755 lines
21 KiB
C
755 lines
21 KiB
C
/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
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static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
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/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
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{
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return(ssl->session);
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}
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
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/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
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{
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SSL_SESSION *sess;
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/* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
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* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
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* non-null and when we up the reference count. */
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
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sess = ssl->session;
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if(sess)
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sess->references++;
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
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return(sess);
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}
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int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
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{
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
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new_func, dup_func, free_func);
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}
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int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
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{
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return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
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}
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void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
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{
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return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
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}
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
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{
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SSL_SESSION *ss;
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ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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if (ss == NULL)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return(0);
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}
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memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
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ss->references=1;
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ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
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ss->time=time(NULL);
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ss->prev=NULL;
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ss->next=NULL;
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ss->compress_meth=0;
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
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return(ss);
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}
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/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
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* has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
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* until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
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* "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
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* and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
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* it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
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* very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
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* store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
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#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
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static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
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unsigned int *id_len)
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{
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unsigned int retry = 0;
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do
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if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
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return 0;
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while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
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(++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
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if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
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return 1;
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/* else - woops a session_id match */
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/* XXX We should also check the external cache --
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* but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
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* we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
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* with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
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* to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
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* and make a reservation for it if it does not
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* (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
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*/
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return 0;
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}
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int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
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{
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/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
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unsigned int tmp;
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SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
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GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
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if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
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/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
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if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
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ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
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else
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ss->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
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if (s->session != NULL)
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{
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SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
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s->session=NULL;
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}
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if (session)
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{
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if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
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{
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ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION;
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ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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}
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else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
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{
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ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION;
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ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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}
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else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
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{
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ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
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ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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}
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else
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return(0);
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}
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/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
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CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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if(s->generate_session_id)
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cb = s->generate_session_id;
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else if(s->ctx->generate_session_id)
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cb = s->ctx->generate_session_id;
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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/* Choose a session ID */
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tmp = ss->session_id_length;
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if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
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{
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/* The callback failed */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return(0);
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}
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/* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
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* nor set it higher than it was. */
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if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
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{
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/* The callback set an illegal length */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return(0);
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}
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/* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
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if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
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memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
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else
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ss->session_id_length = tmp;
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/* Finally, check for a conflict */
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if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
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ss->session_id_length))
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return(0);
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}
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}
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else
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{
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ss->session_id_length=0;
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}
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if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
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ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
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s->session=ss;
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ss->ssl_version=s->version;
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ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
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return(1);
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}
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int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len)
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{
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/* This is used only by servers. */
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SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data;
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int fatal = 0;
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data.ssl_version=s->version;
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data.session_id_length=len;
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if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
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goto err;
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memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
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if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
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{
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CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data);
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if (ret != NULL)
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/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
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CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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}
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if (ret == NULL)
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{
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int copy=1;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
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ret=NULL;
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if (s->ctx->get_session_cb != NULL
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&& (ret=s->ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,©))
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!= NULL)
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{
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s->ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
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/* Increment reference count now if the session callback
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* asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
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* returned by the callback are shared between threads,
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* it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
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* or things won't be thread-safe). */
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if (copy)
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CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
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/* Add the externally cached session to the internal
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* cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
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if(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
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/* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
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* things are very strange */
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SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret);
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}
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if (ret == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
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/* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
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if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
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&& (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
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|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)))
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{
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/* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
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* want to use it in this context. */
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if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
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{
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/* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context
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* -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard
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* of this session, but then applications could effectively
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* disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
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fatal = 1;
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goto err;
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}
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else
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{
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#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
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* so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
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#endif
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goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
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}
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}
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if (ret->cipher == NULL)
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{
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unsigned char buf[5],*p;
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unsigned long l;
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p=buf;
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l=ret->cipher_id;
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l2n(l,p);
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if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
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ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
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else
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ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
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if (ret->cipher == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
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#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
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/* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
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* it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could
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* be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
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* later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
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CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
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#endif
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if ((long)(ret->time+ret->timeout) < (long)time(NULL)) /* timeout */
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{
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s->ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
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/* remove it from the cache */
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SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,ret);
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goto err;
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}
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s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
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/* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */
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/* again, just leave the session
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* if it is the same session, we have just incremented and
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* then decremented the reference count :-) */
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if (s->session != NULL)
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SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
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s->session=ret;
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s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
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return(1);
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err:
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if (ret != NULL)
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SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
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if (fatal)
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return -1;
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else
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return 0;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
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{
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int ret=0;
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SSL_SESSION *s;
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/* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
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* even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
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* doubly linked list and an lhash */
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CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
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/* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
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/* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
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* In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
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* ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
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if (s != NULL && s != c)
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{
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/* We *are* in trouble ... */
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SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
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SSL_SESSION_free(s);
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/* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
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* (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
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* session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
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* two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
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* cache) */
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s = NULL;
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}
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/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
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if (s == NULL)
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SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
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if (s != NULL)
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{
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/* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
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* count because it already takes into account the cache */
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SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
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ret=0;
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}
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else
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{
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/* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
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ret=1;
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if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
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{
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while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
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SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
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{
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if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
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ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
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break;
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else
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ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
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}
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}
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}
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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return(ret);
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}
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int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
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{
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return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
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}
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static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
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{
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SSL_SESSION *r;
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int ret=0;
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if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
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{
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if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
|
|
{
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
r->not_resumable=1;
|
|
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(r);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret=0;
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if(ss == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
#ifdef REF_PRINT
|
|
REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (i > 0) return;
|
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
|
|
abort(); /* ok */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id);
|
|
if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
|
|
if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
|
|
if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss));
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret=0;
|
|
SSL_METHOD *meth;
|
|
|
|
if (session != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
|
|
if (meth == NULL)
|
|
meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
|
|
if (meth == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (meth != s->method)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
|
|
return(0);
|
|
if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
|
|
session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
|
|
else
|
|
session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
|
|
session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
|
|
memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
|
|
session->krb5_client_princ_len);
|
|
s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
if (s->session != NULL)
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session=session;
|
|
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
|
|
/* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->session != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
meth=s->ctx->method;
|
|
if (meth != s->method)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
}
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
s->timeout=t;
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
return(s->timeout);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
return(s->time);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
s->time=t;
|
|
return(t);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
|
|
{
|
|
long l;
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
l=s->session_timeout;
|
|
s->session_timeout=t;
|
|
return(l);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
return(s->session_timeout);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
typedef struct timeout_param_st
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
long time;
|
|
LHASH *cache;
|
|
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
|
|
|
|
static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */
|
|
{
|
|
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
|
|
* save on locking overhead */
|
|
lh_delete(p->cache,s);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
|
|
s->not_resumable=1;
|
|
if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
|
|
p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *)
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long i;
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
|
|
|
|
tp.ctx=s;
|
|
tp.cache=s->sessions;
|
|
if (tp.cache == NULL) return;
|
|
tp.time=t;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
i=tp.cache->down_load;
|
|
tp.cache->down_load=0;
|
|
lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp);
|
|
tp.cache->down_load=i;
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if ( (s->session != NULL) &&
|
|
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
|
|
!(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)))
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
|
|
|
|
if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
|
|
{ /* last element in list */
|
|
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
|
|
{ /* only one element in list */
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head=NULL;
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev;
|
|
s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
|
|
{ /* first element in list */
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head=s->next;
|
|
s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{ /* middle of list */
|
|
s->next->prev=s->prev;
|
|
s->prev->next=s->next;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s->prev=s->next=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head=s;
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail=s;
|
|
s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
s->next=ctx->session_cache_head;
|
|
s->next->prev=s;
|
|
s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head=s;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|