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ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
|
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/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
|
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if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
|
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&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
|
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
|
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
|
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return 1;
|
|
}
|
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goto err;
|
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}
|
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/* Fall through */
|
|
|
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case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
|
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
|
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if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
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return 1;
|
|
}
|
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goto err;
|
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}
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
|
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
|
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return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
|
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
|
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return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
/* No valid transition found */
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
|
|
* move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
|
|
* server.
|
|
*/
|
|
static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
|
|
* TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
|
|
* ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
/* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
|
|
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
|
|
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
|
|
else
|
|
st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
|
|
: TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
|
|
if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
|
|
: TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
|
|
/* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
|
|
st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
|
|
: TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try to read from the server instead */
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
|
|
* move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
|
|
*/
|
|
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
|
|
* version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
|
|
* later
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
|
|
return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
if (!s->renegotiate) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
|
|
* received a message from the server. Better read it.
|
|
*/
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Renegotiation */
|
|
/* fall thru */
|
|
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
|
|
* actually selected a version yet.
|
|
*/
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
|
|
* we will be sent
|
|
*/
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
|
|
else
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
/*
|
|
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
|
|
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
|
|
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
|
|
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
|
|
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
|
|
} else {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
|
|
}
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
st->
|
|
hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
|
|
else
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
|
|
* convenient time.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
|
|
if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
|
|
* the client to the server.
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* No pre work to be done */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
|
|
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
|
|
* messages unless we need to.
|
|
*/
|
|
st->use_timer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
|
|
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
|
|
* attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
|
|
* on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
|
|
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
|
|
* client to the server.
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* No post work to be done */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
|
|
s->first_packet = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
|
|
&& s->max_early_data > 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
|
|
* cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
|
|
* we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
/*
|
|
* We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
|
|
* in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
|
|
*/
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
|
|
* client
|
|
*
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
* 1: Success
|
|
* 0: Error
|
|
*/
|
|
int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
|
|
confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
*confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
|
|
else
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
|
|
*confunc = NULL;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_finished;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
|
|
* reading. Excludes the message header.
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
|
|
return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
|
|
return s->max_cert_list;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
|
|
* practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
|
|
* to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
|
|
*/
|
|
return s->max_cert_list;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
|
|
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
return 3;
|
|
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
|
|
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
|
|
return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
|
|
*/
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
|
|
return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
|
|
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
|
|
return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
|
|
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
|
|
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
|
|
return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
|
|
* from the server
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
|
|
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
size_t sess_id_len;
|
|
int i, protverr;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
|
|
/* Should not happen */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
|
|
protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
|
|
if (protverr != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sess == NULL
|
|
|| !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
|
|
|| !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
|
|
|
|
p = s->s3->client_random;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
|
|
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
size_t idx;
|
|
i = 1;
|
|
for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
|
|
if (p[idx]) {
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
i = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
|
|
DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
|
|
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
|
|
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
|
|
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
|
|
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
|
|
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
|
|
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
|
|
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
|
|
* 1.0.
|
|
*
|
|
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
|
|
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
|
|
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
|
|
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
|
|
* 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
|
|
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
|
|
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
|
|
* know that is maximum server supports.
|
|
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
|
|
* containing version 1.0.
|
|
*
|
|
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
|
|
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
|
|
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
|
|
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
|
|
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
|
|
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
|
|
* the negotiated version.
