1e3f62a382
This is an inherent weakness of the padding mode. We can't make the implementation constant time (see the comments in rsa_pk1.c), so add a warning to the docs. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
95 lines
2.8 KiB
Text
95 lines
2.8 KiB
Text
=pod
|
|
|
|
=head1 NAME
|
|
|
|
RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptography
|
|
|
|
=head1 SYNOPSIS
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
|
|
|
int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
|
|
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
|
|
|
int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
|
|
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
|
|
|
=head1 DESCRIPTION
|
|
|
|
RSA_public_encrypt() encrypts the B<flen> bytes at B<from> (usually a
|
|
session key) using the public key B<rsa> and stores the ciphertext in
|
|
B<to>. B<to> must point to RSA_size(B<rsa>) bytes of memory.
|
|
|
|
B<padding> denotes one of the following modes:
|
|
|
|
=over 4
|
|
|
|
=item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
|
|
|
|
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode.
|
|
|
|
=item RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
|
|
|
|
EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty
|
|
encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
|
|
|
|
=item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
|
|
|
|
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes
|
|
that the server is SSL3 capable.
|
|
|
|
=item RSA_NO_PADDING
|
|
|
|
Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I<only> be used to implement
|
|
cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code.
|
|
Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
B<flen> must be less than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5
|
|
based padding modes, less than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 41 for
|
|
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
|
|
The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling
|
|
RSA_public_encrypt().
|
|
|
|
RSA_private_decrypt() decrypts the B<flen> bytes at B<from> using the
|
|
private key B<rsa> and stores the plaintext in B<to>. B<to> must point
|
|
to a memory section large enough to hold the decrypted data (which is
|
|
smaller than RSA_size(B<rsa>)). B<padding> is the padding mode that
|
|
was used to encrypt the data.
|
|
|
|
=head1 RETURN VALUES
|
|
|
|
RSA_public_encrypt() returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e.,
|
|
RSA_size(B<rsa>)). RSA_private_decrypt() returns the size of the
|
|
recovered plaintext.
|
|
|
|
On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be
|
|
obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
|
|
|
|
=head1 WARNING
|
|
|
|
Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information
|
|
which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
|
|
attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
|
|
design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
|
|
|
|
=head1 CONFORMING TO
|
|
|
|
SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
|
|
|
|
=head1 SEE ALSO
|
|
|
|
L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
|
|
L<RSA_size(3)>
|
|
|
|
=head1 COPYRIGHT
|
|
|
|
Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
|
|
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
|
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
|
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
|
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
|
|
|
|
=cut
|