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openssl/test/handshake_helper.c
Emilia Kasper 7b7cea6d71 Fix ALPN tests when NPN is off 
OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG only disables NPN, not ALPN

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-08-08 12:19:31 +02:00

707 lines
24 KiB
C
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/*
* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include "handshake_helper.h"
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new()
{
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret;
ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
OPENSSL_assert(ret != NULL);
return ret;
}
void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result)
{
OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated);
OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated);
OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated);
OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated);
OPENSSL_free(result);
}
/*
* Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert
* from the SSL object directly, we use the info callback and stash
* the result in ex_data.
*/
typedef struct handshake_ex_data {
int alert_sent;
int alert_received;
int session_ticket_do_not_call;
ssl_servername_t servername;
} HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA;
typedef struct ctx_data {
unsigned char *npn_protocols;
size_t npn_protocols_len;
unsigned char *alpn_protocols;
size_t alpn_protocols_len;
} CTX_DATA;
/* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */
static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data)
{
OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols);
ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols);
ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL;
}
static int ex_data_idx;
static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
{
if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
(HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) {
ex_data->alert_sent = ret;
} else {
ex_data->alert_received = ret;
}
}
}
/* Select the appropriate server CTX.
* Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found.
* If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch.
* Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch.
* An empty SNI extension also returns SSL_TSLEXT_ERR_NOACK.
*/
static int select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore)
{
const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
(HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
if (servername == NULL) {
ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
}
if (strcmp(servername, "server2") == 0) {
SSL_CTX *new_ctx = (SSL_CTX*)arg;
SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx);
/*
* Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior
* allows testing of cases where the options between two
* contexts differ/conflict
*/
SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL);
SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx));
ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
} else if (strcmp(servername, "server1") == 0) {
ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
} else if (ignore) {
ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
} else {
/* Don't set an explicit alert, to test library defaults. */
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
}
/*
* (RFC 6066):
* If the server understood the ClientHello extension but
* does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two
* actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level
* unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake.
*
* This behaviour is up to the application to configure; we test both
* configurations to ensure the state machine propagates the result
* correctly.
*/
static int servername_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
{
return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1);
}
static int servername_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
{
return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0);
}
static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION);
return 0;
}
static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
return 1;
}
static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
{
return 0;
}
static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name,
unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
{
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
(HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
ex_data->session_ticket_do_not_call = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */
static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen)
{
size_t len, i, prefix;
len = strlen(protos);
/* Should never have reuse. */
OPENSSL_assert(*out == NULL);
/* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */
*out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
OPENSSL_assert(*out != NULL);
*outlen = len + 1;
/*
* foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o'
* foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r'
*/
memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len);
prefix = 0;
i = prefix + 1;
while (i <= len) {
if ((*out)[i] == ',') {
OPENSSL_assert(i - 1 - prefix > 0);
(*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix;
prefix = i;
}
i++;
}
OPENSSL_assert(len - prefix > 0);
(*out)[prefix] = len - prefix;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it
* also supports. In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's
* protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first
* protocol that it supports.
*/
static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
void *arg)
{
CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
int ret;
ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen,
ctx_data->npn_protocols,
ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
/* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */
OPENSSL_assert(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
|| ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP);
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *len, void *arg)
{
CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
*data = ctx_data->npn_protocols;
*len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
#endif
/*
* The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports
* and that is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server
* supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL
* respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
*/
static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
{
CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
int ret;
/* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */
unsigned char *tmp_out;
/*
* The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|.
* The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer,
* so we can return directly without storing a copy.
*/
ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen,
ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen);
*out = tmp_out;
/* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */
return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
}
/*
* Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly
* in the server/client CONF.