|
|
*
|
|
* For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
|
|
* supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Session ID */
|
|
if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
|
|
sess_id_len = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|
|
|| (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
|
|
sess_id_len))
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ciphers supported */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
|
|
if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* COMPRESSION */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
|
|
&& s->ctx->comp_methods
|
|
&& (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
|
|
int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
|
|
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Add the NULL method */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS extensions */
|
|
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al;
|
|
size_t cookie_len;
|
|
PACKET cookiepkt;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
|
|
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
|
|
if (c == NULL) {
|
|
/* unknown cipher */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
|
|
* or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
|
|
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
|
|
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
|
|
/* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
|
|
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
|
|
* set and use it for comparison.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
|
|
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
|
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
|
|
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET session_id, extpkt;
|
|
size_t session_id_len;
|
|
const unsigned char *cipherchars;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
unsigned int compression;
|
|
unsigned int sversion;
|
|
unsigned int context;
|
|
int protverr;
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* load the server random */
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
|
|
* Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
|
|
* TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
|
|
*/
|
|
protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al);
|
|
if (protverr != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
|
|
* message must be on a record boundary.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the session-id. */
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
|
|
if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
|
|
|| session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
|
|
session_id_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
compression = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS extensions */
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
|
|
PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
|
|
} else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
|
|
: SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
|
|
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1))
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
s->hit = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
/* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
|
|
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
|
|
* secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
|
|
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
|
|
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
|
|
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
|
|
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
|
|
* EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
|
|
* ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
|
|
* first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
|
|
* message to see if the server wants to resume.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
|
|
&& s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
|
|
/*
|
|
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
|
|
* backwards compat reasons
|
|
*/
|
|
int master_key_length;
|
|
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
|
if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
|
|
&master_key_length,
|
|
NULL, &pref_cipher,
|
|
s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
|
|
&& master_key_length > 0) {
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
|
|
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
|
|
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (session_id_len != 0
|
|
&& session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
|
|
&& memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
|
|
session_id_len) == 0)
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|
|
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
|
|
/* actually a client application bug */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
|
|
* didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
|
|
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
|
|
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
|
|
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
|
|
|| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& s->session->ext.tick_identity
|
|
!= TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
|
|
/* session_id_len could be 0 */
|
|
if (session_id_len > 0)
|
|
memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
|
|
session_id_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
|
|
if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
|
|
* version.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
|
|
|
|
if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
if (compression != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
|
* using compression.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (compression == 0)
|
|
comp = NULL;
|
|
else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
|
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
|
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
|
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
|
|
labelbuffer,
|
|
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
|
|
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
|
|
* we're done with this message
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
|
|
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int sversion;
|
|
int errorcode;
|
|
const unsigned char *cipherchars;
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
|
|
int al;
|
|
PACKET extpkt;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->hello_retry_request = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
|
|
errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 0, &al);
|
|
if (errorcode != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
|
|
/* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
|
|
/* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
|
|
&extensions, &al, NULL, 1)
|
|
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
|
|
extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
|
|
extensions = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
|
|
* ClientHello will not change
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
|
|
* a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
|
|
* automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
|
|
* need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
|
|
* for HRR messages.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
|
|
s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
|
|
unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
size_t chainidx;
|
|
unsigned int context = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
|
|
|| context != 0
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certstart = certbytes;
|
|
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
|
|
if (x == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
|
|
PACKET extensions;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
|
|
&al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
|
|
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
|
|
PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
|
|
/*
|
|
* The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
|
|
* for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
|
|
* However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
|
|
* to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
|
|
* no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
|
|
* reverted because at least one application *only* set
|
|
* SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
|
|
* server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
|
|
* nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
|
|
* sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
|
|
* (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
|
|
* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
|
|
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
|
|
if (i > 1) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
|
|
* which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
|
|
*/
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
|
|
sk = NULL;
|
|
/*
|
|
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
|
|
* skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
|
|
* type.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
|
|
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
|
|
&& (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
|
|
(i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
|
|
