5584f65a10
The flags RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME and DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME which previously provided the ability to switch off the constant time implementation for RSA, DSA and DH have been made no-ops and deprecated. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
198 lines
5.7 KiB
C
198 lines
5.7 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which
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* are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. -
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* Geoff
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include "rsa_locl.h"
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static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
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BN_GENCB *cb);
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/*
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* NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
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* implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here
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* so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application
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* that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't
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* have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD.
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*/
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int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
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{
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if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
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return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
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return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
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}
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static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
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BN_GENCB *cb)
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{
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BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
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int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (r3 == NULL)
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goto err;
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bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
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bitsq = bits - bitsp;
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/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
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if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value);
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/* generate p and q */
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for (;;) {
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if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (BN_is_one(r1))
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break;
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
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goto err;
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for (;;) {
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/*
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* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
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* continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
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* bail if it happens 3 times.
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*/
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unsigned int degenerate = 0;
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do {
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if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
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goto err;
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} while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
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if (degenerate == 3) {
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ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (BN_is_one(r1))
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break;
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
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goto err;
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if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
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tmp = rsa->p;
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rsa->p = rsa->q;
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rsa->q = tmp;
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}
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/* calculate n */
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if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
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goto err;
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/* calculate d */
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if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
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goto err; /* p-1 */
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
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goto err; /* q-1 */
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if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
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goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
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{
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BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
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if (pr0 == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
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BN_free(pr0);
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goto err; /* d */
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}
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/* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */
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BN_free(pr0);
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}
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{
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BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
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if (d == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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if ( /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
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!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
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/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
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|| !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
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BN_free(d);
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goto err;
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}
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/* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
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BN_free(d);
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}
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{
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BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
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if (p == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
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if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
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BN_free(p);
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goto err;
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}
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/* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
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BN_free(p);
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}
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ok = 1;
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err:
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if (ok == -1) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
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ok = 0;
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}
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if (ctx != NULL)
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ok;
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}
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