608 lines
17 KiB
C
608 lines
17 KiB
C
/* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 16 /* require 128 bits = 16 bytes of randomness */
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#ifndef MD_RAND_DEBUG
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# ifndef NDEBUG
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# define NDEBUG
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# endif
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#endif
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "openssl/e_os.h"
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
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#if !defined(NO_SHA) && !defined(NO_SHA1)
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#define USE_SHA1_RAND
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#elif !defined(NO_MD5)
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#define USE_MD5_RAND
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#elif !defined(NO_MDC2) && !defined(NO_DES)
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#define USE_MDC2_RAND
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#elif !defined(NO_MD2)
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#define USE_MD2_RAND
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#else
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#error No message digest algorithm available
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#endif
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#endif
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/* Changed how the state buffer used. I now attempt to 'wrap' such
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* that I don't run over the same locations the next time go through
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* the 1023 bytes - many thanks to
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* Robert J. LeBlanc <rjl@renaissoft.com> for his comments
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*/
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#if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
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#define MD_CTX MD5_CTX
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#define MD_Init(a) MD5_Init(a)
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#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD5_Update(a,b,c)
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#define MD_Final(a,b) MD5_Final(a,b)
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#define MD(a,b,c) MD5(a,b,c)
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#elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
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#define MD_CTX SHA_CTX
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#define MD_Init(a) SHA1_Init(a)
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#define MD_Update(a,b,c) SHA1_Update(a,b,c)
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#define MD_Final(a,b) SHA1_Final(a,b)
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#define MD(a,b,c) SHA1(a,b,c)
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#elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
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#include <openssl/mdc2.h>
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#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
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#define MD_CTX MDC2_CTX
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#define MD_Init(a) MDC2_Init(a)
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#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MDC2_Update(a,b,c)
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#define MD_Final(a,b) MDC2_Final(a,b)
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#define MD(a,b,c) MDC2(a,b,c)
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#elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
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#include <openssl/md2.h>
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#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
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#define MD_CTX MD2_CTX
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#define MD_Init(a) MD2_Init(a)
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#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD2_Update(a,b,c)
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#define MD_Final(a,b) MD2_Final(a,b)
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#define MD(a,b,c) MD2(a,b,c)
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#endif
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#ifdef BN_DEBUG
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# define PREDICT
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#endif
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/* #define NORAND 1 */
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/* #define PREDICT 1 */
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#define STATE_SIZE 1023
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static int state_num=0,state_index=0;
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static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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static long md_count[2]={0,0};
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static double entropy=0;
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static int initialized=0;
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#ifdef PREDICT
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int rand_predictable=0;
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#endif
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const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
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static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
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static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
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static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
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static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
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static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
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RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
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ssleay_rand_seed,
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ssleay_rand_bytes,
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ssleay_rand_cleanup,
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ssleay_rand_add,
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ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
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};
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RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void)
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{
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return(&rand_ssleay_meth);
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}
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static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
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{
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memset(state,0,sizeof(state));
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state_num=0;
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state_index=0;
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memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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md_count[0]=0;
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md_count[1]=0;
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entropy=0;
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}
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static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
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{
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int i,j,k,st_idx;
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long md_c[2];
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unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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MD_CTX m;
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#ifdef NORAND
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return;
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#endif
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/*
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* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
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*
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* The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
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* the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
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* function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
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* is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
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* (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
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* the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
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* (which is incremented after each use).
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* The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
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* 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
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* hash function.
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*/
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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st_idx=state_index;
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/* use our own copies of the counters so that even
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* if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the
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* same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_
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* difference */
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md_c[0] = md_count[0];
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md_c[1] = md_count[1];
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memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
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/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
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state_index += num;
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if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE)
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{
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state_index%=STATE_SIZE;
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state_num=STATE_SIZE;
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}
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else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE)
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{
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if (state_index > state_num)
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state_num=state_index;
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}
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/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
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/* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE]
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* are what we will use now, but other threads may use them
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* as well */
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md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
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{
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j=(num-i);
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j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
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MD_Init(&m);
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MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
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if (k > 0)
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{
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MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
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MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
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}
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else
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MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
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MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
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MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
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MD_Final(local_md,&m);
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md_c[1]++;
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buf=(const char *)buf + j;
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for (k=0; k<j; k++)
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{
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/* Parallel threads may interfere with this,
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* but always each byte of the new state is
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* the XOR of some previous value of its
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* and local_md (itermediate values may be lost).