&& i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->peer_type = i;
|
|
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
X509_up_ref(x);
|
|
s->session->peer = x;
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
|
|
sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
|
|
&s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
done:
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
PACKET psk_identity_hint;
|
|
|
|
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
|
|
* tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
|
|
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
|
|
* identity.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
|
} else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
|
|
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
|
|
if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
|
|
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
|
|
(int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|
|
|| (s->srp_ctx.g =
|
|
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
|
|
(int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
|
|
|| (s->srp_ctx.s =
|
|
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
|
|
(int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
|
|
|| (s->srp_ctx.B =
|
|
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
|
|
(int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
|
|
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DH *dh = NULL;
|
|
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int check_bits = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
dh = DH_new();
|
|
|
|
if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
|
|
p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
|
|
g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
|
|
NULL);
|
|
bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
|
|
(int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
|
|
if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* test non-zero pubkey */
|
|
if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = g = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
bnpub_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
|
|
* public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
|
|
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
BN_free(p);
|
|
BN_free(g);
|
|
BN_free(bnpub_key);
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
PACKET encoded_pt;
|
|
const unsigned char *ecparams;
|
|
int curve_nid;
|
|
unsigned int curve_flags;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
|
|
* public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
|
|
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
|
|
* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
|
|
|
|
if (curve_nid == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
|
|
if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
|
|
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
|
|
if (pctx == NULL
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
pctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
|
|
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
|
|
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
|
|
* and ECDSA.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
|
|
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
|
|
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al = -1;
|
|
long alg_k;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
|
|
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
save_param_start = *pkt;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
|
|
s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
|
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (alg_k) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) {
|
|
PACKET params;
|
|
int maxsig;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
|
|
* equals the length of the parameters.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
|
|
PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
unsigned int sigalg;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
|
|
if (rv == -1) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (rv == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
if (maxsig < 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check signature length
|
|
*/
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
|
|
/* wrong packet length */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
|
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
|
|
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
|
md_ctx = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
|
|
&& !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
|
|
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
|
|
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
|
|
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* still data left over */
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (al != -1)
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
/* Clear certificate validity flags */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
PACKET reqctx, extensions;
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
&rawexts, &al, NULL, 1)
|
|
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
|
|
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
PACKET ctypes;
|
|
|
|
/* get the certificate types */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
PACKET sigalgs;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the CA RDNs */
|
|
if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
|
|
|
|
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
done:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
unsigned int ticklen;
|
|
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
|
|
unsigned int sess_len;
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
|
|
|| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
|
|
|| (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
|
|
|| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
|
|
* ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
|
|
* be 0 here in that instance
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ticklen == 0)
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
|
|
* we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
|
|
* we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
|
|
* time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
|
|
* post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
|
|
* cache.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
|
|
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
|
|
/*
|
|
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
|
|
* one
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
|
|
*/
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = new_sess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
|
|
* but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
|
|
s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
|
|
s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
|
|
if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
|
|
s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
|
|
s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
PACKET extpkt;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
|
|
|| !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
|
|
&exts, &al, NULL, 1)
|
|
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
|
|
exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
|
|
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
|
|
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
|
|
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
|
|
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
|
|
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
|
|
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
|
|
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
|
|
* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
|
|
* but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
|
|
s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
|
|
EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
|
|
|
|
/* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(exts);
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(exts);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
|
|
* parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
|
|
* |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t resplen;
|
|
unsigned int type;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
|
|
|| type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
|
|
if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al;
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
|
|
* server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
|
|
* In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
|
|
* on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
|
|
* the server
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
|
|
* |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
|
|
* message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
|
|
&& s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
|
|
int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
|
|
SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
|
|
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
|
|
/* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
|
|
if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
|
|
/* should contain no data */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
|
|
* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
|
|
* strnlen.