*/
static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data,
CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data,
CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data)
{
unsigned char *ticket_keys;
size_t ticket_key_len;
switch (extra->client.verify_callback) {
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL:
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb,
NULL);
break;
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL:
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb,
NULL);
break;
default:
break;
}
/* link the two contexts for SNI purposes */
switch (extra->server.servername_callback) {
case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH:
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_ignore_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
break;
case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH:
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_reject_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
break;
default:
break;
}
/*
* The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the
* session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second
* session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked
*/
if (server2_ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx,
do_not_call_session_ticket_cb);
if (extra->server.broken_session_ticket) {
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (extra->server.npn_protocols != NULL) {
parse_protos(extra->server.npn_protocols,
&server_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
&server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb,
server_ctx_data);
}
if (extra->server2.npn_protocols != NULL) {
parse_protos(extra->server2.npn_protocols,
&server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
&server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
OPENSSL_assert(server2_ctx != NULL);
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb,
server2_ctx_data);
}
if (extra->client.npn_protocols != NULL) {
parse_protos(extra->client.npn_protocols,
&client_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
&client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb,
client_ctx_data);
}
#endif
if (extra->server.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
parse_protos(extra->server.alpn_protocols,
&server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
&server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data);
}
if (extra->server2.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
OPENSSL_assert(server2_ctx != NULL);
parse_protos(extra->server2.alpn_protocols,
&server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
&server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data);
}
if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;
size_t alpn_protos_len;
parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols,
&alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len);
/* Reversed return value convention... */
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos,
alpn_protos_len) == 0);
OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos);
}
/*
* Use fixed session ticket keys so that we can decrypt a ticket created with
* one CTX in another CTX. Don't address server2 for the moment.
*/
ticket_key_len = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, NULL, 0);
ticket_keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ticket_key_len);
OPENSSL_assert(ticket_keys != NULL);
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, ticket_keys,
ticket_key_len) == 1);
OPENSSL_free(ticket_keys);
}
/* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */
static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client,
const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra)
{
if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE)
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client,
ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername));
}
typedef enum {
PEER_SUCCESS,
PEER_RETRY,
PEER_ERROR
} peer_status_t;
/*
* RFC 5246 says:
*
* Note that as of TLS 1.1,
* failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a
* session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform
* with widespread implementation practice.
*
* However,
* (a) OpenSSL requires that a connection be shutdown for all protocol versions.
* (b) We test lower versions, too.
* So we just implement shutdown. We do a full bidirectional shutdown so that we
* can compare sent and received close_notify alerts and get some test coverage
* for SSL_shutdown as a bonus.
*/
static peer_status_t do_handshake_step(SSL *ssl, int shutdown)
{
int ret;
ret = shutdown ? SSL_shutdown(ssl) : SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
if (ret == 1) {
return PEER_SUCCESS;
} else if (ret == 0) {
return shutdown ? PEER_RETRY : PEER_ERROR;
} else {
int error = SSL_get_error(ssl, ret);
/* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */
if (error == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
return PEER_RETRY;
else
return PEER_ERROR;
}
}
typedef enum {
/* Both parties succeeded. */
HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS,
/* Client errored. */
CLIENT_ERROR,
/* Server errored. */
SERVER_ERROR,
/* Peers are in inconsistent state. */
INTERNAL_ERROR,
/* One or both peers not done. */
HANDSHAKE_RETRY
} handshake_status_t;
/*
* Determine the handshake outcome.
* last_status: the status of the peer to have acted last.
* previous_status: the status of the peer that didn't act last.
* client_spoke_last: 1 if the client went last.
*/
static handshake_status_t handshake_status(peer_status_t last_status,
peer_status_t previous_status,
int client_spoke_last)
{
switch (last_status) {
case PEER_SUCCESS:
switch (previous_status) {
case PEER_SUCCESS:
/* Both succeeded. */
return HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS;
case PEER_RETRY:
/* Let the first peer finish. */
return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
case PEER_ERROR:
/*
* Second peer succeeded despite the fact that the first peer
* already errored. This shouldn't happen.
*/
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
case PEER_RETRY:
if (previous_status == PEER_RETRY) {
/* Neither peer is done. */
return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
} else {
/*
* Deadlock: second peer is waiting for more input while first
* peer thinks they're done (no more input is coming).
*/
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
case PEER_ERROR:
switch (previous_status) {
case PEER_SUCCESS:
/*
* First peer succeeded but second peer errored.
* TODO(emilia): we should be able to continue here (with some
* application data?) to ensure the first peer receives the
* alert / close_notify.
