c7504aeb64
This allows operation inside a chroot environment without having the random device present. A new call, RAND_keep_random_devices_open(), has been introduced that can be used to control file descriptor use by the random seed sources. Some seed sources maintain open file descriptors by default, which allows such sources to operate in a chroot(2) jail without the associated device nodes being available. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6432)
185 lines
5.1 KiB
C
185 lines
5.1 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "rand_lcl.h"
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#include "internal/rand_int.h"
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#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
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# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
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# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
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# endif
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# include <windows.h>
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/* On Windows 7 or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */
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# if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0601
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# define USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
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# endif
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# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
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# include <bcrypt.h>
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# pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib")
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# ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS
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# define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
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# endif
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# else
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# include <wincrypt.h>
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/*
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* Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from
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* http://developer.intel.com/design/security/rng/redist_license.htm
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*/
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# define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22
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# define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
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# endif
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size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
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{
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# ifndef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
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HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
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# endif
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unsigned char *buffer;
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size_t bytes_needed;
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size_t entropy_available = 0;
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# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
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entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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# endif
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# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
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entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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# endif
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# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
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bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
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buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
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if (buffer != NULL) {
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size_t bytes = 0;
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if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buffer, bytes_needed,
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BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS)
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bytes = bytes_needed;
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rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
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entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
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}
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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# else
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bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
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buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
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if (buffer != NULL) {
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size_t bytes = 0;
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/* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
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if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
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CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
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if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0)
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bytes = bytes_needed;
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CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
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}
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rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
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entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
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}
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
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buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
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if (buffer != NULL) {
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size_t bytes = 0;
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/* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */
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if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL,
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INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC,
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CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
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if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0)
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bytes = bytes_needed;
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CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
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}
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rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
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entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
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}
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if (entropy_available > 0)
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return entropy_available;
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# endif
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return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
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}
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int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
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{
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struct {
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DWORD pid;
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DWORD tid;
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FILETIME time;
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} data = { 0 };
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/*
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* Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
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* ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for
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* different process instances.
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*/
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data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
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data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
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GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&data.time);
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return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
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}
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int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
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{
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struct {
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DWORD tid;
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LARGE_INTEGER time;
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} data = { 0 };
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/*
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* Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
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* The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
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* concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
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*/
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data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
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QueryPerformanceCounter(&data.time);
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return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
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}
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# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
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int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
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{
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RAND_poll();
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return RAND_status();
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}
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void RAND_screen(void)
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{
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RAND_poll();
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}
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# endif
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int rand_pool_init(void)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
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{
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}
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void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
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{
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}
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#endif
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