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* Alway using locking could hurt performance more
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* than necessary given that conflicts occur only
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* when the total seeding is longer than the random
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* state. */
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state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k];
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if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
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st_idx=0;
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}
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}
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memset((char *)&m,0,sizeof(m));
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
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* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
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* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
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* much entropy as fits into md. */
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for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
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{
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md[k] ^= local_md[k];
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}
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if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
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entropy += add;
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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#ifndef THREADS
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assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
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#endif
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}
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static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
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{
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ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, num);
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}
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static void ssleay_rand_initialize(void)
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{
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unsigned long l;
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#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
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pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
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#endif
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#ifdef DEVRANDOM
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FILE *fh;
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#endif
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#ifdef NORAND
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return;
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#endif
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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/* put in some default random data, we need more than just this */
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#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
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l=curr_pid;
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RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
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l=getuid();
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RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
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#endif
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l=time(NULL);
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RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
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#ifdef DEVRANDOM
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/* Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD
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* have this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block
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* if it runs out of random entries. */
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if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL)
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{
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unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
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int n;
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setvbuf(fh, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
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n=fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,ENTROPY_NEEDED,fh);
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fclose(fh);
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RAND_add(tmpbuf,sizeof tmpbuf,n);
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memset(tmpbuf,0,n);
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef PURIFY
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memset(state,0,STATE_SIZE);
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memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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#endif
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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initialized=1;
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}
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static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
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{
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int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
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int ok;
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long md_c[2];
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unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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MD_CTX m;
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#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
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pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
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#endif
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#ifdef PREDICT
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if (rand_predictable)
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{
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static unsigned char val=0;
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for (i=0; i<num; i++)
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buf[i]=val++;
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return(1);
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
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*
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* For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
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*
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* Input into the hash function the top 10 bytes from the
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* local 'md' (which is initialized from the global 'md'
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* before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are
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* to be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the
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* 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this digest output
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* (which is kept in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are
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* returned to the caller and the bottom (up to) 10 bytes are xored
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* into the 'state'.
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* Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
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* caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
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* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
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* global 'md'.
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*/
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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if (!initialized)
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ssleay_rand_initialize();
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ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
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if (!ok)
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{
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/* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing
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* the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new
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* state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate.
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* Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to
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* adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious
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* to provide *information-theoretic* randomness.
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*/
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entropy -= num;
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if (entropy < 0)
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entropy = 0;
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}
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st_idx=state_index;
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st_num=state_num;
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md_c[0] = md_count[0];
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md_c[1] = md_count[1];
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memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
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state_index+=num;
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if (state_index > state_num)
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state_index %= state_num;
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/* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % st_num]
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* are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
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md_count[0] += 1;
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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while (num > 0)
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{
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j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
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num-=j;
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MD_Init(&m);
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#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
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if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
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{
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MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid);
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curr_pid = 0;
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}
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#endif
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MD_Update(&m,&(local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
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MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
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#ifndef PURIFY
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MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
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#endif
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k=(st_idx+j)-st_num;
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if (k > 0)
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{
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MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
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MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
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}
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else
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MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
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MD_Final(local_md,&m);
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for (i=0; i<j; i++)
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{
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state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */
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*(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
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if (st_idx >= st_num)
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st_idx=0;
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}
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}
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MD_Init(&m);
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MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
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MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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MD_Final(md,&m);
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
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memset(&m,0,sizeof(m));
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if (ok)
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return(1);
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else
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{
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RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
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return(0);
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}
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}
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/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
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unpredictable */
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static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, err;
|
|
|
|
ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
err = ERR_peek_error();
|
|
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
|
|
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
|
|
(void)ERR_get_error();
|
|
}
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int RAND_status(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!initialized)
|
|
ssleay_rand_initialize();
|
|
return (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef WINDOWS
|
|
#include <windows.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************
|
|
* Initialisation function for the SSL random generator. Takes the contents
|
|
* of the screen as random seed.