*/
return client_spoke_last ? CLIENT_ERROR : SERVER_ERROR;
case PEER_RETRY:
/* We errored; let the peer finish. */
return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
case PEER_ERROR:
/* Both peers errored. Return the one that errored first. */
return client_spoke_last ? SERVER_ERROR : CLIENT_ERROR;
}
}
/* Control should never reach here. */
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */
static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
char *ret;
if(len == 0)
return NULL;
/* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */
OPENSSL_assert(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len);
ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len);
OPENSSL_assert(ret != NULL);
return ret;
}
static HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake_internal(
SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, SSL_SESSION *session_in,
SSL_SESSION **session_out)
{
SSL *server, *client;
BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client;
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data;
CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data;
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new();
int client_turn = 1, shutdown = 0;
peer_status_t client_status = PEER_RETRY, server_status = PEER_RETRY;
handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
unsigned char* tick = NULL;
size_t tick_len = 0;
SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL;
const unsigned char *proto = NULL;
/* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */
unsigned int proto_len = 0;
memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data));
memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data));
memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data));
configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, extra,
&server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data);
server = SSL_new(server_ctx);
client = SSL_new(client_ctx);
OPENSSL_assert(server != NULL && client != NULL);
configure_handshake_ssl(server, client, extra);
if (session_in != NULL) {
/* In case we're testing resumption without tickets. */
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_add_session(server_ctx, session_in));
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_session(client, session_in));
}
memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data));
memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data));
ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
OPENSSL_assert(client_to_server != NULL && server_to_client != NULL);
/* Non-blocking bio. */
BIO_set_nbio(client_to_server, 1);
BIO_set_nbio(server_to_client, 1);
SSL_set_connect_state(client);
SSL_set_accept_state(server);
/* The bios are now owned by the SSL object. */
SSL_set_bio(client, server_to_client, client_to_server);
OPENSSL_assert(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0);
OPENSSL_assert(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0);
SSL_set_bio(server, client_to_server, server_to_client);
ex_data_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "ex data", NULL, NULL, NULL);
OPENSSL_assert(ex_data_idx >= 0);
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(server, ex_data_idx,
&server_ex_data) == 1);
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(client, ex_data_idx,
&client_ex_data) == 1);
SSL_set_info_callback(server, &info_cb);
SSL_set_info_callback(client, &info_cb);
/*
* Half-duplex handshake loop.
* Client and server speak to each other synchronously in the same process.
* We use non-blocking BIOs, so whenever one peer blocks for read, it
* returns PEER_RETRY to indicate that it's the other peer's turn to write.
* The handshake succeeds once both peers have succeeded. If one peer
* errors out, we also let the other peer retry (and presumably fail).
*/
for(;;) {
if (client_turn) {
client_status = do_handshake_step(client, shutdown);
status = handshake_status(client_status, server_status,
1 /* client went last */);
} else {
server_status = do_handshake_step(server, shutdown);
status = handshake_status(server_status, client_status,
0 /* server went last */);
}
switch (status) {
case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS:
if (shutdown) {
ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
goto err;
} else {
client_status = server_status = PEER_RETRY;
shutdown = 1;
client_turn = 1;
break;
}
case CLIENT_ERROR:
ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
goto err;
case SERVER_ERROR:
ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
goto err;
case INTERNAL_ERROR:
ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
case HANDSHAKE_RETRY:
/* Continue. */
client_turn ^= 1;
break;
}
}
err:
ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server);
ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client);
ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername;
if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client)) != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len);
if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0)
ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO;
else
ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES;
ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client, &proto, &proto_len);
ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server, &proto, &proto_len);
ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
#endif
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client, &proto, &proto_len);
ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server, &proto, &proto_len);
ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
ret->client_resumed = SSL_session_reused(client);
ret->server_resumed = SSL_session_reused(server);
if (session_out != NULL)
*session_out = SSL_get1_session(client);
ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data);
ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data);
ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data);
SSL_free(server);
SSL_free(client);
return ret;
}
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx,
SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx,
const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
{
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result;
SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
result = do_handshake_internal(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx,
&test_ctx->extra, NULL, &session);
if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_SIMPLE)
goto end;
OPENSSL_assert(test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME);
if (result->result != SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) {
result->result = SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED;
return result;
}
HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result);
/* We don't support SNI on second handshake yet, so server2_ctx is NULL. */
result = do_handshake_internal(resume_server_ctx, NULL, resume_client_ctx,
&test_ctx->resume_extra, session, NULL);
end:
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
return result;
}
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