5c39a55d04
Change all calls to getenv() inside libcrypto to use a new wrapper function that use secure_getenv() if available and an issetugid then getenv if not. CPU processor override flags are unchanged. Extra checks for OPENSSL_issetugid() have been removed in favour of the safe getenv. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7047)
246 lines
7.7 KiB
C
246 lines
7.7 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
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#include "p12_lcl.h"
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int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12)
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{
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return p12->mac ? 1 : 0;
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}
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void PKCS12_get0_mac(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pmac,
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const X509_ALGOR **pmacalg,
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **psalt,
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const ASN1_INTEGER **piter,
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const PKCS12 *p12)
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{
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if (p12->mac) {
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X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, pmacalg, pmac);
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if (psalt)
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*psalt = p12->mac->salt;
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if (piter)
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*piter = p12->mac->iter;
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} else {
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if (pmac)
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*pmac = NULL;
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if (pmacalg)
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*pmacalg = NULL;
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if (psalt)
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*psalt = NULL;
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if (piter)
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*piter = NULL;
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}
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}
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#define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32
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static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen,
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const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *key,
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const EVP_MD *digest)
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{
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unsigned char out[96];
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if (keylen != TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
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digest, sizeof(out), out)) {
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(key, out + sizeof(out) - TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN, TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
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return 1;
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}
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/* Generate a MAC */
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static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
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int (*pkcs12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int slen,
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int id, int iter, int n,
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unsigned char *out,
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const EVP_MD *md_type))
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{
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int ret = 0;
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const EVP_MD *md_type;
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HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
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unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
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int saltlen, iter;
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int md_size = 0;
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int md_type_nid;
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const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
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const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
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if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
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pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
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if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
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return 0;
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}
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salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
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saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
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if (!p12->mac->iter)
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iter = 1;
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else
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iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter);
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X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
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X509_ALGOR_get0(&macoid, NULL, NULL, macalg);
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if ((md_type = EVP_get_digestbyobj(macoid)) == NULL) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
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return 0;
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}
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md_size = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
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md_type_nid = EVP_MD_type(md_type);
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if (md_size < 0)
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return 0;
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if ((md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_94
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|| md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
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|| md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512)
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&& ossl_safe_getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12") == NULL) {
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md_size = TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN;
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if (!pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
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md_size, key, md_type)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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} else
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if (!(*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID,
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iter, md_size, key, md_type)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL
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|| !HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL)
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|| !HMAC_Update(hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
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p12->authsafes->d.data->length)
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|| !HMAC_Final(hmac, mac, maclen)) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
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HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
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return ret;
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}
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int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen)
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{
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return pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, maclen, NULL);
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}
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/* Verify the mac */
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int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
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{
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unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int maclen;
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
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if (p12->mac == NULL) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
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PKCS12_key_gen_utf8)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
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if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
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|| CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Set a mac */
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int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
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const EVP_MD *md_type)
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{
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unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int maclen;
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
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if (!md_type)
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md_type = EVP_sha1();
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if (PKCS12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, md_type) == PKCS12_ERROR) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Note that output mac is forced to UTF-8...
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*/
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if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
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PKCS12_key_gen_utf8)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
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if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* Set up a mac structure */
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int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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const EVP_MD *md_type)
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{
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X509_ALGOR *macalg;
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PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free(p12->mac);
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p12->mac = NULL;
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if ((p12->mac = PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new()) == NULL)
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return PKCS12_ERROR;
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if (iter > 1) {
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if ((p12->mac->iter = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p12->mac->iter, iter)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!saltlen)
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saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
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if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
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if (!salt) {
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if (RAND_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
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return 0;
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} else
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memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen);
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X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
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if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(macalg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md_type)),
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V_ASN1_NULL, NULL)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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