|
|
*
|
|
* Created 960901 by Gertjan van Oosten, gertjan@West.NL, West Consulting B.V.
|
|
*
|
|
* Code adapted from
|
|
* <URL:http://www.microsoft.com/kb/developr/win_dk/q97193.htm>;
|
|
* the original copyright message is:
|
|
*
|
|
* (C) Copyright Microsoft Corp. 1993. All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* You have a royalty-free right to use, modify, reproduce and
|
|
* distribute the Sample Files (and/or any modified version) in
|
|
* any way you find useful, provided that you agree that
|
|
* Microsoft has no warranty obligations or liability for any
|
|
* Sample Application Files which are modified.
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* I have modified the loading of bytes via RAND_seed() mechanism since
|
|
* the original would have been very very CPU intensive since RAND_seed()
|
|
* does an MD5 per 16 bytes of input. The cost to digest 16 bytes is the same
|
|
* as that to digest 56 bytes. So under the old system, a screen of
|
|
* 1024*768*256 would have been CPU cost of approximately 49,000 56 byte MD5
|
|
* digests or digesting 2.7 mbytes. What I have put in place would
|
|
* be 48 16k MD5 digests, or effectively 48*16+48 MD5 bytes or 816 kbytes
|
|
* or about 3.5 times as much.
|
|
* - eric
|
|
*/
|
|
void RAND_screen(void)
|
|
{
|
|
HDC hScrDC; /* screen DC */
|
|
HDC hMemDC; /* memory DC */
|
|
HBITMAP hBitmap; /* handle for our bitmap */
|
|
HBITMAP hOldBitmap; /* handle for previous bitmap */
|
|
BITMAP bm; /* bitmap properties */
|
|
unsigned int size; /* size of bitmap */
|
|
char *bmbits; /* contents of bitmap */
|
|
int w; /* screen width */
|
|
int h; /* screen height */
|
|
int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */
|
|
int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */
|
|
|
|
/* Create a screen DC and a memory DC compatible to screen DC */
|
|
hScrDC = CreateDC("DISPLAY", NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
hMemDC = CreateCompatibleDC(hScrDC);
|
|
|
|
/* Get screen resolution */
|
|
w = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, HORZRES);
|
|
h = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, VERTRES);
|
|
|
|
/* Create a bitmap compatible with the screen DC */
|
|
hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n);
|
|
|
|
/* Select new bitmap into memory DC */
|
|
hOldBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hBitmap);
|
|
|
|
/* Get bitmap properties */
|
|
GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR)&bm);
|
|
size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes;
|
|
|
|
bmbits = Malloc(size);
|
|
if (bmbits) {
|
|
/* Now go through the whole screen, repeatedly grabbing n lines */
|
|
for (y = 0; y < h-n; y += n)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
/* Bitblt screen DC to memory DC */
|
|
BitBlt(hMemDC, 0, 0, w, n, hScrDC, 0, y, SRCCOPY);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy bitmap bits from memory DC to bmbits */
|
|
GetBitmapBits(hBitmap, size, bmbits);
|
|
|
|
/* Get the MD5 of the bitmap */
|
|
MD(bmbits,size,md);
|
|
|
|
/* Seed the random generator with the MD5 digest */
|
|
RAND_seed(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Free(bmbits);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Select old bitmap back into memory DC */
|
|
hBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hOldBitmap);
|
|
|
|
/* Clean up */
|
|
DeleteObject(hBitmap);
|
|
DeleteDC(hMemDC);
|
|
DeleteDC(hScrDC);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|