wbrawner/openssl
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions
openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
Ben Laurie 7c770d572a Add and use a constant-time memcmp. 
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a)
2013-02-06 14:16:55 +00:00

789 lines
22 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/* ssl/s3_both.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
{
int ret;
ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
s->init_num);
if (ret < 0) return(-1);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
if (ret == s->init_num)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
return(1);
}
s->init_off+=ret;
s->init_num-=ret;
return(0);
}
int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned long l;
if (s->state == a)
{
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
p+=i;
l=i;
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for
renegotiation checks */
if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{
OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
}
else
{
OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
* I do this.
*/
l&=0xffff;
#endif
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
l2n3(l,d);
s->init_num=(int)l+4;
s->init_off=0;
s->state=b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
{
const char *sender;
int slen;
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{
sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
}
else
{
sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
}
#endif
int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
{
int al,i,ok;
long n;
unsigned char *p;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* the mac has already been generated when we received the
* change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
*/
#endif
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
a,
b,
SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (i != n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for
renegotiation checks */
if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
{
OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
}
else
{
OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
return(0);
}
/* for these 2 messages, we need to
* ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
* ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
* ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
* ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
* ssl->session->read_compression assign
* ssl->session->read_hash assign
*/
int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == a)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*p=SSL3_MT_CCS;
s->init_num=1;
s->init_off=0;
s->state=b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
}
unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long l=7;
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l))
return 0;
l-=7;
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
l2n3(l,p);
l+=3;
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
l2n3(l,p);
l+=4;
return(l);
}
/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
* maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
* The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
* the body is read in state 'stn'.
*/
long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long l;
long n;
int i,al;
if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
*ok=1;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
return s->init_num;
}
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
{
int skip_message;
do
{
while (s->init_num < 4)
{
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
&p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
s->init_num+=i;
}
skip_message = 0;
if (!s->server)
if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
* if their format is correct. Does not count for
* 'Finished' MAC. */
if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
{
s->init_num = 0;
skip_message = 1;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
}
while (skip_message);
/* s->init_num == 4 */
if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
(st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
(stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
{
/* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
* hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
* start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
* Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
* we have not completed the handshake. */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
}
s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
n2l3(p,l);
if (l > (unsigned long)max)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
s->state=stn;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
s->init_num = 0;
}
/* next state (stn) */
p = s->init_msg;
n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
while (n > 0)
{
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
s->init_num += i;
n -= i;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
* Finished verification. */
if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
ssl3_take_mac(s);
#endif
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
*ok=1;
return s->init_num;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
*ok=0;
return(-1);
}
int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_PKEY *pk;
int ret= -1,i;
if (pkey == NULL)
pk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
else
pk=pkey;
if (pk == NULL) goto err;
i=pk->type;
if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
}
else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
ret=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
}
#endif
else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc)
{
ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
}
else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc)
{
ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
}
else if (x && (i == EVP_PKEY_DH || i == EVP_PKEY_DHX))
{
/* For DH two cases: DH certificate signed with RSA and
* DH certificate signed with DSA.
*/
i = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
if (i & EVP_PKS_RSA)
ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
else if (i & EVP_PKS_DSA)
ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
}
err:
if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
return(ret);
}
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
{
int al;
switch(type)
{
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
default:
al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
return(al);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
/* On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't just
* free() and malloc() buffers all the time, so we need to use freelists from
* unused buffers. Currently, each freelist holds memory chunks of only a
* given size (list->chunklen); other sized chunks are freed and malloced.
* This doesn't help much if you're using many different SSL option settings
* with a given context. (The options affecting buffer size are
* max_send_fragment, read buffer vs write buffer,
* SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_WRITE_BUFFER, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, and
* SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.) Using a separate freelist for every
* possible size is not an option, since max_send_fragment can take on many
* different values.
*
* If you are on a platform with a slow malloc(), and you're using SSL
* connections with many different settings for these options, and you need to
* use the SSL_MOD_RELEASE_BUFFERS feature, you have a few options:
* - Link against a faster malloc implementation.
* - Use a separate SSL_CTX for each option set.
* - Improve this code.
*/
static void *
freelist_extract(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, int sz)
{
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent = NULL;
void *result = NULL;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
if (list != NULL && sz == (int)list->chunklen)
ent = list->head;
if (ent != NULL)
{
list->head = ent->next;
result = ent;
if (--list->len == 0)
list->chunklen = 0;
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (!result)
result = OPENSSL_malloc(sz);
return result;
}
static void
freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem)
{
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
if (list != NULL &&
(sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) &&
list->len < ctx->freelist_max_len &&
sz >= sizeof(*ent))
{
list->chunklen = sz;
ent = mem;
ent->next = list->head;
list->head = ent;
++list->len;
mem = NULL;
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (mem)
OPENSSL_free(mem);
}
#else
#define freelist_extract(c,fr,sz) OPENSSL_malloc(sz)
#define freelist_insert(c,fr,sz,m) OPENSSL_free(m)
#endif
int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
else
headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
#endif
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
{
len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
+ headerlen + align;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
{
s->s3->init_extra = 1;
len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
#endif
if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 1, len)) == NULL)
goto err;
s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
}
s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
return 1;
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
else
headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
#endif
if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
{
len = s->max_send_fragment
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
+ headerlen + align;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
#endif
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
len += headerlen + align
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL)
goto err;
s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
}
return 1;
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return 0;
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
{
if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
{
freelist_insert(s->ctx, 0, s->s3->wbuf.len, s->s3->wbuf.buf);
s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
{
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
{
freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf);
s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
Reference in a new issue View git blame Copy permalink