|
|
*/
|
|
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
|
|
size_t identitylen = 0;
|
|
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
|
|
char *tmpidentity = NULL;
|
|
size_t psklen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
|
|
|
|
psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
|
|
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
|
|
psk, sizeof(psk));
|
|
|
|
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (psklen == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
|
|
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
identitylen = strlen(identity);
|
|
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
|
|
tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
|
|
if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
|
|
tmppsk = NULL;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
|
|
s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
|
|
tmpidentity = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
|
|
size_t enclen;
|
|
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
|
|
size_t pmslen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
|
|
if (pms == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
|
|
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
|
|
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
|
|
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
pctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
|
|
if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
|
|
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
|
|
|
|
skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
|
|
if (skey == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
|
|
if (ckey == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
|
|
|
|
if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* send off the data */
|
|
DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
|
|
if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
|
|
if (skey == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
|
|
if (ckey == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate encoding of client key */
|
|
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
|
|
|
|
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
|
|
X509 *peer_cert;
|
|
size_t msglen;
|
|
unsigned int md_len;
|
|
unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
|
|
int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
|
|
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
|
|
size_t pmslen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
|
|
dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
|
|
*/
|
|
peer_cert = s->session->peer;
|
|
if (!peer_cert) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
|
|
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
|
|
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
|
|
* certificate key for key exchange
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
|
|
pmslen = 32;
|
|
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
|
|
if (pms == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
|
|
/* Generate session key
|
|
* TODO(size_t): Convert this function
|
|
*/
|
|
|| RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
};
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
|
|
* data
|
|
*/
|
|
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
|
if (ukm_hash == NULL
|
|
|| EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
|
|
ukm_hash = NULL;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encapsulate it into sequence
|
|
*/
|
|
msglen = 255;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
|
|
|| (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
|
|
&abytes)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
|
|
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
|
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long alg_k;
|
|
int al = -1;
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
|
|
&& !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
|
if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
|
if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
|
|
if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (al != -1)
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
|
|
size_t pmslen = 0;
|
|
|
|
pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
|
|
pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
/* Check for SRP */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
/* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
|
|
pms = NULL;
|
|
pmslen = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
pms = NULL;
|
|
pmslen = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
|
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
|
|
* used.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
|
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
|
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
|
|
* cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
|
|
* certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
|
|
if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
|
|
* adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
|
|
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *x509 = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
|
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
|
|
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
|
|
i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
|
|
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We need to get a client cert */
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
* return(-1); We then get retied later
|
|
*/
|
|
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
return WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
|
|
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
} else if (i == 1) {
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_free(x509);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't ever get here */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
|
|
* later
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
|
|
|| !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
|
|
: s->cert->key,
|
|
&al)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
|
|
&& (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
int idx;
|
|
#endif
|
|
long alg_k, alg_a;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
|
|
/* we don't have a certificate */
|
|
if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
/* This is the passed certificate */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
idx = s->session->peer_type;
|
|
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
|
|
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
|
|
/* check failed */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
|
|
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
|
|
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len, padding_len;
|
|
unsigned char *padding = NULL;
|
|
|
|
len = s->ext.npn_len;
|
|
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
|
|
/* should contain no data */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
|
|
* compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
|
|
* attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
|
|
* HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
|
|
* but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
SSL_renegotiate(s);
|
|
else
|
|
SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
PACKET extensions;
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
|
|
&al, NULL, 1)
|
|
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
|
|
rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
|
|
{
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
|
|
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
|
|
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
|
|
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (i != 0)
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
|
|
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
|
|
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
|
|
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
|
|
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
|
|
|
|
if (sk == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
|
|
# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
|
|
# error Max cipher length too short
|
|
# endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
|
|
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
|
|
* use TLS v1.2
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
|
maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
|
|
maxlen = 0xfffe;
|
|
|
|
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
|
|
maxlen -= 2;
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
|
|
maxlen -= 2;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
|
|
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
|
|
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
|
|
if (!maxverok) {
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|
|
&& DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
|
|
maxverok = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
|
|
&& c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|
|
maxverok = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
totlen += len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
|
|
|
|
if (!maxverok)
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
|
|
"SSL/TLS version");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (totlen != 0) {
|
|
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
|
|
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
|
|
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
|
|
};
|
|
if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
|
|
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
|
|
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
|
|
};
|
|
if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
|
|
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
|
|
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|